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Preface
At the beginning of the third millennium the world is undergoing
major social, economic and technological changes, a third Industrial
Revolution. This revolution is linked to the new information-process-
ing technology of communications and computers. At least two ear-
lier industrial revolutions have already occurred: the first, in the last
third of the eighteenth century, involved new technologies such as the
steam engine and all the machinery powered by it; the second one,
came a hundred years later, and featured the development of electric-
ity, the combustion engine and automobile industry, science-based
chemicals and the beginning of new communication technologies
such as the telegraph and the telephone.
These “revolutions” did not create total breaks in history; thus,
the continuities in society could be as significant as the novelties.
Neither were these revolutions merely technological by nature: they
also created organisational, occupational, economic, and cultural
changes. It should not be claimed that technological innovation
“caused” these societal changes. (This claim would express doubtful
technological determinism.) Instead, it can be stated that there is a
constant interplay between technical innovations and their social
adoption and use.
These historical periods were seen differently by Alvin Toffler,
who spoke about the three waves of human civilisation. The first wave
was linked with the so-called agricultural revolution in the neolithic
For the times they are a-changing…
                                     Bob Dylan
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age about 8000 B.C.; this “quantum leap” led to the dramatic increase
in human population, the formation of cities and states, hierarchical
organisation, and class structure – and last but not least:  the inven-
tion of the new communication and storage technology called writ-
ing. The second wave was the industrial revolution of conventional his-
tory, e.g. the development started by the invention of the steam engine
and the use of fossil fuel. This new tide meant the replacement of
animal and man power by fossil energy – and the replacement of feu-
dal aristocracy who controlled this resource by a new bourgeois class
who controlled new means of production. Industrialisation was a
rich, many-sided social process that touched every aspect of human
life: it reshaped cities and organisations and created new kinds of la-
bour, transportation and communication. One can add that before the
industrial revolution there was a remarkable communication revolu-
tion – the invention of printing in the 15th century. The third wave now
relates to the information technology innovations after World War II.
Toffler announced that this third wave would cause as vast planetary
changes as did the earlier agricultural and industrial revolutions.
While Toffler’s three waves are large scale phenomena, there
could also be minor waves. Nikolai Kondtratiev and Joseph Schum-
peter were talking about the “long waves” of economic development
that results from the endogeneous logic of modern capitalism. Each
technological innovation could give an impetus to a business cycle or
a techno-economic paradigm that lasts 48–60 years. The first phase of
the cycle would be a boom that lasts until the peak is reached; then
comes a recession, which turns to a depression. The depression, an
economic crisis that forces entrepreneurs to seek new means for
profit-making, would encourage people to make innovations that
would bring forth a new business cycle. It is to be noted that originally
the word “revolution” was understood as a cyclical term, since the
word comes from Latin “revolvere” (a circular motion, rotation, as in
the expression “revolving door”).
The first technological paradigm or business cycle was started by
the steam engine in the 1780s; railroadisation brought about the sec-
ond cycle in the 1840s, electricity and the internal combustion engine
was linked with the third cycle started in the 1890s. The fourth boom
started in the 1950s by the invention and application of transistor
technology. The boom we are now experiencing began in the 1990s
with silicon chips and microcomputers. According to this periodicity,
the information age is indeed the fifth industrial boom, which will con-
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tinue to prosper for the next ten to fifteen years. This contemporary
wave could be bigger than the others, just as some waves in the sea
can rise as roaring breakers when coinciding with other waves. Now
two coinciding waves, namely a “normal” technological revolution
and a communication revolution, join their forces and cause an extra-
ordinary powerful surge.
Regardless of how many waves or revolutions we see in history,
the newest tide is worth studying. This book gives different perspec-
tives on the phenomenon often called “information society” though
we prefer in the title of this book the term “informational society” be-
cause it is not yet so overworked and overused as the previous one.
“The information society” is a phrase that is used in thousands of ad-
ministrative or political strategy papers, in loose prophesies, in
countless popular articles etc. The term “informational society” or the
same in a more extended form “the informational mode of capital-
ism” is used by Manuel Castells in his seminal trilogy The Information
Age (1996–1998). A plural form “informational societies” indicates
that there could be different ways to organise societies of that kind.
This book is divided into four parts. The first part (Chapters 1–3)
consists of introductory texts and analyses of the central concepts
and information society discourses. The second part (Chapters 4–6) is
devoted to structural changes in economy, work and organisational
life. The third part (Chapters 7–9) is about the changing nature of the
public sphere and learning environments. The fourth part (Chapters
10 and 11) focuses on the global challenges for nation-states and on
the research traditions in the field.
Chapter 1. “The Emergence of ‘Information Society’ as a Major Social
Scientific Research Programme” by Antti Kasvio is an introductory
text. It presents an historical overview of information society related
debates, the first and second rounds of theorising the impact of new
information and communication technologies. How the “informa-
tion society” became one of the most popular issues in the Western
societies?  How are the theories of post-industrial society  related with
the debates on information society? Kasvio brings out the main fea-
tures of Manuel Castells’ analysis of informational mode of capita-
lism.
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Chapter 2. “Are We Living in the Information Society or in the Know-
ledge Society? A Deeper Look at the Concepts of Information and
Knowledge” by Erkki Karvonen concentrates on the first part of the
expression “information society”, asking the following questions:
What is the difference between information and knowledge? Why is
knowledge the most valuable resource in economy today? The slogan
“knowledge is power!” is often heard, but we are rarely informed of
those special features that make knowledge so potent. The text also
asks if our society is really a knowledge society or is it rather a society
of advanced signal transmission.
Chapter 3. “Narratives and Rhetoric of the Information Society in Ad-
ministrative Programs and in Popular Discourse” by Jari Aro analy-
ses the popular and official rhetoric concerning information society.
Two Finnish and one European Commission strategy papers are un-
der consideration here. Aro applies the Proppian and Greimasian
myth analysis to probe the deep mythical level of these texts and asks:
What are the qualifying, decisive and glorifying tests in texts of this
kind? Is the official rhetoric a tale of the quest for some magical de-
vice? What is that hidden device?
Chapter 4. “From Technological Control of Production Towards a
Meaning-Based Co-ordination of Action: New ICT Applications and
an Alternative Organisation Logic” by Gerd Schienstock is about trans-
formation processes in organisations. How does the existing socio-
economic structure change by the processes of informatisation? How
does globalisation affect the development of a new organisation
logic? What is the alternative for the traditional Taylorist/Fordist or-
ganisation model?
Chapter 5. “Information Occupations, Informational Work and Social
Divisions: The Landscape in Finland and Hungary” by Raimo Blom,
Harri Melin and Peter Robert draws on the statistical data of informa-
tional occupations. Instead of sketching great visions of a brave new
world, the authors turn to empirical data gathered from several coun-
tries and, without any illusions, proclaim what seem to be the trends
in working life. They ask what kind of structural changes have taken
place in the work organisation due to computers and the use of new
technology in general? Are there any new social divisions? Is the in-
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formational work as wonderful as it is often advertised? Are the
changes so dramatic as many theorists have predicted?
Chapter 6. “Latecomer Strategies and Information Society Visions of
Post-socialism: ICT Policies in Eastern and Central Europe of the
1990s” by Pál Tamás is concerned with the globalisation effects in
post-socialist countries. The author criticises neoliberal “laissez-
faire” policy, and too narrow economic reasoning, which ignores the
socio-political effects of globalisation. For instance, the first wave of
globalisation before 1914 led to the marked growth of inequalities
within nations and between countries. Is this happening again, or are
we entering a new phase in a cycle of regulation and re-regulation?
Moreover, if the socially destructive effects of markets are recognised,
is it possible to put the genie back in the bottle? The problem lies in the
fact that policy issues are globalised, but our ability to deal with them
is not. The author characterises the post colonial information socie-
ties in Eastern Europe. He applies the frontier metaphor: the idea or
“cyberfrontier” is related to the frontier of North American “Wild
West” in the 19th century.
Chapter 7. “The Blurring Dividing Line Between Public and Private,
and the Redefinition of the Public Sphere” by Mária Heller examines
how the new information and communication technology will
change the nature of the public sphere. Former rigid boundaries bet-
ween private and public will break down and lead to the appearance
of several overlapping public spheres (micro, mezzo, macro). The old
mass media are largely one-way communication from transmitter to
receiver; the new media encourage people to take part in public dis-
cussion on all levels. In the era of the cyber-media many analysts see
hopes for a fundamental change in the act of communication, a turn
in the erosion of the public sphere, a reappearance  and re-institutio-
nalisation on a higher level of a democratic society that actively in-
volves large audiences, although more negative aspects of the
changes are also foreseen.
Chapter 8. “New Communication Technologies, and the Public
Sphere” by Robert Angelusz asks if the era of mass communication has
come to an end. Is there only narrowcasting in the future, and no more
broadcasting? To what extent will computer-mediated communica-
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tion become the domain of entertainment? Does the new technology
help to maintain democracy, public sphere and public, deliberative
discussion on common issues?
Chapter 9. “European Perspectives on Lifelong Learning Environ-
ments in the Information Society” by Eero Pantzar deals with the sub-
ject that has been the most significant theme in European discussions
on education. When societies, work and institutions are in constant
change, then one’s knowledge goes out of date in a short period of
time. That is why there is also a constant need to update the knowl-
edge or need for the lifelong learning. Are the informal learning envi-
ronments better than institutional education in the schools? Are the
schools to be replaced by learning centres with modern communica-
tion technology?
Chapter 10. “Global Challenges and National Answers” by Frank
Webster is an overview of the challenges of globalisation for the na-
tion-states. Many questions treated elsewhere in the book are summa-
rised here. Globalisation means “a triumph of business civilisation”:
more traditional forms of life like peasantry are destroyed and re-
placed by money-based economy, markets, commodification of activi-
ties and competition. The economic sovereignty of nations is rela-
tively limited. But if the economy cannot be touched by government,
then just what are the politicians to do? One key policy has led to a
prioritisation of education. Prime Minister Tony Blair used to say that
there are three important things, namely “education, education, edu-
cation”…
Chapter 11. “So What? Reflections on the Study of Information So-
ciety” by Kaarle Nordenstreng turns our attention from the issues of in-
formation society to the study of this topic in contemporary universi-
ties. He asks both why information society is worth studying, and
how such studies  should be organised, particularly regarding those
who specialise in journalism and mass media. His thesis is that infor-
mation society serves as a useful vehicle to ensure that society is not
seduced by fashionable attention to culture and technology. He advo-
cates priority in studies on information society to sociology and po-
litical economy, and he calls for a truly interdisciplinary platform for
studies, but without sacrificing depth for breadth.
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The texts here were written in the context of the European Union’s
Tempus project (SJEP 11334; 1996–1999). The objective was to de-
velop information society related courses and teaching materials to
be used in higher education in Hungary, beginning with the partners
of this Tempus project: The Eötvös Loránd (ELTE) University, and the
Economic University of Budapest. The Tempus project was initiated
at the University of Tampere by professor Kaarle Nordenstreng with
the late Professor Veronica Stolte Heiskanen  (a  scholar of Hungarian
origin). The first Hungarian counterparts included the late Professor
Rudolf Andorka, who at the time was Rector of the Economic Univer-
sity of Budapest. The Tempus project was targeted at advanced un-
dergraduate students in social sciences, particularly communication.
This English version of the textbook is published in tandem with the
Hungarian version of the book.
The writers, mostly Finnish and Hungarian scholars, include ex-
perts in questions of technology and informational society. One of the
leading scholars of information society research, Professor Frank
Webster (University of Birmingham, UK) joined the project as an ad-
junct professor at the University of Tampere and his contribution is
also included.  The Information Research Programme of The Academy of
Finland has financially supported this publication. The Institute of So-
ciology of  ELTE University of Budapest also participated in the finan-
cing. Various bodies at the University of Tampere have born part of
the expenses; these include:  The Information Society Research Centre,
The Work Research Centre, The Department of Sociology and Social Psy-
chology, and The Department of Journalism and Mass Communication.
The authors and the editor would like to thank Margot Morgan,
Marianne Wargelin and Virginia Mattila for their help in polishing
our English.
Erkki Karvonen
May 2001
Tampere, Finland

part one
theoretical perspectives

The Emergence of ‘Information Society’
as a Major Social Scientific
Research Programme
ANTTI KASVIO
We are at present undergoing a fundamental transformation:
from an industrial society to the information society. Information
society technologies increasingly pervade all industrial and societal
activities and are accelerating the globalisation of economies, in
particular by providing SMEs with new ways to access to the glo-
bal marketplace, and societies. (European Council 1998)
The above citation from a recent EU science policy document is just
one example of the numerous contemporary statements in which it is
taken for granted that nowadays we are living in the midst of a large-
scale societal change, and that this process – triggered by the digital
revolution – is leading us towards an information society that differs
in essential ways from the preceding industrial stage of societal de-
velopment. But what do we actually mean with the “information soci-
ety”? Is it just a society with lots of computers and millions of people
using the internet? Or do we have a more coherent theoretical analy-
sis about the transformation process or about the new stage of societal
development towards which we are heading?
One of today’s big paradoxes is that despite a very widespread
use of the term “information society” we do not actually have an es-
tablished social scientific research tradition that would have taken
this societal form as its specific object of study. For instance one of the
last years’ most authoritative sociological textbooks, Anthony
Giddens’ Sociology, did not even mention the term information society
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in the index of its first editions (see Giddens 1990). This probably
wasn’t just an accidental lapse. Rather it reflects the fact that only a
few texts were – or still are – produced by the leading social scientific
publishers or journals on information society. If social scientists have
analysed the ongoing epochal changes, they have been much more
interested about distinctions between e.g. “modern” and “post-
modern”, “fordism” and “postfordism”, “organised” and “disor-
ganised capitalism”, “early” and “reflexive” modernity, “welfare”
and “risk” society etc. than about those that might possibly be emerg-
ing between the “industrial” and “information” societies. The very
term “information society” has been rather unpopular among aca-
demic social scientists because of the loose manner in which the con-
cept was used by many technology journalists, management writers
and futurologists during the 1980s.
Thus the first really serious efforts to produce an adequate theo-
retical understanding about the character of the information society
as a qualitatively new stage of societal development are, as a matter of
fact, of rather recent origin. It is now possible to say that a crucial step
was taken by Manuel Castells though the publication of his Informa-
tion Age trilogy (Castells 1996–67). Since then – and after the enthusi-
astic comments presented by Anthony Giddens in his review of the
trilogy’s first volume1  – we can say that the analysis of the social con-
sequences of the ongoing digital revolution has gained a legitimate
position also within the academic social science.
In this article my intention is to present a brief description of the
way in which analysis of the information society has developed into
an important area of social scientific research. At the end of my pres-
entation I will also present the main outlines of Manuel Castells’
theoretical programme and discuss its significance for future re-
search work.
1. Giddens wrote in The Times Higher Education Supplement e.g. as follows: ”This should be
a time of renewal for the social sciences. Modern social science arose from the extraordi-
nary changes that created an industrial order out of the ruins of feudal society. Arguably
we live today in a period of equally intense and puzzling transformation, perhaps signalling
a move beyond the industrial era altogether. Yet where are the great sociological works
that chart this transition? Intellectually feeble accounts of the information society and
vacuous accounts of postmodernism fill the space which should be occupied by more
compelling and substantive social interpretations. Hence the importance of Manuel
Castell’s multivolume work, in which he seeks to chart the social and economic dynamics
of the information age. It would not be fanciful to compare the work to Max Weber’s
Economy and Society, written almost a century earlier” (Giddens 1996, 18).
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PRECEDENTS OF THE DISCOURSE
Conceptions of future among some of the classics of modern
social thought
The classical tradition of social scientific research that emerged dur-
ing the 19th and early 20th centuries was mainly interested in analys-
ing the emergence and specific developmental dynamics of modern
industrial societies. The utmost stage of societal development seemed
to be a highly industrialised urban society in which the economy was
dominated by large and bureaucratically controlled enterprise or-
ganisations, the traditional relations of social subordination were re-
placed by market and voluntary contract relations and in which the
traditional belief systems were replaced by much more secular and
rationalistic ways of thinking. The key problem for social scientists
was to find a way in which such societies could be held together as
the traditional ways of maintaining social solidarity did not function
any longer. Also socialist utopias produced by the revolutionary
working class movement remained within the confines of industrial
society. Thus it might seem that in searching the historical roots of
modern information society theories we can leave the entire classical
tradition aside and move directly to later developments without risk-
ing any big omissions.
It is, however, worthwhile to look more closely at the work of some
leading theoreticians of the classical tradition. For instance Max We-
ber analysed in his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft the development of mod-
ern capitalism in terms of an increasing dominance of the principles
of “formal rationality”. We can speak for instance about the emer-
gence of rational, scientific methods of production, the spread of ra-
tional managerial principles in capitalist enterprises and the
strengthening elements of rationality in different cultural expres-
sions of modern societies. One very important instance of the overall
tendency towards rationality was according to Weber the generalisa-
tion of “Fachmenschentum”, embodied by professional specialists
who base their practice on systematic theoretical knowledge acquired
through formal education (see e.g. Weber 1976, 576–577). Thus the in-
creasing significance of knowledge in the activities of modern socie-
ties, which is nowadays stressed in all information society discus-
sions, wasn’t by any means an unknown phenomenon to Weber. In
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his political theory Weber also recognised the risks that were con-
nected to the spiritual emptiness of purely formal, instrumental ra-
tionality. In modern “plebiscitarian” democracies this might, accord-
ing to Weber, easily lead the citizens to support charismatic leader-
ship in their search for more substantive forms of rationality (see We-
ber 1976, 157–158).
Karl Marx on his part analysed in Das Kapital the development
dynamics and basic contradictions of modern capitalism. According
to standard interpretations Marx was primarily a theorist of indus-
trial capitalism who thought that the ruthlessly advancing capital
accumulation process would gradually drive the industrial prole-
tariat into a revolutionary force that would in the end transcend the
entire capitalist system. The socialist mode of production would be
based on a common ownership of the most crucial means of produc-
tion – i.e. factories, machinery etc. Within this framework it might
therefore seem futile to search for hints towards any kind of informa-
tion society theorising. One should, however, take into account the
fact that in analysing the development of forces of production Marx
stressed that the productive apparatuses would in future be increas-
ingly guided by systematic scientific knowledge. The actual subjects
of the production processes would, according to Marx, be the so-
called polytechnical workers, i.e. workers who would be able to uti-
lise modern scientific and technical knowledge in their productive
activities (see Marx 1968, 519–513). Thus a century ago Marx was
clearly conscious of the future role of knowledge as a crucially impor-
tant productive force. Also he took it rather much for granted that, as
the productive forces developed further, a declining share of the soci-
ety’s total work input would be used in direct production activities.
There is also a third important strand in early socio-economic
theorising which is of great relevance for later discussions about the
information society. In his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
Karl Schumpeter presented a thesis defining entrepreneurship as a
central moving force of economic and social development in modern
societies. According to Schumpeter the continuous and often very
tough competition between individual capitalists has at times led to
the destruction of large amounts of productive resources, especially
during economic recessions. But on the other hand these same proc-
esses of ‘creative destruction’ have been leading into an enormous
generation of new productive resources. As a matter of fact unending
change functions as the very basis of the existence of a capitalist sys-
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tem which cannot survive in a stationary state (Schumpeter 1976, 81–
86). In recent times the Schumpeterian approach has served often as
an interpretative framework when analysing the high-yield - high-
risk business activities which are typical for the ‘new economy’ that
is emerging alongside the digital revolution (see e.g. Burstein & Kline
1995, Grove 1996).
Theories of industrial society during the 1950s
After the end of the Second World War most industrial countries were
struggling with enormous tasks of economic reconstruction. In many
countries the economic instability of capitalism and mass unemploy-
ment were seen as factors that had contributed significantly to the rise
of nazism and socialism as well as to the emergence of retrograde
nationalism. Therefore the intention was to create conditions in
which such crises wouldn’t be repeated again and in which every-
body would be guaranteed at least some basic security. Several coun-
tries especially in Eastern Europe and Asia, were following the so-
cialist path of development, and many former colonies acquired na-
tional independence. All over the world efforts were made to build
economic and institutional settings which would enable for citizens
to reach standards of living so far enjoyed only within the most ad-
vanced countries.
This was a period of renewal for Western social science. Sociol-
ogy had already established its academic positions in the United
States. In Western Europe also a new tradition was created according
to the North American model. Modern empirical methods were used,
and a new generation of social scientists started to study problems
characteristic of advanced industrial societies. Sociology of work and
industry was one of the favourite topics among this generation. One
important strand in this whole was the theory of this so-called “in-
dustrial society”. Authors like Clark Kerr, Reinhard Bendix, Raymond
Aron, Helmuth Schelsky and others wrote about the general develop-
mental dynamics of industrial modernisation. These writers had a
unitary vision about the emergence of modern industrial and urban-
ised societies which would have societal institutions and political
organisations built essentially according to the model of Western plu-
ralistic democracies. All the countries would finally end in this rather
universal system, even if the nation-building processes would follow
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different kinds of concrete historical paths. The centrally planned
socialist economies were also seen as temporary deviations from this
general developmental scheme.
At that time much criticisms were directed against the theories of
industrial society. In the developing countries the theorists of indust-
rial society were criticised for ethnocentrism because of the ways in
which they made absolute of the political institutions typical of West-
ern countries. Socialists criticised the denial of any possible deviation
from the universally “rational” capitalist development model. A third
important strand was the cultural criticism presented by e.g. some
representatives of the Frankfurt School vis-à-vis the naive developmen-
tal optimism that was according to them characteristic of most theo-
ries of industrial society (e.g. Habermas 1963).
Even if during the 1950s and early 1960s the social scientific dis-
cussions were still dominated by debates about the logic of industrial
modernisation, some economists had already started to look beyond
the industrial stage of development. For instance the American
economist Colin Clark published in 1951 a book Conditions of Indus-
trial Progress, in which he stated that modern societies would go
through three stages of economic development. The first stage would
be dominated by primary industries, whereas the industrial stage
would be dominated by different kinds of secondary activities. A
third stage would follow in which most people would earn their liv-
ing from different kinds of tertiary activities, mainly from services.
Increasing productivity in the primary and secondary sector activi-
ties would be liberating resources that would be oriented towards the
third sector. The United States, in which more than half of the entire
economically active population would soon be employed in the terti-
ary sector, seemed to be leading this development (Clark 1951).
Knowledge as a factor of economic growth
Theories of industrial society were debated actively during the 1950s,
when the post-war economic period was just beginning. Later on the
situation changed when the advanced industrial countries went
through a long lasting period of strong economic growth, high levels
of employment and increasing affluence of their populations. This
was also a time of rapidly expanding education, the building of new
red-brick universities and the initiation of large-scale technology pro-
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grammes at least partly funded by the state. During this time the ques-
tion of knowledge as an increasingly important factor of economic
growth arose as a central topic of discussion.
Peter F. Drucker, the founding father of modern management lite-
rature, was one of the first theoreticians who saw the real significance
of knowledge as becoming perhaps the most important competitive
asset of modern enterprises during the 1950s. Later he developed this
thesis further e.g. in his book The Age of Discontinuity that came out in
1969 (see Drucker 1993, 6). Another pioneering figure was the Ameri-
can economist Fritz Machlup, who published in 1962 a book named
The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States. In this
book Machlup tried to analyse concretely the role that knowledge had
in the functioning of the U.S. economy. He gathered a lot of statistical
information about knowledge flows and assets, and later wrote many
articles and research papers that gained a lot of attention among
other economists of his time (Machlup 1992).
Within the OECD several studies were made in which attempts
were made to identify more precisely the role of knowledge and skills
as being the ‘fourth’ production factor alongside the three tradition-
ally mentioned land, labour and capital. There was general aware-
ness that vast resources had been invested in education and research
& development (R&D) activities, especially in the most dynamically
developing economies. Now it was necessary to measure more ex-
actly the actual contribution of knowledge to the pace of economic
growth in different countries. A typical method was the use of knowl-
edge as a kind of a “residual” factor. This means that when the contri-
butions of all other factors of economic growth were taken into ac-
count, the remaining part was interpreted as being the consequence
of increasing levels of growth. A practical recommendation for the
governments of advanced industrial economies was that they ought
to increase the resources directed to R&D and education, if they
wanted to maintain high levels of economic growth. Harvey Brooks
was one of the most important figures behind these discussions, and
one of the most important publications was the OECD report named
Science, Growth and Society that was published in 1972 (OECD 1972).
A Marxian variant of these discussions developed in the form of
discussions about the so-called ‘scientific and technological revolu-
tion’. For instance the USSR Academy of Science published a book
named Man – Science – Technology as an overall synthesis of these dis-
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cussions (USSR Academy of Science 1973). An important precedent
was, however, the so-called Richta-report with the title Political
Economy of the 20th Century that was published by the Czechoslovak
Academy of Science in 1969. This report presented an optimistic vi-
sion of the emancipatory possibilities connected to scientific and
technical development, but was flanked with civilising elements
reminiscent of the ideas of “socialism with a human face” that arose
during the Prague spring and that were later crushed violently
through the military invasion of Warsaw Pact countries (Richta-Re-
port 1969).
There emerged also a tradition of criticisms directed against the
naive technological optimism typical for many of the above men-
tioned theories. Foremost examples were Herbert Marcuse and his
analyses of the “one-dimensional” society (Marcuse 1968), attacks
against “technocracy” (Galbraith 1967), and later ecologically
founded discussions about the natural limits of continuous economic
growth (Meadows et al. 1972).
Theories of ‘post-industrial society’
The “glorious thirty years” (Fourastié 1994) of post-war economic
growth and a naive belief in Keynesian economic regulation ended
with the increasing economic problems of advanced industrial coun-
tries in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The first energy crisis in 1974
especially, and the consequent world-wide economic recession,
shocked many advanced industrial countries. In addition to these
instabilities new themes rose to the fore in the social scientific discus-
sions. One of the big issues during the 1970s was the debate about the
movement from industrial to post-industrial society.
Daniel Bell is internationally known as the foremost theoretician
of post-industrial society. His book The Post-Industrial Society came
out in 1973. In this book the authors’ main thesis was, that the ad-
vanced countries were moving from the “industrial” stage towards a
“post-industrial” stage of development. One of the most important
expressions of this transition was that the majority of these countries’
economically active citizens would earn their living from different
kinds of post-industrial service sector occupations. The United States
was the first country to move into the post-industrial stage, but West-
ern Europe and Japan soon followed.
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In presenting his analysis Bell wanted to distance himself from
the earlier theories of capitalism and industrial society in the sense
that he did not want to separate any economic or basic technological
structure that would determine the development of all other parts of
the society. Rather he spoke about the selection of different kinds of
‘axial principles’ as a perspective through which one would be able
to analyse the developmental dynamics of different institutional ar-
rangements. The main feature that separated post-industrial societies
from all preceding stages of societal development was the increasing
significance of theoretical knowledge. According to this observation
Bell also thought that the institutions of knowledge – universities, re-
search institutes etc. – would become the leading centres of power in
the same sense as the headquarters of large industrial enterprises
used to be in the industrial stage.
Bell was known mainly as an academic liberal when he pub-
lished his book, which did not as a matter of fact lead into such a big
debate as perhaps one could have expected. The younger generation
of social scientists was more thrilled e.g. about critical theory and
Marxist political economy. Later on Bell himself continued writing
about the post-industrial society, which he identified without any big
revisions the information society during the 1980s. During that dec-
ade he also shifted politically towards new conservatism, which was
at that time fast gaining ground in American universities, and this
was also the position from which he wrote his next magnum opus,
The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (1987). In Bell’s theoretical
perspective these contradictions were naturally those characteristic
more generally for post-industrial information societies.
Bell did not, however, actually introduce the term ‘post-industrial
society’ into modern social scientific discourse. In this respect the
honours belong to the French sociologist Alain Touraine, who had
published his own analysis, the book La société post-industrielle in
1969.
In the 1950s Touraine was one of the founders of the French
“sociologie du travail” tradition, and he did extensive studies about
the development of industrial work at the Renault automobile facto-
ries in Paris. He was also an active left intellectual, who believed in
the emancipatory potentials of the industrial working class. Rather
soon, however, he came to the conclusion that the social forces of tra-
ditional industrial society would not be leading the development of
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the society that was emerging at that time. The main conflict lines
would develop between the different kinds of new social actors and
the “programmed society” that was emerging. This thesis was at the
core of the book, which was very much influenced by the heated de-
bates that were going on at all French universities and in all intellec-
tual circles at the time of the big student revolts of 68.
Touraine’s analysis of the postindustrial society did not become
internationally as well-known as Bell’s, but his intellectual influence
can be seen in many later writings closely related to theories of the
information society. For instance, Manuell Castells was very much
indebted to Alain Touraine when he developed his own theory of the
information age. Touraine himself moved on from his analysis of
postindustrial society towards a long series of studies on different
new social movements (e.g. the antinuclear movement, women’s
movement, ecological movement, the Polish Solidarnosz etc.). Also he
further developed his theory about the developmental dynamics of
modern societies, which he studied as a specific kind of self-produc-
tion process, and the methodology of “sociological interventions”,
which is one form of action research. Touraine has also remained up
to the present a highly visible figure in French and European intellec-
tual life (for an interesting collective account of Touraine’s work see
Clark & Diani 1996).
The microelectronics revolution and its consequences
The economic recession of the mid-1970s led into a broad wave at ra-
tionalisation within the industries of most advanced countries. This
was also the time when many textile, clothing and electronics compa-
nies started to relocate their activities from advanced industrial coun-
tries to Asia, North Africa, Latin America and to other regions where
the production costs were much cheaper. During the early 1980s a
lively discussion arose about the so-called “microelectronics revolu-
tion”, which was assumed to influence strongly the future economic
growth and employment prospects of advanced industrial countries.
The microelectronics revolution began during the late 1940s,
when the first transistors were built at the Bell laboratories in Califor-
nia. The real significance of this revolution became visible later when
the companies learned to produce integrated circuits printed on sili-
con chips. The next big innovation was microprocessors, thumbnail-
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size components which were able to perform the functions of an en-
tire computer. The unit prices went down and the effective function-
ing of microelectronic components grew very fast as the basic tech-
nologies developed and the companies started to produce them on a
massive scale.
In the early 1970s microelectronics were first applied for military
purposes. Later on they became a basis for the development of the so-
called flexible manufacturing technologies. One started to talk about
such new technologies as e.g. computer-aided manufacturing, com-
puter-aided design, industrial robots etc. Another important new
area of commercial applications was the development of personal
computers. A big step was taken when the famous Apple I and Apple
II personal computers were introduced to the market.
In Western countries a lively discussion emerged about the social
and economic consequences of the microelectronics revolution. It was
feared that the generalisation of microelectronic technologies would
deepen the problems of unemployment. The new programmable ma-
chines would damage the traditionally strong labour market posi-
tions of skilled industrial workers, it would make it easier to relocate
production away from the Western countries, and soon the job-de-
stroying effects of automation would become visible in the offices as
well. A pessimistic vision emerged in discussions about jobless
growth and the crisis of work in western societies. Some of these prob-
lems were discussed in the book Microelectronics and Society published
by the Club of Rome (see Friedrichs & Schaff 1982).
During these times new kinds of criticisms towards the theories
of postindustrial society emerged. For instance such British authors
as Jonathan Gershuny and Ian Miles wrote that within the socially
relatively homogenous Western societies the prevailing trend would
not be towards an increasing expansion of services, because the citi-
zens did not have enough money to buy an increasing volume of serv-
ices from each other. Rather the trend would be towards the develop-
ment of such technologies which would enable people to eliminate
the need to purchase more services. For instance, the citizens would
buy and use more automobiles instead of using taxis, they would buy
televisions or records instead of going to the theatre or a concert, they
would buy a new washing machine instead of taking their dirty
clothes to a laundry, they would purchase microwave ovens and fro-
zen meals instead of going to a restaurant etc. This trend towards a
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“self-service society” was strengthened by the continuous cheapen-
ing of labour-saving technical devices in relation to the costs of the
use of service labour (see e.g. Gershuny 1978, Gershuny & Miles
1983).
In many countries – e.g. in Finland – the public authorities set
official committees to produce objective analyses about the social and
economic consequences of the microelectronics revolution. In many
cases these reports and white papers produced a somewhat more
optimistic assessment about the employment prospects in advanced
industrial countries than were earlier presented in public discus-
sions. Even if certain risks undeniably existed especially among some
occupational groups, more new jobs would probably be created in the
fast-growing sectors of the economy than would be destroyed as a
consequence of the increasing utilisation of new technologies.
Fairly soon bolder and more speculative interpretations emerged
about the new opportunities that might be opening with the progress
of the microelectronics revolution. It would not only help create new
jobs especially in small innovative enterprises. It might also bring
back to Western countries some of the manufacturing activities that
had earlier been relocated to low-cost countries. The development of
microelectronic technology might make it possible to liberate human
work from its traditional boundaries of time and location, and it
might transform the everyday lives of citizens. Such speculations
formed a platform for the emergence of the first theories of an informa-
tion society.
THEORIES OF INFORMATION SOCIETY:
 THE FIRST ROUND
One of the most important influences for later social scientific theori-
sations on information society came from the field of economics. A
young doctoral student from Stanford University, Marc Uri Porat,
published 1976 his Ph.D. dissertation on The Information Economy, in
which the author revised the traditional division of modern econo-
mies and their occupational structures into the primary, industrial
and service sectors. Among the different postindustrial activities
Porat separated a fourth sector, the information sector, specifically
information occupation. On the basis of careful analyses of the U.S.
economic and occupational statistics Porat could also show that just
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the information occupations had been the fastest growing occupa-
tional group in the U.S. economy (see Porat 1977). A lot of attention
was paid to Porat’s results at the time of their publication, and later
on similar kinds of analyses of the growth of information economy
and information jobs were made in several OECD countries.
Among the first discourses directly related to the emergence of
information society were those programmatic writings in which the
authors propagated an effective utilisation of new microelectronic
technologies. In Western Europe for instance James Martin published
1979 a book The Wired Society, in which he sketched a vision about a
society with highly developed telecommunication networks. The
French president Giscard d’Estaing ordered a report from two well-
known specialists, Simon Nora and Alain Minc, who published their
report entitled The Telematic Society in 1981. This book played an im-
portant role when the French authorities decided to invest large
amounts in the development and spread of the so-called Minitel sys-
tem in France. Perhaps at that time one of the most devoted propo-
nents of the idea of “information society” in Western countries was
Tom Stonier, who built the arguments presented in his book The Wealth
of Information: A Profile of the Post-Industrial Economy very much on the
analyses made earlier by Porat about changes in the occupational
structures of contemporary societies (Stonier 1983).
One of the early actors in this field was the Japanese Ministry of
Industry and Trade MITI. It had previously made Japan a global
leader in the development and production of microelectronics. Now it
saw its central task as taking Japan to the forefront as an information
society. Quite ambitious experiments were made e.g. through the
building of experimental suburbs with many possibilities for mutual
networking. Recently it has been said that the entire term ‘informa-
tion society’, johoka shakai in Japanese, has actually come to Western
discussions from Japan. One of the foremost theoreticians of informa-
tion society, Yoneji Masuda, is also Japanese, but we will come back to
his work later.
In Western countries perhaps the broadest publicity was gained
by such futurological authors as Alvin Toffler and John Naisbitt. In his
book The Third Wave (Toffler 1980) Toffler gathered a large collection
of different kinds of changes that he thought to be connected to the
new industrial revolution that was carrying us from the age of tradi-
tional smokestack industries towards a new kind of postindustrial
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civilisation. He wrote about the new businesses arising around com-
puters, electronics, biotechnology and other leading branches of the
economy. He wrote also about flexible factories, niche markets, the
generalisation of part-time work and the deconcentration of mass
media. He analysed also the fusion of producers and consumers into
new kinds of “prosumers”, the development of distance work as well
as other changes that were going on in political life and within na-
tion-states.
John Naisbitt on his part wrote about the ten “megatrends” that
would transform the ways in which advanced industrial societies
had earlier been functioning. Among these megatrends were e.g. the
microelectronics revolution and the spread of its applications, which
has led into the transition from industrial to information society. He
wrote a lot about changes in the occupational structure, the rise of
entrepreneurship, the development of a global economy and pres-
sures towards the development of new work organizations. He did
not, however, combine the different strands of his analysis into a co-
herent theory of information society (Naisbitt 1984).
One of the boldest interpretations about the emancipatory
potentials of a postindustrial information society was presented by
Yoneji Masuda, a Japanese author largely influenced by Western futu-
rologists. His book The Information Society as Post-Industrial Society
(1981) is said to be an embarrassing combination of technocratic so-
cial engineering and high-flying civilisatory ideas. Masuda describes
the future information society as being a kind of a “computopia”, a
place in which a general harmony dominates. It is characterised e.g.
by an extensive utilisation of computers and electronic networks,
strong growth of the information or knowledge sector, formation of a
“synergic economy” in which the markets and price mechanism are
replaced by purposive action of voluntary groups, the replacement of
hierarchies through horizontal organisations, the development of
participatory democracy and the adoption of new values within the
framework of which people are striving towards good life (Masuda
1990, 4-10).
We can thus conclude that the first round of analyses directed
towards the information society were mainly produced by futu-
rological and management writers, not by academic social scientists,
and the contributions did not receive an enthusiastic response
among the latter. Some mainly critical reviews have been written
about these discourses, in England e.g. by Krishan Kumar (1995),
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David Lyon (1988) and Frank Webster (1995) and in Germany by
Hensel (1990). In Finland an interesting review was written by Leh-
tinen and Luotola (1985). Most of the academic social scientists consid-
ered the information society literature to be a collection of intellectu-
ally rather loose popular writings without any real theoretical signifi-
cance. Some more serious analyses were written about so-called
“knowledge” or “communication” societies – which in this case
meant societies in which expert knowledge has an increasing influ-
ence (Stehr 1994) or in which the development of communications are
changing the ways in which modern societies are functioning
(Münch 1991). Other kinds of discourses like those concerning
postmodernism, reflective modernisation, life politics, risk society etc.
were experienced as being more relevant and intellectually more ex-
citing2 . 
2. It is, however, interesting to notice that one of the key texts of contemporary
postmodern theoretical discource, Jean-Francois Lyotard’s La Condition Postmoderne
(1979) was originally written for the University Council of Quebec as a report about
knowledge in the information society. The connection isn’t just external; the essay con-
tains highly interesting reflections upon alternative paths of ‘informationalisation’ that
have not lost their relevance during the two decades that have passed since the time of
its writing.
Those researchers acting between social sciences and computer
studies, who were keenly interested in the societal effects of compu-
terisation, were the exception to this generally sceptical attitude to-
wards information society theorising. An indication about this has
been for instance the Information Society Journal that was launched by
a U.S. researcher of social informatics, professor Rob Kling in 1981.
There have also been researchers of mass communications (e.g.
Mosco 1996) and telecommunications (Melody 1997) who have
found relevant connections between their specific subject areas and
more general reflections about the development of postindustrial in-
formation societies.
FROM DIGITAL REVOLUTION TOWARDS
INFORMATION SOCIETY
In some way the optimistic visions presented by the first-generation
theorists of information society seemed to be realised during the
1980’s, when the economy grew vigorously and new jobs were cre-
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ated in most advanced industrial countries. This was, however, also a
time of hard money-making, straightforward consumerism and
tough individualist social values, which did not leave very much
room for the more liberal or humanistic ideals connected to some vi-
sions of a future information society. The whole situation changed,
however, as a consequence of the stock market crash in 1987 and the
economic recession that followed in early 1990s.
During the recession the rate of unemployment rose, especially in
Western Europe, to levels that were not experienced earlier during the
entire postwar period. It was noticed that during each economic cycle
unemployment had risen onto a higher level. Some of the leading
business representatives stated that unemployment might in future
rise even further due to the increasing pressures of global competi-
tion, the relatively high cost levels in advanced industrial countries
and the continuous rationalisations that would take place both
within the private and in the public sector. Innovation researchers
pointed out that during the 1980s most technological innovations
had been oriented towards process innovations, i.e. innovations
which do not create new demand but which make it possible to sat-
isfy existing demand with a smaller use of labour force and other re-
sources. Therefore it was feared rather generally that the advanced
industrial countries might be approaching an era of jobless growth
during which the pace of growth would not be fast enough in order to
be able to compensate for those job losses that would follow from the
organisational downsizing processes.
Within these conditions some of the leading innovation research-
ers directed their attention towards the so-called “digital revolution”.
Digital revolution was regarded as a major technological innovation
that continued further those change processes earlier triggered by the
microelectronics revolution. The essence of the digital revolution is in
the generalisation of a new way of processing information - based on
binary logic – and in the development of increasingly effective ways
of handling and delivering such information. This process has led
into the construction of “information highways” and into the devel-
opment of increasing synergies between such previously separate
technologies as computers, telephones and electronic mass media.
One has started to use the term “new information and communica-
tion technologies” to cover these areas.
For instance Richard Freeman and Luc Soete presented the digital
revolution as a basis for the formation of a new “technological para-
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digm” that would permeate all the major areas of economic activity
and that might in this capacity function as the initiator of a new long
wave of vigorous economic growth in the same way as for instance
the generalisation of automobiles has functioned during previous
decades. The great potential of new information and communication
technologies is seen to lie in their capacity to generate new kinds of
needs and entirely new demand. Their actual job-creating potentials
are not connected to the actual production of new information and
communication technologies, but rather to the development of soft-
ware, services and new kinds of contents that are being delivered via
the new information highways. An important factor is also the way in
which an effective utilisation of new information and communica-
tion technologies might help improve the competitiveness of ad-
vanced industrial countries in a situation in which they had already
largely lost their relative competitive advantages vis-a-vis the emerg-
ing economies in more traditional areas of economic activity (see e.g.
Freeman & Soete 1994).
Ideas concerning the potential possibilities connected to the
progress of digital revolution were received with great enthusiasm
both among the decision-makers of advanced industrial countries
and also among the general public. Many political leaders struggling
with problems of unemployment took the digital revolution as a kind
of salvation message, and a large number of conferences, meetings
and roundtables were organised around this topic during the years
1993–95. In the United States president Bill Clinton and his vice Al
Gore launched an extensive “National Information Infrastructure
Programme”, whereas the European Union included information
highways as an essential element of those “transeuropean networks”
that would have an important role in the employment policies de-
signed in the “Growth, Competitiveness and Employment” white pa-
per that was published in December 1993 (EC Commission 1993).
From our point of view it is important to notice that still in the
early 1990s “new information and communication technologies”
and “information highways” were generally spoken about, whereas
from 1993–1994 for instance the EU authorities started to use the term
“information society” in order to stress the overall character of
changes that were going on.  For instance the Directorate General III of
the European Commission, headed by the commissioner Martin
Bangemann, presents the following “official” definition of the term
“information society”:
Chapter 136
 The Information Society is the name given to the European Un-
ion’s response to the revolution in society triggered by the rapid
developments in information and communications technologies.
The Information society is a revolution based on information, it-
self the expression of human knowledge. Technological progress
now enables us to process, store, retrieve and communicate infor-
mation in whatever form it may take – oral, written and visual –
unconstrained by distance, time and volume. This revolution adds
huge new capacities to human intelligence and constitutes a re-
source which changes the way we work together and the way we
live together. (European Commission 1998)
 Both international organisations and national authorities
started setting different kinds of taskforces to formulate general strat-
egies and to launch immediate concrete actions in order to promote
the development towards information society. During the early 1990s
there were many kinds of processes that stimulated a general interest
towards questions of information society. One was the very fast devel-
opment of technology, which was expressed e.g. in the introduction of
increasingly effective computers and other information technological
products to the markets. Bill Gates, a former “computer nerd”, had just
risen via the huge success of Microsoft to become the richest man in
the world. Several other spectacular success stories could be found in
the businesses growing around the digital revolution.
A new generation of popular writers – like Nicholas Negroponte,
the director of MIT Media Lab – were promoting actively the ideas of
digital revolution (see Negroponte 1995), the numbers of internet us-
ers were increasing at an explosive rate all over the world, and
schools, companies, media, public authorities and individual house-
holds have done their best in order maintain themselves at the pace of
the technological, economical and cultural revolution that is said to
be taking place. The United States, the actual starting point of the dig-
ital revolution, seemed to be moving towards a new economy in
which the rise of stock market prices was hitting all earlier records
and in which the traditional economic fluctuations were assumed to
have passed into history.
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THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ANALYSIS
 OF INFORMATION SOCIETY AS A RESEARCH
PROGRAMME
Scepticism among the social scientists
One paradoxical feature in recent developments has been that one
has spoken almost overall about the ongoing transition towards the
information society as a qualitatively new stage of societal develop-
ment. One of the very few places where this discussion has not come
to the fore has been social scientific literature itself. The economists
for instance within the OECD have had lively debates about the dy-
namics of “knowledge-based economies” (see e.g. OECD 1996), and
many social scientists have been highly interested about the emer-
gence of new kinds of “virtual communities” together with the spread
of electronic networks (see e.g. Turkle 1996). But until recently the so-
cial scientists have not generally accepted the idea that the digital
revolution would really mean such a fundamental social transforma-
tion as did happen for instance two hundred years ago as a conse-
quence of the industrial revolution. It is quite evident that the social
scientists want to distance themselves from the simple causal infer-
ences according to which changes within the socioeconomic sphere
could really be analysed as “social consequences” of technological
development that proceeds according to its own internal logics.
Many social scientists may consider the discussions about informa-
tion society mainly as a rhetorical means which will help persuade
people to behave in a certain manner.
The criticism presented by Krishan Kumar a couple of years ago
against popular conceptions of information society is probably repre-
sentative of the attitudes that have prevailed more broadly among the
academic social scientists. According to Kumar
The information society is a reality, and we inhabit that reality. It
has affected the way we see the world and the way we live in it...
But an information revolution – a speeding up of the supply and
use of information goods – is not the same thing as an information
society. The information revolution may be changing our attitudes
to politics, work, family life and personal identity in complex ways
but so far this does not seem to add up to a new form of society...
Certainly we have no warrant for accepting the claims of Bell,
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Stonier and the other theorists of the information society that we
have entered a new phase of social evolution, comparable to the
“great transformation” ushered by the industrial revolution. That
revolution achieved a new relationship between town and coun-
try, home and work, men and women, parents and children. It
brought in a new ethic, and new social philosophies. There is no
evidence that the spread of information technology has caused
any such major changes. On the contrary, the bulk of the evidence
indicates that what it has mainly done is to enable industrial socie-
ties to do more comprehensively what they have already been do-
ing. (Kumar 1995, 162)
However, the attitudes have started to change gradually within
the academic social sciences3.  Undoubtedly one of the most impor-
tant turning points has been the publication of Manuel Castells’ Infor-
mation Age trilogy in 1996–97 and the reception this work has re-
ceived within the social scientific community. Castells has made the
first effort to grasp systematically the essential features of that funda-
mental societal transformation that we are approaching together
with the advance of the digital revolution.
Castells’ analysis
This chapter does not allow enough space for an extensive presenta-
tion of Castells’ ideas. It is, however, important to know at least the
main features of his analysis. Castells himself presents his main goal
as follows:
This book studies the emergence of a new social structure, mani-
fested under various forms, depending on the diversity of cultures
and institutions throughout the planet. This new social structure is
associated with the emergence of a new mode of development,
informationalism, historically shaped by the restructuring of the
capitalist mode of production towards the end of the twentieth
century. (Castells 1996, 14)
3. One example is for instance the launching of a new social scientific journal Information,
Communication and Society by Routledge with a distinguished editorial board and with a
purpose to provide ”an international forum where the emerging properties of the infor-
mation society can be critically explored and disseminated” (Information, Communication
and Society 1998).
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It is important to notice from the outset that Castells does not
want to present himself as a theoretician of the Information Society.
Neither does he want to present the society he is analysing as a
postcapitalist society. Rather he sees his main task is to analyse the
“informational mode of development” of advanced capitalist socie-
ties. He describes the differentia specifica of this formation in the fol-
lowing manner:
In the new, informational mode of development the source of pro-
ductivity lies in the technology of knowledge generation, informa-
tion processing, and symbol communication. To be sure, knowl-
edge and information are critical elements in all modes of develop-
ment, since the process of production is always based on some
level of knowledge and in the processing of information. How-
ever, what is specific for the informational mode of development
is the action of knowledge upon knowledge itself as the main
source of productivity. Information processing is focused on im-
proving the technology of information processing as a source of
productivity, in a virtuous circle of interaction between the knowl-
edge sources of technology and the application of technology to
improve knowledge generation and information processing: this
is why, rejoining popular fashion, I call this new mode of develop-
ment informational, constituted by the emergence of a new tech-
nological paradigm based on information technology. (17)
Castells locates the historical emergence of the new informational
mode of development around the economic restructuring processes
that begun within the advanced industrial countries and especially
in the United States during the 1980s. He speaks also about the rise of
informationalism as a kind of capitalist perestroika. All his analysis
revolves around three fundamental axes: the changes that take place
within the areas of material production, human experience and in the
structures of power.
One can discern in Castells’ analysis two major trends that have
driven forward the development towards informational capitalism.
One of them is globalisation of the economy and the other is digital
revolution. The actual transition takes place in many dimensions.
Castells writes for instance about the emergence of new kinds of net-
work enterprises, changes in the institutions of work, the cultures of
“real virtuality”, the “space of flows” as the main driving force in the
spatial organisation of  society’s activities, “timeless time” as a spe-
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cific combination of our past, present and future, the emergence of
networks as a fundamental organising principle of contemporary
societies, the specific dialectics between identity and power, a new
division between the insiders and the excluded and the very impor-
tant and problematic relations that emerge between the Net and the
Self.
In developing the main categories of his analysis Castells stresses
that he does not want to present any totalistic and conceptually
closed “theory” of informational capitalism. Rather he wants to point
out the character of informationalism as a historical project that can
be realised in many different ways depending on the specific histori-
cal, institutional and cultural settings in which the projects are being
realised in each concrete time and locality. This methodological prin-
ciple can be seen in the composition of the three-volume book which
consists of a large number of quite concrete studies of individual ob-
jects and processes. The concrete historical components are espe-
cially pronounced in the second (Power and Identity) and third (End
of Millenium) volumes of the book. The case studies are bound to-
gether by means of careful conceptualisations of those analytical cat-
egories that form the author’s actual theoretical programme. But
Castells does not want to go further than this in formulating a sub-
stantive “theory” of informational capitalism. As he himself writes,
As for the actual content of this common social structure that
could be considered to be the essence of the new informational so-
ciety, I’m afraid I am unable to summarize it in one paragraph: in-
deed, the structure and processes that characterize informational
societies are the subject matter covered in this book. (22)
Despite these methodologically well grounded reservations
Castells does present later in the first volume of his book an informa-
tive description about the “network society” that according to him ex-
presses the actual core of the way in which the societal activities will
increasingly become organised in informational capitalism. Apolo-
gising for the lengthy citation I want to present the passus as a whole:
Our exploration of emergent social structures across domains of
human activity and experience leads to an overarching conclusion:
as a historical trend, dominant functions and processes in the in-
formation age are increasingly organized around networks. Net-
works constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and
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the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the opera-
tion and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power,
and culture. While the networking form of social organization has
existed in other times and spaces, the new information technology
paradigm provides the material basis for its pervasive expansion
throughout the entire social structure. Furthermore, I would ar-
gue that this networking logic includes a social determination of a
higher level than that of the specific social interests expressed
through the networks: the power of flows takes precedence over
the flows of power. Presence or absence in the network and the
dynamics of each network vis-a-vis others are critical sources of
domination and change in our society; a society that, therefore, we
may call the network society, characterized by the preeminence of
social morphology over social action. (469)
Assessments
It is still too early to assess the real significance of Castells’ analysis
for the development of modern social scientific thinking. Therefore it
is also too early to say whether the comparison made by Anthony
Giddens between Castells’ work and the Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft of
Max Weber we have referred to earlier is justified or not.  Neither do
the reviews that have appeared so far in the leading social scientific
journals help clarify the issue very much (see e.g. Giddens 1996, King
1998, Williams 1998). And we do not know yet, whether Castells’
analysis of informational capitalism will become the dominant theo-
retical paradigm for the studies of epochal changes we are at present
experiencing.
From the point of view of the history of theory it is interesting to
notice that Castells had already  presented essential parts of his con-
ceptual and theoretical apparatus several years earlier, in his book
The Informational City (Castells 1989), which in itself was received
positively as an interesting and innovative analysis of contemporary
urban developments, but which was not regarded as a major theoreti-
cal breakthrough in modern sociology. Of course Castells has added a
lot of elements to his theoretical apparatus in writing the Information
Age, which has a much broader scope. It seems that not only the ac-
tual content of a theoretical contribution, but also the correct timing of
its presentation do signify a lot from the point of view of the actual
impact it has within the scientific community.
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4. Touraine has also presented in a recent article a highly interesting  account of the way
he has tried to understand the dynamics of contemporary societies: ”Just as Marx, follow-
ing Ure, showed that it was the factory, and thus a new form of production, which
marked the beginnings of industrial society, so the birth of programmed, post-industrial
society can be located in the emergence and rapid development of activities of mass use
of information, and more precisely of symbolic messages relating to personality and cul-
ture. We must not, therefore, define post-industrial society in technological terms. It is
always in terms of culture and social relations of production that the definition of a
societal type must be made; this point is constantly present in my analysis, even though it
is not explicitly formulated” (Touraine 1996, 316). On the basis of this account it is very
understandable that also Touraine is reluctant to use the term ‘information society’ as an
overall characterisation of the new type of society that is emerging.
A reader of the Information Age may have varying experiences in
different stages of acquaintance with the text. The very first experi-
ence could very well be great enthusiasm, which is later somewhat
diminished by the feeling that some of the most time-bound materials
might turn into a deadweight rather soon, which isn’t necessarily
good for a book that is expected to attain the status of a modern “clas-
sic”. Sometimes one may get a feeling of the euphoric tempo with
which the author (who during his writing was forced to struggle with
a difficult illness) has written certain parts of the manuscript, and
this means that in certain parts the formulations are not fully finished
and sometimes the reader is left rather unsure about what the author
actually means with some of his categorisations. With still further
reading one starts, however, to admire the analytical clarity and the
real innovativeness of the core elements of the author’s theorisation.
Also the historicism of the book’s approach gradually appears as a
correct solution.
During the last years some other interesting analyses have been
presented about the information society. For instance Frances
Cairncross has written about the “death of distance” as one of the fun-
damental consequences of the spread of new electronic networks
(Cairncross 1997), and Peter F. Drucker has written about the transi-
tion from advanced capitalism towards a new kind of post-capitalist
society in which knowledge replaces capital as the most important
source of wealth (Drucker 1993). Alain Touraine has analysed the
social, cultural and political dimensions of the ongoing transforma-
tions in a highly interesting manner in his Pourron-nous vivre ensemble
(Touraine 1997)4.  Among these perhaps Drucker’s contribution can
be regarded as the clearest and theoretically most grounded alterna-
tive to Castells’ conception of informational capitalism. There is not,
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however, one single contribution that would be able to compete with
the book of Castells in terms of its theoretical scope and the author’s
capacity to synthesise several essential features of today’s societal
development into a coherent framework of interpretation. Therefore it
is evident that even if Castells’ approach will not be adopted by every
social scientist interested in analysing the epochal changes of today,
it will be very difficult for anybody to totally ignore his contribution.
In this sense Castell’s work has become an intellectual benchmark,
against which everybody can try to sharpen one’s own analytical
sabres.
CONCLUSIONS
The short theory historical overview we have presented above shows
that even if the concept of information society is of rather recent ori-
gin, modern social science has a rather long tradition of theoretical
reflections about the increasing significance of knowledge and infor-
mation in the functioning of advanced societies. Today we have also
entered a historical stage in which it is practically impossible to avoid
noticing the huge impact which new information and communica-
tion technologies have in all spheres of modern living. Thus even if
we haven’t yet a valid conception of the “information society” or a
widely accepted theory of its functioning, all social scientists nowa-
days must somehow take the significance of the digital revolution
into account in their work.
It is also important to point out that there are many levels on
which we can try to analyse contemporary information societies. The
production of coherent overall theoretical interpretations about the
character of the epochal changes we are experiencing is of course a
task that has to be worked out by the social scientists. But at the same
time social science must do concrete research e.g. on the ways in
which the institutions of work are changing, on coming trends in the
society’s spatial organisation, on the development of new media, new
types of entrepreneurship  etc. In all these specific fields of research
we have to ask in what ways the development and use of new infor-
mation and communication technologies are influencing the ways in
which the central societal institutions of contemporary societies will
function in future.
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Besides producing adequate descriptions about the ongoing
change processes social science must adopt also a more constructive
role; i.e. it has to participate directly in the building of tomorrow’s in-
formation societies. This task has become necessary because different
kinds of technical and social innovations are nowadays increasingly
linked to each other. Social scientists should adopt an active role in
the realisation of those social innovations and experiments through
which different actors are trying to find socially and culturally feasi-
ble ways of utilising the new information and communication tech-
nologies. Such innovations and experiments can be made both at the
micro level, i.e. in connection with the implementation of specific new
technological solutions, as well as at the macro level, i.e. when new
kinds of socioeconomic strategies are developed in different societies
in order to bring them to the forefront of today’s information society
developments.
Such new challenges can be tackled concretely for instance when
the European Union is preparing its Fifth Framework Plan for re-
search and technical development for the years 1998–2002. The ear-
lier framework programmes have been oriented almost solely to-
wards technical research and its applications, and social and cul-
tural scientists have not had practical possibilities to participate in
their realisation. Now the Union has decided that the largest thematic
programme will be targeted towards the “creation of a user-friendly
information society”. Within this theme area the doors are opened for
an increased mutual co-operation between technical research and
development, demonstration activities and socioeconomic and cul-
tural studies. European social scientists interested in studying prob-
lems of information society development should fully exploit this
new historical opportunity.
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Are We Living in the Information Society
 or in the Knowledge Society?
A Deeper Look at the Concepts
of Information and Knowledge
ERKKI KARVONEN
Contemporary societies are characterised as “information societies”
and this era is called  the “information age”, as some earlier periods
in human history have been called  the ”stone age” and the ”bronze
age” (cf. Castells 1996). Scholars like Peter Drucker and Nico Stehr
prefer using the term ”knowledge society” instead of “information
society” to emphasise the crucial value of knowledge in the new
economy. American economist Fritz Machlup (1962) has written of
“knowledge industry”. Sociologist Daniel Bell (1973) described the
emerging new economy and society as a “post-industrial society”,
but later he called it the “information society”.
Bell insists that knowledge and information are the ”axial princi-
ples of post-industrial society”. Alvin Toffler (1991) also claims that
knowledge or information are nowadays the key to power – not
money or military force. Drucker (1993) has similar ideas, when he
states that ”knowledge has become the  resource, rather than a re-
source” in the economic life. Land, labour, energy and capital are still
important resources for production, but knowledge is the most criti-
cal resource.
Information and knowledge seem to be central concepts in dis-
cussions on information society related issues. However, the dis-
courses concerning these topics rarely offer a theoretically sound un-
derstanding of these concepts as such. In many cases, the concepts
are used in a loose way, which leads to confusion. One of the pioneers
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of the information society research, Fritz Machlup, has said that the
word “information” has become  ”an all-purpose weaselword” that
is ”infelicitous, misleading, and disserviceable” (Machlup 1983, 653,
658).
One reason for this confusion in terms can be traced back to the
1940s when Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver (1949) started us-
ing the term “information” as a synonym for ”signal transmission”.
The confusion arises from the fact that in everyday usage “informa-
tion” and “knowledge” are used as synonyms, but in the technical
usage “information” has nothing to do with the contents of a mes-
sage, i.e. with “knowledge”. When we hear the word “information”,
we just can’t know if it refers to electronic signal transmission or if it
means sharing of knowledge (instruction) in the normal sense.
The sociological discussion on information society often concen-
trates on the social impacts of the new information technology and
does not particularly discuss the essence of knowledge and informa-
tion. Sociologists think that it is not their job to think about what infor-
mation is, and so they leave the task to philosophers. In fact each dis-
cipline tends to give this troublesome task to some other discipline.
An analysis of “knowledge”, on the other hand, seems to be a phi-
losopher’s task, though some aspects of it are claimed by the soci-
ologist... When I tried out the title of this study on representatives
of various disciplines, many were surprised that an economist
would find himself qualified to undertake this kind of research... If
these things have to be explained, “Let George do it”. George is al-
ways someone in another discipline. (Machlup 1962)
For instance Manuel Castell’s widely celebrated massive trilogy
The Information Age (1433 pages) pays little attention to the definitions
of concepts like knowledge and information. The only definitions are
given in the footnote, where Castells (1996, 17) states that ”I have no
compelling reason to improve on Daniel Bell’s own definition of
knowledge”. However Bell, too, seems to pass the problem fluently
(for Bell’s definitions, see footnote)1
1. Bell defines knowledge: “By knowledge I mean a set of organized statements of facts or
ideas, presenting a reasoned judgement or an experimental result, which is transmitted to
others through some communication medium in some systematic form. Thus, I distinguish
knowledge from news and entertainment.” (Bell 1982, 505–506)
   The concept of information is defined by Bell as follows: “By information I mean data
processing in the broadest sense; the storage, retrieval, and processing of data become the
essential resource for all economic and social exchanges.” (op. cit. 504).
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Castells prefers the definition given by Marc Porat (1977, 2): “In-
formation is data that have been organized and communicated”.
Taken philosophically these definitions are unsatisfactory; they do
not help us to understand why “information” and “knowledge” are
so crucial. It is easy to agree with Frank Webster, who criticises
Castells for being conceptually too vague in this sense. According to
Webster  Castells’ work:
Fails to identify both the characteristics of and reasons for the de-
velopment of a new epoch, the information age, because of im-
precise and variable definitions of information itself, and, associ-
ated, unclear explanations of what brings about the transition.
(Webster 1997, 83; emphasis mine).
Also Nico Stehr claims that the central concept of knowledge is
essentially treated as a “black box” in discussion about the post-in-
dustrial society:
A look at the conceptions of knowledge employed by those who
have elevated knowledge to the new axial principle of modern so-
ciety indicates that these theorists pause but briefly to consider the
social nature of knowledge, particularly of scientific knowledge.
Although many and elaborate definitions of knowledge are of-
fered, an equivalent effort toward a theoretical analysis of the de-
cisive phenomenon “knowledge as such” is not thought necessary.
The new qualities of scientific knowledge and its social conse-
quences are merely postulated. In short, knowledge is essentially
treated as a black box. (Stehr 1994, 92)
In the following, I try to develop more theoretical depth and clar-
ity for the understanding of information and knowledge. I also try to
find answers to questions like: Why is information so crucial that the
whole era is named after it? What makes knowledge valuable? On
what is the value of knowledge based? How is  “information” related
to “knowledge” and “communication”? Is information a synonym
for knowledge or should we make a clear distinction between them?
Is our society a knowledge society or merely a society of advanced signal
transmission?
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THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE
AND INFORMATION
Etymological roots for terms ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’
Words “information” and “knowledge” are often used in inter-
changeable ways in ordinary speech. In many cases words have al-
most the same meaning. However “Information” is normally linked
with telling somebody something, giving advice, instruction, teach-
ing etc. i.e. transfer of knowledge, while “knowledge” does not have
such a connection with communication. This distinction echoes Fritz
Machlup’s (1962, 15) early, simple definition: “Information is the
communication of knowledge”.
The most familiar context for the word “information” is informa-
tion desk, where you can ask advice about how to find places etc. For
example: The information desk people told me where the office is, and
now I know its location. The act of informing gives me knowledge of
how things are in the world.
It is useful to study the etymology of these concepts. The word ‘in-
formation’ was developed in medieval scholastic Latin to cover the
meaning of the Greek word “morphe” (form, shape). Aristotle used
this term when characterising perception: in the act of perception
man receives only the form (morphe) of a tree, not the substance (hyle)
of a tree (wood). Therefore perception was something like using a sig-
net ring to stamp a certain figure on a wax-sealed letter. Aristotle in-
sisted it was only the form of the signet ring which was significant,
and the material (substance) used to made the signet ring was irrel-
evant. It did not make a difference whether the stamp was made of
bronze or gold, because only the form of the stamp was transferred
into the wax and not the substance of the stamp. In scholastic phi-
losophy, this Aristotelian notion turned to the idea of “intentional-
ity”, i.e. something existing as an idea in mind, but not necessarily in
material reality.
Developed in this fashion the medieval Latin meaning for infor-
mation was “the action of ‘informing’ or forming the matter”. Infor-
mation was used in the sense of “giving a form or character to some-
thing”. Particularly the matter to be formed was the human mind:
“formation or moulding of the mind or character by means of train-
ing, instruction, teaching”. (Oxford English Dictionary).
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This archaic meaning of information as the formation of matter is
still usable today. Notice that in this sense the word does not impli-
cate any meaning or content to be transferred, but only certain “form”
or certain order. So, this old meaning for information is compatible
with Shannonian information theory. The television set, for example,
is capable of receiving some transmitted organisation of light and
black dots and showing this organisation (picture) on the screen.  A
computer can perform different types of operation for digitally organ-
ised forms, but this does not mean that the computer has  conscious-
ness or that it “knows” something. Furthermore, we can imagine a
futuristic piece of furniture, which is made out of amorphous material
capable of taking different shapes. This matter could receive digital
information e.g. for taking the shape of a baroque chair, or on another
day the shape of a table.
What, then, is the linguistic meaning of “knowledge”. The word
“knowledge” is  etymologically related to the Greek words
“gignôskein” and “gnôsis”, which were articulated in ancient Latin
as “nosco”, “gnosco” and “cognoscere” (a root for “cognition”). In
French the word has the form “connaitre”, there is also the word
“savoir” for knowledge. In German there are several verbs: “können”
and “kennen”, and also “wissen”. By the way the Finnish word for
knowing is “tietää”, which has the etymological meaning of “to
know the way to somewhere”, to know how to reach some place or
end. Actually, the Finnish word has the meaning ”know-how”.
The meaning of the “knowledge” -related words in the Indo-
european languages is something like: “to be familiar by experience or
through information or report” or “to have learnt by committing to
memory”. So, knowledge is something you have in your mind or in
your memory, i.e. stored electronically and chemically in the web of
your neurones. We can extend the notion of memory to external
memories like the picture drawn on the wall of the cave or on paper,
the word uttered, legend told or sung, note written, book printed, film
exposed, tape recorded, file saved on a disk or hard disk etc.
It seems that knowledge has to exist as some organisation of some
matter. However, this could work as the characterisation of informa-
tion, but it is not a sufficient definition of knowledge. We can talk
about knowledge only when this stored organisation somehow de-
scribes reality or refers to something other than itself. This reference,
or standing for something else leads us to treat knowledge as a semi-
otic sign, a symbol, a mark. A signifier exists as a sign only for crea-
¯¯
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tures who are able to interpret its meaning. Therefore knowledge can
only exist to the knower or interpreter, but of course the interpreter
need not necessarily be a human knower, rather any living organism
and even an artificial intelligence program could know in this sense.
Semiotic levels of information
In Saussurian sense a sign consists of two linked components:
signifier (the material bearer or vehicle) and signified (the content, con-
cept, image of mind). Ferdinand de Saussure does not particularly
thematise the sign’s relation to the real world. On the contrary
Charles  S. Peirce,  another “founding father” of semiotics, takes into
account this relation called reference or signification. Peirce begins
with the classic triadic sign conception: name (onoma), concept
(noema) and object (pragma) and then renamed the components as
sign, interpretant and object.
We should take seriously the Greek word for objects (pragma): it
has a meaning of worldly objects encountered in practical action. So
the “essence” of objects depends on and is related to the activity car-
ried out. For example a certain object is a “pen” for those who use it in
writing, but it could be a “weapon” for those who use it for aggressive
purposes. That is to say: knowledge is relational by nature, it arises
from and belongs to certain kind of practical encounter with the
world.
Pragma (object) Onoma (name)
Noema (concept)
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The FRISCO (1996) – group of scholars takes the classic triadic
sign relation and its articulations made by Peirce and Morris as a
point of departure. The group, however, finds the triangle missing
one essential factor: namely the actor who is interpreting or using a
sign. So this component is added to the figure to make a tetrahedral
model for semiosis. The actor is in relation to sign, to concept and to
pragmata.
Doede Nauta (1973) and Ronald Stamper (1973, 1996a and b) dis-
tinguish different levels of information or semiosis. These semiotic
levels constitute “semiotic ladders” from the physical world to the
social world. According to the FRISCO -group these levels or layers
are: physical level, empirics, syntactics, semantics, pragmatics and
social level.
“Semiotic ladders” of information:
The reality could be thematised in each of these levels. Every level
has its own adequate theoretical framework to describe and explain
the distinguishing characteristics of this level of information. There
are processes which are best explained by physics and which do not
need theories from upper levels. Information processes in the human
world can be understood as “layered”. Scholars can choose on which
Pragma
Concept
Sign
Interpreter, actor, user
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
Social world
Pragmatics
Semantics
Empirics
Physical world
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level they study their subject, they can even choose the level of physi-
cal description when trying to explain the processes of human soci-
ety. Of course the physical description is not a sufficient description
of a human being, which needs to be understood in all of the above
mentioned levels if an adequate description is desired.
In a similar fashion Nauta distinguishes levels of potential infor-
mation, implicit, concursive, discursive, syntactic, semantic, prag-
matic information. Nauta insists that the Shannonian mathematical
communication theory, or ”information theory” is working at the
level of zero-semiosis, i.e. it is a  theory for potential information or
information capacity. It describes only the infrastructure for signal
transmission, rather than saying anything about the contents to be
transferred. Here Nauta differs from many other commentators, who
think Shannon’s theory is a theory for the syntactic level. For Nauta,
Shannon’s theory is not yet a theory for proper semiotics, but a “zero-
semiotical” physical theory. We can say that this is a theory for “infor-
mation” in the archaic sense: the transmission of organisation of
sign-vehicles or mere forms that could possibly carry meaningful
messages or knowledge. Stamper and the FRISCO -group state that
Shannonian theory is working mainly in the “empirics” level.
To properly understand “information society” related issues we
should apply theories from semantic, pragmatic and social levels.
These are the levels on which we can talk about the contents of infor-
mation, meanings and knowledge. The semantic level is the first level
on which we can thematise the question about knowledge. The prag-
matic level is the one where we can explain the value (use value) of
knowledge and the social level is the one we need to understand the
exchange value of knowledge.
In the following, I will characterise Shannonian mathematical
communication theory and after that I introduce theories of semantic,
pragmatic and social levels.
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THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY
OF INFORMATION
In 1948, electrical engineer Claude Shannon of Bell Telephone Labo-
ratories published his famous article “The Mathematical Theory of
Communication” (1963). However his followers prefer talking about
“the mathematical theory of information”. Before Shannon and
Weaver,  Nyquist (1924) and Hartley (1928) made seminal studies on
“information”. The cybernetic theory developed by Norbert Wiener in
the 1940s laid the theoretical basis for Shannonian theory. This main
branch of electrical engineering theory for communication is some-
times called the Hartley-Wiener-Shannon theory of information.
Shannon gave the word “information”  a special technical defini-
tion that divorced it from its common sense usage. In Shannon’s
theory, information is no longer connected with the semantic content of
statements or with meaning.
The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproduc-
ing at one point either exactly or approximately a message se-
lected at another point. Frequently the messages have meaning
(...). These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the
engineering problem. (Shannon 1963, 3).
So, engineers are concerned primarily with the correct transmis-
sion of signals, or (electric) representations of the messages; they are
not commonly interested, professionally, with the purposes of mes-
sages. Referring to our earlier discussion on archaic meaning for
word information, we can say that the question here is about  the ac-
curate transmission of  form, not any content.
→ →
→
transmitter signal→information
source
noise
sourse
→receiver destination
received
signal
Figure 1.
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A basic idea in information theory is that information can be
treated very much like a physical quantity, such as mass or energy.
A homely analogy may be drawn between the system in Figure 1.
and a transportation system; for example, an information source
(user who generates the message) is like a lumber mill producing
lumber at a certain point. The channel in Figure 1. might corre-
spond to a conveyor system for transporting the lumber to a sec-
ond point... (Shannon in Encyclopedia Britannica article on the In-
formation Theory)
Here information is understood as communication, which in
turn is understood in terms of transportation of entities like pieces of
lumber transported by a conveyor belt. The first problem for the engi-
neer is logistical: how efficiently the channel can be used and what is
the best way to “pack” transported entities. The second problem is
accuracy of reproduction or forming a copy mentioned earlier. By the
way, this second problem is not easily understood with the conveyor
belt analogy, because a conveyor belt does not reproduce a copy of an
original at the receiver end of the channel. This problem became acute
in communication technology only after electrical transmission was
invented (telegraph, telephone, radio etc.). For instance in printing
technology the copy of the message was made mechanically at the
sender end and then physically carried over the distance. So, printing
technology does not encourage the development of a transmission
theory, but electrical communication technology does.
The Shannonian understanding of information is problematic in
relation to everyday understanding of information as instruction or
communication of knowledge. People normally think that informa-
tion always has a semantic content or meaning, but from now on
Shannonian theory need not have any meaning at all. For Shannon
information  is anything that can be coded and transmitted. It could
be the most revolutionary chemical formula or hard-core porn or just
gibberish. Anything goes.
Properly, we should call this theory a “Statistical Theory of Signal
Transmission”. Instead of speaking about the information society at
this level, we should rather talk about The Signal Transmission Society.
Clearly, we live in this kind of society of advanced signal transmis-
sion.
This is not to say that the Shannonian theory of information is
worthless. On the contrary, it has been very fruitful and has made
possible enormous advances in electronic engineering and commu-
58 Chapter 2
nication technology. At the heart of this conception lies a fruitful
theory of statistical physics for entropy .
Shannon’s formula for information is an analogy of Bolzmann’s
well known formula for thermodynamic entropy. Both refer to the no-
tions of probability and improbability from statistical physics. The so
called “white noise” appearing on television screen when it is totally
untuned, is the probable state of affairs; but the order of signals chosen
by a sender to make a meaningful message is a very improbable ar-
rangement in the world. The problem here is: how to get this very im-
probable organisation to be accurately reproduced at the receiver’s
end? How to increase the probability of the desired organisation to be
reproduced in the desired way in another receiving device?
The famous second law of thermodynamics states that the
amount of entropy in a system is increasing. This means that the im-
probable complexity or higher order tends to reduce down to the more
probable lower degree order – namely, if nothing is done to maintain
the higher order2 . In this sense an electrical engineer is fighting
against the entropic tendency of reduction back to more probable
states of order. This fight is by no means only for the engineer, but it is
actually a necessary task for any living organism on earth. Life itself
and human society are so improbable and non-entropic (negentropic)
phenomena that they need to be continuously maintained or repro-
duced.
In the following, we see how this probability theory could be used
in the semantic level of information. At this level we can study how
the transferred signals depict the world or how they carry meanings.
THEORY OF SEMANTIC INFORMATION
Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Rudolf Carnap (1952/1964) developed a
theory for semantic information, which concentrates on what a
proposition expressed by linguistic sentence is telling about the
world. The description of the world expressed in the sentences could
be more or less accurate. Let’s have a look at two sentences:
2. Some scholars like Wicken (1988) prefer using the term “complexity” when talking the
about order of closed systems (living organisms, society etc.) instead of using the term
“entropy” which is rather a term for the universe as a whole. It is also said that thermo-
dynamics concerns statistical disorder, not organisational complexity and that we are
actually in need of an adequate theory for organisational complexity.
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1. The enemy attacked at dawn.
2. The enemy attacked in battalion strength  at  5.30 a.m.
It is clear that the second statement is more precise or contains
more semantic precision than the first. So, there is more information
in the latter one, it is more informative. This is intuitively clear, be-
cause the last sentence gives more details of the case. However,
Carnap and Bar-Hillel did not use this common sense understand-
ing, but they preferred to define the amount of information negatively.
Negative definition is not very often used in everyday reasoning,
but in philosophy it has been crucial. It was philosopher Baruch
Spinoza who stated that Omnis determinatio est negatio i.e. that every
definition is a negation, exclusion of something. According to Carnap
and Bar-Hillel the amount of information expressed in the sentence h
depends on how many possible state-descriptions in language L it ex-
cludes.
If the sentence excludes none of the descriptions possible in the
used language, then it gives no information. If somebody says that
some particular object is black or white or green or any colour recog-
nised in language, then the informant does not lessen our uncertainty
of what colour this object really is. The same is true when the inform-
ant excludes all the possible descriptions and do not agree on any de-
scription. Of course this could be due to the restrictions of used lan-
guage.
Let’s consider a few example sentences:
Example 1.
At the information desk I could ask “where is classroom seven?”
And I could get different answers, e.g.:
1. The informant might say “It could be there, or there, or this
direction “ (pointing in different directions). In this, the informant
excludes nothing, and all alternatives are left open. Normally, we
would say that this person does not really know where the class-
room is or he/she is not willing to tell me the fact he/she knows.
2. In the second case the informant says: “It is certainly not there,
but it could be there or there”. This answer is more informative,
because it excludes one direction and leaves only two alternatives
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to try. We can say that he or she knows something and this answer
practically helps me to find the classroom.
3. In the third case the informant states that: “It is in that direction,
not there and there”. This answer is the most informative of the
three, because it excludes two possibilities and leaves only one
alternative to try. In this case, we can say that he or she really
seems to know how things are. Of course this claim could prove to
be right or wrong. However, the question of truth is not considered
in this semantic theory.
Example 2.
Imagine that you have one thousand doors in the corridor and
then you want to know which one is Mr X’s room. If the informant
says that this room is somewhere in the middle of the corridor,
then he gives you some information. This information is better
than nothing, because now you need not check the ends of the
corridor and you will probably find the room sooner and so save
time and other valuable resources.
In the second case, the informant clearly insists that Mr X could be
found in the room number 648. This answer is very informative,
because it excludes 999 alternatives. This helps you much, be-
cause if you don’t know the right alternative, then you have to try
all of those doors. But if you come to know it, then you can imme-
diately go to the right door, saving your time and energy.
Example 3.
Consider a strongbox with a combination lock . Your task is to
open the box, but you don’t know the right combination. In that
case, you have to try and try until you find the right combination,
and this will probably take several years, because the probability
to find the right combination is so low. What happens if somebody
tells you what the number is? Needless to say, you can open the
box in a few seconds instead of spending the rest of your life trying
to open it. In this case the saving of time is striking: several years
versus a few seconds.
These examples show the importance of  the semantic informa-
tion in practical situations and this leads us to the practical level of
information, to the use value of information or knowledge. However,
Carnap and Bar-Hillel restrict the domain of their theory, so that they
61Are We Living in the Information Society or
in the Knowledge Society?
are not willing to go to practical questions and are also reluctant to
talk about truth values. Nauta (1973) states that this kind of limitation
is an artificial abstraction.
However, before going to the practical information level there is a
need to present two commentaries on semantic information. The first
comment was made by Bar-Hillel himself, and it states that the con-
cept of semantic information intrinsically has nothing to do with
communication or transmission: we can simply have the information
in our brains. But of course we can get messages that update our
knowledge of the world.
The second comment deals with the question of truth which was
neglected by Carnap and Bar-Hillel. I will soon discuss how the
theory of semantic information could be applied to reinterpret the so-
called classic definition of knowledge presented in Plato’s Theaetetus
-dialogue. In Greek, this definition goes as follows: Alethes doxa meta
logu. And this could be translated in different ways, such as “true
belief with an account”, “true belief plus good reasons for believing
it” and “true, justified belief”.
Ilkka Niiniluoto (1989), for instance,  begins with this definition
by stating that knowledge is belief with two criteria: 1) it has to be true,
and 2) there have to be good explanations about the reasons why this
is so (theory, evidence, experience etc.). Therefore, the truth or the cor-
respondence of a proposition to reality is not sufficient criterium for
real knowledge, because a pure guess could prove to be right. So, the
informant would have to tell how she or he came to claim what was
claimed. If he says that he simply saw it from the tea leaves, then the
claim cannot achieve the status of scientific knowledge.
Secondly, Niiniluoto develops the classic definition by replacing
the word “belief” with “semantic information”. So we have a defini-
tion of knowledge like this: Knowledge is 1) a statement that contains se-
mantic information (the exclusion of possibilities),   2) which is true and is  3)
derived from reasonable theory or evidence.
Notions of truth and accountability have been under discussion
for hundreds of years, and so also Niiniluoto’s notions of them could
be challenged in different ways as I have discussed elsewhere (Kar-
vonen 1997). Here we can only say that Niiniluoto, as a philosopher
belonging to the philosophical tradition of scientific realism, is not
eager to thematise the pragmatic level of information. Pragmatist ar-
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guments are seen too “subjectivist” and “relativist” for realist phi-
losophers.
PRAGMATIC INFORMATION
Doede Nauta (1973, 220) insists that a theory of semantic information
should be characterised as “zero-pragmatic” like the Shannonian
theory was “zero-semiotic” in relation to proper-semiotic levels.
Shannon’s theory did not describe the actual communication of mes-
sages, but the potentiality and possibility of transferring messages.
Similarly, semantic theory is correlated with the precision of potential
action on any recipient. Nauta states that the semantically more in-
formative sentence contains more intelligence for potential action. The
sentence “A train leaves from King’s Cross station for Edinburgh at
10 a.m. today” offers better conditions for rational action than the sen-
tence “A train will leave London for Edinburgh today”.
What is then pragmatic information? Nauta (1973, 222) defines
pragmatic information as “that which reduces uncertainities relevant to a
purposeful state”. A purposeful state is the goal which an actor is
reaching for. Those goals may vary, or an actor can change his or her
aims. “To reduce or decrease uncertainities” is the same as “to in-
crease certainty, increase the probability of achieving one’s ends”.
Here we are talking about the pragmatic value of information for pur-
poseful action. This is stated in Kharkevich’s (1960) theory concern-
ing the value of information (see Sharov 1992).
Strong and Walker (1987, 21) have the same idea when explain-
ing the value of information. They state that “the value of information
stems from the ability of the individual to revise his action choice in
the light of his revised probabilities”.
Now we can define the value of information as the increase which it
produces in the probability of achieving some purpose. Notice that not
only the information can increase the probability of achieving the
goal, but resources like energy as well are critical for successful activ-
ity. It is important to note that the value of information can also be of
negative value, so that the probability of attaining the purpose de-
creases. If the dissemination of misleading information is purposeful,
then we can talk about disinformation.
Let’s now return to the example of the strongbox with a combina-
tion lock. In this case one’s  aim was to open the door. Without prag-
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matic information, i.e. knowing the right combination this would be
an extremely improbable accident and so the probability of achieving
the goal would be minimal. However, if the actor received some infor-
mation or instruction, the probability for successful action would in-
crease significantly.
The exclusion of possible alternatives given by information
means exclusion of trial and error or research and development ef-
forts. This means greater effectiveness and economy of resources. So,
knowledge makes some actors more effective in comparison with
those actors who don’t know or don’t have the “know-how”. The
knowing persons or knowledgeable organisations are in a sense ”up-
graded”, and so they are also more dangerous than competitors.
Knowledge or pragmatic information means better competitiveness.
Living organisms, human beings, society and technological
products for instance represent very improbable high order or com-
plexity (negentropy). The spontaneous emergence of a mobile phone
in nature is extremely improbable. So, there has to be lots of ’know-
how‘ or information for making this kind of product.
We can estimate that the complexity of products and human sys-
tems are increasing all the time. Therefore we need more and more
knowledge to increase our opportunities to achieve our aims. Our so-
ciety is becoming more and more knowledge- intensive.
At this pragmatic level of information or knowledge, we could ex-
plain the use value of knowledge. To speak about the exchange value of
knowledge we should step up one more level to the social world level.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC LEVEL
According to the sociologist  Georg Simmel (1908, 1971) human soci-
ety is best understood as a process of  “sociation” (Vergesellschaft-
ung), where people enter into mutual interaction  (Wechselwirkung)
or exchanging the valuable things they have or the favours they can
do:
Society exists where a number of individuals enter into interaction,
which arises on the basis of certain drives or for the sake of certain
purposes. (Simmel 1971, 23)
What drives actors (people, organisations) into interaction is the
certain goals they want to achieve and needs they want to satisfy. As
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we have learnt earlier, knowledge is critical to purposeful action, be-
cause it significantly increases the probability to attain one’s ends.
So, one sort of exchange between people is the exchange of know-
how. To put this simply: somebody who knows helps me to achieve
my aim, and reciprocically I repay the favour somehow.
Simmel views exchange as the purest and most concentrated
form of significant human interaction. In fact, much action that may
initially appear to be unilateral actually involves reciprocal effects
(i.e. is a form of exchange) and generally all interactions may more-or-
less be conceived of as exchange. Economic exchange – regardless of
whether it involves material objects, labour, or embodied labour – en-
tails the sacrifice of some good that has potential uses for others.
Knowledge, however, is a different kind of good. When sharing it
with other actors, you don’t lose the knowledge you have. But the ex-
change value of your knowledge does lessen: if others already know
the same as you, then they are not willing to exchange your knowl-
edge for anything else they command.
Where there is exchange, there is also a market. In the market peo-
ple controlling some goods or skills exchange their good for some-
body else’s good. The actor must “own” some exchangeable values to
operate successfully in the market. Actors have to have some “ex-
change value”, for instance the skills or knowledge that are needed by
other actors in the market. If you don’t have such a skill, you are out of
the (labour) market.
Services are said to be very essential in the post-industrial
economy. Services can be defined as work that helps other people
achieve their “purposeful states” or ends. Those purposeful states are
anything that we want or prefer. People would like to have a good
feeling, and entertainment services or a bottle of beer could fulfil that
desire.
Purposeful states are improbable arrangements in the world and
they do not appear spontaneously: some work is needed to achieve
them. For instance, cleaning is a job which helps to maintain, to sus-
tain, or reproduce a desirable order in a house. And teacher’s work is
to help young people to get desired good jobs or increase their prob-
ability to get those jobs. The knowledge work or intelligence is the
work that increases the probability of any successful action. Hope-
fully the contributions in this book could give students better chances
to achieve their goals and so the work here has been value-additive by
nature.
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WE LIVE IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY AND
IN A KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY
The answer to the question of whether we do live in an information
society or in a knowledge society is – as we have seen – that we live in
both of them. However this does not mean that information society
and knowledge society are the same thing.
The contemporary world is really a world of advanced communi-
cation technology, i.e. a society of advanced signal transmission tech-
nology. This is the information society in the information theoretical
sense.
At the same time, this is also a world of specialists and experts.
They have special knowledge so necessary for society, that the system
will not run a single day without their contribution. This knowledge
is needed for communication technology and the transmission of
messages. So the knowledge society is a condition for this kind of techno-
logical society. And vice versa, knowledge has a connection with tech-
nology, and not only with communication technology. For instance a
microscope lets us know things that we could previously only guess
at.
We have to keep in mind that thus far every existing society has
been a knowledge society. People had knowledge of how to find some-
thing to eat and how to catch fish etc. Every society has also been an
information society: people have transmitted messages, they have had
communication and community. Children were taught, legends were
told at campfire, drums served as a jungle-radio, smoke signals car-
ried messages over the distance.
Nowadays we live in a society where specialisation and division
of labour is highly developed. There are millions of specialists who
are devoted to solving special problems and these specialised
knowers are connected together with communication technology: we
live in a network society. This network makes it possible to learn from
each other’s experiences, failures and successes. At least in theory
every single knower can give his or her knowledge to the common
knowledge-base. By communication, every single person comes to
know more than by living separately.
Let’s consider our earlier example: the problem of opening the
combination lock of a strong-box. Suppose the task is divided be-
tween one million people who start trying to find the right combina-
tion. If they have to report their success to others, when one hits the
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right number, then all the people will to know it. They can concentrate
on solving the rest of the numbers. This way the human network has
enormous problem solving power, just like connected computers can
constitute very effective computing power. We can guess that the
strongbox will be opened in a few hours instead of several years of
individual effort.
The strength of the human race is in its social nature and in its
ability to communicate with a semantically informative language
and this kind of communicative community could be very effective.
Many eyes see more than just one pair of eyes. Millions of eyes see bet-
ter than just one pair of eyeballs. Millions of people are nowadays
connected together with communication technology to share their
knowledge. Millions of detectives and innovators are trying a huge
variety of possible solutions; millions of specialists are trying to open
the strong-box of nature. All this is boosted by contemporary capital-
ism with sharp economic competition that drives entrepreneurs to
make inventions. However, the capitalism itself also hinders the free
flow of meaningful knowledge. If knowledge is the critical resource
for success and competitiveness, then knowledge is not shared with
competitors or enemies.
Anyway, more and more knowledge is accumulating and this ac-
cumulation of knowledge is an evolutionary power. Any system in-
volved in the evolutionary process could be characterised by “geno-
type” and “phenotype”. In biology genotype is the genetic code that
controls the development of the bodily structure (phenotype). The
making of an organism can be seen as a translation of digital DNA
code to the structurally complex adult “analogic” form (Hoffmeyer
and Emmeche 1991). Sharov (1992) states that a living organism ex-
ists in two ways: ideally and materially. The genotype is a sort of
ideal plan or the “know-how” to make the material phenotype, i.e.
genotype is the ability of a system to reproduce its own phenotype
and phenotypes of other objects. The genotype of higher animals and
man has two parts: 1) a biogenetic part (DNA), and 2)  a  noogenetic
part, which is transmitted to offspring by a learning process. The hu-
man evolution is mainly noogenetic in character. (Boulding 1978).
More and more knowledge is accumulating in the human
noosphere (culture). This knowledge is the ideal part of human exist-
ence and the technological devices are one material outcome of this
ideality. The more knowledge we have, the more we are able to do.
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This leads to a cultural and technical evolution which is a million
times faster than natural evolution (Rothschild 1992). The pace of
change is just accelerating. Where does this acceleration lead? To a
catastrophe or to a better society?
We are in the midst of great historic transition into the Age of Bio-
technology. This means that man knows how the living organisms
are genetically encoded and that man is now able to genetically engi-
neer synthetic living creatures. Jeremy Rifkin (1998) says that the
computer revolution is only a prelude to a far more significant change
taking place in the global economy. During the Biotech Century our
way of life is likely to be transformed more fundamentally in a few
decades than in the previous thousand years.
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Narratives and Rhetoric of the Information
Society in Administrative Programs
and in Popular Discourse
JARI ARO
This chapter consists of three parts. First, I comment the relation be-
tween the debate on the Information Society and a discourse on tech-
nology. Second, I illustrate the official rhetoric on the information so-
ciety by making a short analysis on two Finnish and one European
Commission committee papers. Finally, I touch on the public debate
on the information society in Finland and raise some questions re-
garding its moral nature.
A COMMENT ON THE RHETORICAL APPROACH
TO THE DEBATE ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
Why study the language use in the debate on the information society?
Because by analysing the language use, we can find out which values
and attitudes underlie different conceptions of the information soci-
ety. Rhetorical analysis can also simply point out the central themes
in our discourse on the information society. It can also illustrate the
positions that are reserved for different actors in various conceptions
of the information society. For example, what roles are reserved for
citizens, for civil society and its communities and organisations, for
public administration and for markets. In a way, the debate and dis-
course on the information society function as mirror which reflect our
hopes and fears for the future society. So it is not a neutral conception.
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Quite the contrary, arguments and conceptions on the information
society are always acts in our social world. Their intention is to open
social reality and reproduce it from some perspective to the intended
audience.
In the following my intention is to develop some underlying
themes and structures in the debate on the information society. I use
tools mainly from the so called new rhetoric when I study the argu-
mentative structures in this debate. I also use the so called Parisian
version of semiotics, that is theories of semiotics by A.J.Greimas
(Greimas & Courtes 1982). I describe the narrative structure of various
official strategy papers and of popular debate on information society.
I intend to give an impression of the themes that have been actively
debated in Finnish culture and society in connection with the infor-
mation society. My materials are mainly from the Finnish case, but
also from the European Commission documents. I think that it is in-
teresting to make some comparisons between them. But as you will
find out, the themes and topics are quite alike in both cases.
ON THE TECHNOLOGICAL NATURE OF THE
DEBATE ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
The information society has become a central concept in our daily
speech about social affairs. It functions like a prism – everything in
our society and culture is seen through the information society. In a
way, the information society is a catchword, which describes how our
society is currently changing. It has the capacity to reflect our hopes
and fears and this is what makes it interesting for us.
The discourse on the information society is, of course, speech
about technology. You can see this by watching television news or by
browsing newspaper articles. Whenever the topic is somehow related
to the information society the common imaginary is often technology.
There is always an image of a computer screen or pictures of people
around some technical apparatus doing something related to tech-
nology. Furthermore, the advancement of information society is com-
monly measured by technology. I for example have the privilege to be
a citizen of the nation that has the highest mobile telephone density in
the world. Another indicator of the development of the information
society is the number of computers connected to information net-
works in a particular area.
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But the discourse on the information society is speech about tech-
nology in a deeper and more fundamental aspect. Namely, changes in
our social reality are often seen as results of the technological change.
In its crude version this technological determinism describes technol-
ogy – and also the economy – as independent factors and forces in the
social world. The changes in technology and the economy are seen as
forces that move the rest of society. If social problems arise as society
changes, they are due to the culture lag of social processes and struc-
tures that have not responded rapidly enough and followed the
change in technical and economic structures. There are also more re-
fined versions and visions of the interaction between technology and
society, where technology is seen to be socially embedded. Anyhow,
even this kind of approach seems to revert to the understanding that
technology is a force that can mould and shape the social structure. If
you look, for example, at the European Commission report “Building
the European information society for us all” (1997), you can see, that
the high-level expert group explicitly rejects the notion of technology
as an exogenous variable to which society and individuals must
adapt. However, when they present their own analysis of the central
policy challenges, they all start with a notion of information and com-
munication technology and its impact on the topic at hand. So there is
a contradiction between what is said about writers’ intentions and
what is really done and expressed in the text and analysis.
My intention here is not to deny that technology has the capacity
to change social structures. What I am concerned about here is that
there are not many analyses where technology and social systems are
seen as actors and forces that together form systems and networks of
mutual interaction and influence. (see e.g. Latour 1996)
The debate on information society is a special case within a more
comprehensive debate on technology. In our modern western culture,
we have an ambivalent conception of technology. On the one hand,
technology presents itself as a great liberating power. It holds the
promise of wealth and well-being. It is also understood as a great lev-
elling mechanism because it increases communication and in this
way brings separate social groups closer to one another. On the other
hand, technology is a destructive force that threatens our civilisation.
This ambivalent attitude toward technology is clearly visible in
the debate on the information society. Technology itself is usually de-
fined as a neutral instrument or a means to reach some end. This is
already a dubious statement, because we have good reasons to claim
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that a certain kind of technology always carries with it the “way of
life” and a connection to the social systems where it was developed.
For example it is rational to use cars as means to transport things and
humans from one place to another. But in the long run this is not pos-
sible without a network of gasoline stations and repair facilities. This
comes about when society changes into a “society of automobiles”
and it is no longer a neutral technical question of reaching some ends.
In the same way, new information and communications technologies
carry with them some forms of a technical way of life, such as the need
for electricity to make your computer function or the basic skills of
reading and writing. Usually the requirements for the implementa-
tion of new technologies are already in place, and they do not need to
affect the social environment in some spectacular way. But still there
are some explicit or implicit requirements that this technology needs
in order to function. And because they are not always explicit, this is
a question that should be studied whenever a new technology is im-
ported and implemented into some social environment.
In the debate on the information society technology is described
by using the concepts of challenge and threat or danger. (This vocabu-
lary comes from the so-called SWOT-analysis, where the intention is
to calculate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats a
certain actor has in its position.) Technology is a challenge or prom-
ise, because through it, it is possible to obtain many kinds of social
goods, such as new information, skills, wealth, personal and na-
tional advantages. Yet, technology is a threat or danger, because it can
cause various kinds of social risks, problems, inequality, surveillance
and control, and a new type of criminality as well.
While technology is both a liberating and destructive force, its
contradictory character needs to be solved somehow. Usually, the
answer to this problem is comprehension of the “appropriate use of
technology”. The primary topic in critical and political debate on the
information society is this “appropriate use of technology”. Using
Vladimir Propp’s (1984) terminology, one can say that it fulfils the
function of a magical device or a magical tool in the discourse on the
information society. By finding this mysterious and hidden “appro-
priate use of technology”, one can maximise the beneficial conse-
quences of the information society and minimise its unfavourable re-
sults. So, it is possible to interpret the whole discourse on the informa-
tion society in its deep mythical level, as a tale of the quest for this
hidden device.
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Interestingly enough, this problem has a double technological
character. Information technology as such is a magical device, which
by its sheer presence and use affects almost all social issues, from the
national economy to an individual’s morality. The “appropriate use
of technology” is a consistent technological solution to this problem.
In fact, it means the need to produce some kind of a “user’s manual”
for controlling and manipulating the problems that are likely to occur
when information technology is implemented.
The “appropriate use of technology” seems to mean two things in
general. First of all, it usually indicates a vision of technology as a
means of increasing economic growth. But it also indicates the values
of humanism, equality and justice. Thus the various official strategies
on the information society in Finland are a curious combination of
economic opportunism and moralising speech that say that technol-
ogy must not become a thing that increases the inequality between
citizens.
OFFICIAL RHETORIC ON THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY
My first example of the structure of the official rhetoric on the informa-
tion society is a short description of a governmental document. In the
spring of 1997, the government of Finland (Council of State) pre-
sented its report to the Parliament on the future prospects of the Finn-
ish nation (in Finnish: valtioneuvoston tulevaisuusselonteko
eduskunnalle”): “Reilu ja rohkea – vastuun ja osaamisen Suomi” (lit-
eral translation: “Fair and brave – A Finland of responsibility and
know-how”). In this rather lengthy document, the government de-
scribes its policy on a whole range of issues, beginning from the posi-
tion of Finland in Europe and ending with the affairs of domestic
politics, such as education and social well-being. In its latter part,
there is a chapter on the development of the information society in
Finland, entitled “We are the Finnish information society” (in Finn-
ish: “Suomalainen tietoyhteiskunta olemme me”). (This document
has been published in Finnish in WWW: http://www.vn.fi/vn/
suomi/selont/tulevaisuus/)
This report is the government’s address to the Parliament and, at
the same time, to the Finnish nation. This has some important impli-
cations for the viewpoint presented in this document. Because it is a
government address, it is written from the government’s point of
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view. It is a rhetorical document in a classical deliberative sense,
where someone argues before us, what should be done. And it is
clearly a political document. In fact, it belongs to the character of the
debate on information society that it is thoroughly political by its na-
ture.  This is also a strategy document and this means that its main
function is to create harmony of values and purposes among its read-
ers. The idea of a strategy document is to create a common vision and
a common understanding of the most important tasks for some or-
ganisation or community. So it would be a bit off the mark to read this
document as a serious scientific estimation about the future of the
Finnish nation.
The tenor of this document is a bit authoritarian. Here the Council
of State tells the nation, what can be expected for the future. The gov-
ernment does not ask the nation what it might want. Instead, it tells in
a quite direct way that the future is more like a destiny and that the
things ahead are inevitable. This is one way of arguing about a need
for action. When there are no alternatives to choose from and when
the things ahead are inevitable, the government’s politics can’t ever
be wrong.
This feature is not at all surprising, because in all official rhetoric
on the information society, there are rarely any clarifications of the
reasons why societies are at this historical moment changing into in-
formation societies. Usually, social change and the need for some po-
litical and social action are explained by referring to global changes
in the economy and to rapid technological progress. In the official
rhetoric on the information society, changes in the economy and tech-
nology are generally the basis or a starting point for argument, not a
conclusion or an issue to be argued about. This is a curious fact, be-
cause the discourse on the information society emphasises that all
things around us are changing and nothing will stay the same. How-
ever, this fundamental change does not seem to concern the matter
that economy and technology still are the fundamental forces behind
social change. So, official rhetoric on the information society has the
strong character of technological and economical determinism.
The government begins its report by making some definitions
about the information society. Contradictory interpretations and con-
ceptions of the subject are presented. Next, the report mentions some
paradoxes and risks that may appear in the process of informat-
ionalisation. There is no effort whatsoever made to resolve the contra-
dictions that are brought up in different definitions. Obviously, the
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purpose is to show that informationalisation itself is a contradictory
process. Even though the topic is somewhat problematical, every-
thing is presented as true and reliable knowledge. The text does not
include any doubts or hesitations about the subject, instead it turns
out to be a discourse on truth.
After making these definitions and showing various paradoxes,
the text continues as a catalogue of various topics that have some-
thing to do with the current social change. Yet, there is no clear hint of
what the underlying agenda of the text might be. It probably is a mix-
ture of the agendas of different ministries, since the topics belong to
such categories as the economy, changes in business and industry,
and education. This is one aspect of the official rhetoric on the infor-
mation society, namely that it is inherently diffuse, and that there are
no efforts made to organise the various topics in some reasonable
way. The topics are merely labelled and then just left there without
any further commentary. This feature can also be a result from the
SWOT principle. The idea in SWOT is just to make an inventory of
resources and costs, and then on the basis of this knowledge, to set
forth a plan for action. This makes sense in cases, where the actor is a
single organisation, a person or a community. But the picture gets
quite obscure, when one tries to construct a strategy for a whole na-
tion. There are so many different interests involved, that the commu-
nity and togetherness of all actors can be constructed only on very
general level, which it in the end signifies very little.
Beginning from its title, this report uses a strong rhetoric of iden-
tification in Kenneth Burke’s sense. By addressing its public as “we”,
it tries to demonstrate that the government’s purposes are also the
purposes of the Finnish nation. By saying that “we are the Finnish
information society”, it dissolves the difference between political elite
and people and thus builds solidarity between the two. It tries to per-
suade people to see that the government’s interests are everyone’s
cause. Moreover, the cryptic title “Fair and brave – Finland of respon-
sibility and know-how” (in Finnish: “Reilu ja rohkea – vastuun ja
osaamisen Suomi”) is persuasive in the same way, since who would
not like to live in a society that is fair, brave, responsible and has a
high standard of know-how. In the text, there is also the subtitle
“What do we get more of when we get the information society?”
which functions in the same identifying way. Using this identifying
rhetoric, the text constructs a collective actor, Finland. The message is
clear: This is our collective enterprise.
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In order to see how this official document constructs a narrative
on its discursive level, I made a short Greimasian actantial analysis of
it. The idea of the actantial model is to describe the fundamental rela-
tions in a narrative. Actans are general relation categories that exist in
all imaginable stories, in different stories different actors occupy
actant positions. The same story can be told from a different actant
perspective, a story of a subject’s victory is at the same time a story of
the anti-subject’s loss. The kernel in the actantial model is the rela-
tionship between subject and object. Other actants are organised
around this relation. The sender gives the subject a motive for want-
ing the object. At the same time the sender also determines the values
in this narrative. Helper-actant of course helps the subject and the
opponent actant tries to prevent the subject reaching the object. In the
end of the story a receiver actant evaluates the actions in the story by
gratifying and punishing the actors. In a way, an actantial model is
too trivial a tool for analysing texts, since it always produces the same
kind of description of the events.
Here I name the different actors and functions. In the text, the re-
ceiver actant is the nation. The value object is the well-being and pros-
perity of the Finnish nation. In the body of the text, there are several
actors that function as part of the actant subject. Various business
corporations, public and private organisations, educational institu-
tions, and the public administration are mentioned as social actors.
Most of these actant subjects are also in the function of helpers, de-
pending on the topic in the text. So, the public sector can be a helper
for a private enterprise and vice versa. One definite helper in the text
is the “ability to have know-how” (in Finnish: “osaaminen”). The
changes in the economy and technology are sender actants. Finally,
the “wrong choices” (which are not explicitly defined), bad politics
(most likely practised by former governments) and unfortunate eco-
nomic conditions form opponent actants.
These actants construct a narrative about the future of Finland.
Changes in economy and technology require some actions that will
assure the future well-being and prosperity of the Finnish nation.
There are some difficulties in reaching this goal, former governments
have made the wrong decisions, technological progress contains se-
vere risks, and economic conditions are not always or entirely on the
nation’s side. This is the reason why we all, business corporations,
public and private organisations, institutions and competent citizens
as well, must join together in the effort to build “not only the informa-
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tion super highway but also the highway of creativity”, as it is de-
clared in one slogan of the paper.
Because this is a narrative about the future of Finland, it cannot
describe the events to the end. It obviously must stop the story without
putting it to its evaluative end. In the study of the rhetorics of science
this figure has been noted as well. This figure has been called the ter-
minated or halted narrative. The theory behind this phenomenon is
Greimas’s idea of a canonical narrative schema. A well closed narra-
tive is formed of three parts or tests as Greimas calls them: qualifying,
decisive and glorifying tests. The first part, qualifying test, defines the
situation and builds motives for the actors in the current story. The
second part, the decisive test, describes the events where the actant
subject advances toward the object. The last part, the glorifying test,
consists of the evaluative acts, where the whole meaning and value of
the story and its events are weighed and considered. In terminated or
halted narrative the situation and its actors are defined, but then the
narration is stopped. The persuasive function in this figure is to build
motivation for the reader of such texts to join the common effort that
has been put forward in the text. There are usually some projections
between the actors in the text and its readers. The idea in this Finnish
document is to describe to the Finnish audience the most important
assignments for the future and then also move the responsibility of
reaching the goals to that audience.
The whole chapter on the information society points in this docu-
ment to its last section entitled “The new role of the public sector” (in
Finnish: “Julkisen sektorin uusi tehtävä”). The argument creates a
certain lack or need. “Knowledge and know-how do not easily
change into economic growth, new jobs and well-being. Communica-
tion between primary actors does not happen effectively enough yet.
The lack of a collective vision and strategy makes involvement diffi-
cult. The risks and opportunities of the information society are not
observed rapidly enough, because the magnitude, complexity and
nature of the change is not understood extensively enough.” Here is
the chance for the public sector to achieve a new role. Only the public
sector can satisfy this need, namely the need for public support and
co-ordination between different social actors. “The goal of the public
sector is to activate and harmonise the interests of those who are will-
ing to create new services, and this is how the public sector can assist
in the birth of the future knowledge markets.”
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SOME COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE FINNISH
STRATEGY DOCUMENT AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION REPORT
My second example is made of a small analysis of two documents.
The first one is a Finnish strategy document: “Quality of life, know-
how and competitiveness. The starting points and ends of strategic
development of the information society” (In Finnish: “Elämänlaatu,
osaaminen ja kilpailukyky. Tietoyhteiskunnan strategisen kehittä-
misen lähtökohdat ja päämäärät”. Sitra 206, Helsinki 1998. It has
been published in Finnish in WWW: http://www.sitra.fi/tietoyh-
teiskunta/suomi/st21/sitra206b.htm) This document is made by
SITRA, which is an independent Finnish research and funding or-
ganisation, but in the process of making this document there has been
a great number of specialists from different areas of society. In a way,
this paper has a semi-official nature. It is not an official report, since
the government has not in any way adopted it for its own political
decision making. This document is addressed to the wide popular
audience and the explicit wish is that it will promote public discus-
sion and debate on the development of the information society.
The other document is “Building the European information soci-
ety for us all. Final policy report of the high-level expert group”. This
report is made by an independent expert group. The group itself was
established by the European Commission and its mission was to take
part in the European Commission’s Action Plan on the Information
Society by studying the social and societal issues of information soci-
ety.
Both documents are constructed on the principles of the SWOT
analysis. So it is no wonder that they both share the vocabulary of
challenges vs. threats or opportunities vs. risks.
The first interesting common feature between these documents is
that in both of them there is an emphasis on the concept of knowledge
society instead of information society. In the Finnish language we use
the term “knowledge society” instead of “information society” and
this terminology has led to a number of misunderstandings both acci-
dental and deliberate. By the concept of knowledge society one tries to
make a distinction between concepts of data, information and knowl-
edge. This is one way to offer a perspective on the human and social
aspect in the development of the information society. According to
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this approach, data and information are something that machines
and computers process and knowledge is something that is relevant
to human beings.
In addition, it is also interesting to find out that in both the Euro-
pean Commission’s expert group paper and in the Finnish popular
debate a vision is put forward of a “society of wisdom”.
One would hope, of course, that society would be shifting more
and more towards a ‘wise society’, where scientifically supported
data, information and knowledge would increasingly be used to
make informed decisions to improve the quality of all aspects of
life. Such wisdom would help to form a society that is environ-
mentally sustainable, that takes the well-being of all its members
into consideration and that values the social and cultural aspects of
life as much as the material and economic. Our hope is that the
emerging information society will develop in such a way to ad-
vance this vision of wisdom. (p. 16).
As one can see, this is a utopian vision. The debate on informa-
tion society has this kind of utopian and also dystopian quality be-
side its more practical dimensions.
In the Finnish paper it is essential to state that Finland is a society
at the leading edge of information society development. This can be
interpreted as a national exaggeration and also as a way to construct
a positive self-image for the Finnish nation. It gives a rather comical
impression that the development of the information society is some
kind of a competition, perhaps some sport event like cross-country
skiing. It is also stated that just because Finland has this path finding
position it is also a very demanding role, because Finland will be the
first to face the problems in this development. So, this is one rhetorical
way to emphasise the difficulty of the task and to glorify its meaning,
since we have a tendency to value highly difficult assignments. Fur-
thermore it is also stated, that the role as a path finder is in the interest
of the Finnish nation, because “Finland can most effectively have an
impact on the international development by and with its example
and experiences of the building of the information society, when there
also will be opened markets for the Finnish know-how and prod-
ucts”. As you can see in this argument moral and economic aspects
are neatly put together. The effect is that it is not only morally accept-
able but also economically reasonable to try to keep this position at
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the leading edge. Competitiveness is indeed one central theme in the
Finnish document beginning from its title. This is closely connected
to the actantial structure of the Finnish document. Namely the oppo-
nent actants in the Finnish case are other competing nations. Fin-
land’s situation is presented in such terms that we are always in a
threatened position, where someone else can take our place in the in-
ternational competition.
This aspect of competitiveness is missing from the European
Commission paper. This is understandable since the expert group
tries to see the situation from whole Europe’s perspective. There is - of
course - not a single actor from a national level whose prosperity and
well-being is the evaluative yardstick in this document. But this does
not mean that there are not contradictions and tensions in their narra-
tive. One can say that the European Commission’s paper is written in
a less dramatic way than the Finnish paper. It does not construct such
sharp bipolar settings as the Finnish paper does and it does not em-
phasise in such a great degree the difficulties in the way of the infor-
mation society.
In both papers’ narrative there is however at least one common
opponent actant. This is the uncontrolled and unorganised develop-
ment of the information society. In the Finnish paper there is a lot of
concern about the uncontrolled development of economy and tech-
nology. If these forces are left alone and if they are given the chance to
develop as they want the results could be very devastating to the
Finnish society at large. One result could be the growing division be-
tween the rich and the poor. And this division does not only affect
material goods, but also the division and distribution of knowledge
and information in society. Another concern in the Finnish paper is
that if technological and economic development is not controlled and
regulated somehow, it will not automatically bring to the fore prod-
ucts and services that are relevant to the needs of citizens in the infor-
mation society. In the European Commission’s paper the same kind of
concern is expressed by using the natural metaphor of “harmoniza-
tion by erosion”. By this it is meant the uncontrolled development of
social policy systems in European societies. There is the possibility,
that societies try to gain marginal advantage by downgrading wel-
fare provisions. In this question, the European Commission is seen as
an institution above different national agencies. Once again, the per-
spective is different in national strategies and in the Commission’s
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document. Still, in both of them the question of social integration is
raised.
One interesting perspective to texts of the information society is to
look at what social actors are mentioned in them and what are the
roles they are addressed to. In the Finnish paper the case is clear. Fol-
lowing actors are mentioned in this order: individuals, business or-
ganisations, public administration. Individuals are described as be-
ings who want to develop and express themselves both in work life
and in their free time. What this actually means in the paper is that
individuals should communicate and consume ever more. Individu-
als are also given the duty to make their own decisions on what they
want to consume, the document is clearly against public regulation in
this respect. Business organisations are given a strange position in
this paper. The purpose of their action is “to give work and income
and develop the quality of working life”. Nowhere it is mentioned
that the purpose of business is to make profit. Business organisations
are reacting and adjusting their functions to increasing competition
and internationalisation. The job of the public sector is to advance the
development of the information society by means of legislation, re-
search and education.
These actors are the named positions which are used when
evaluating the consequences of the process of building the informa-
tion society. In the European Commission document the public sector
is the main actor. Different phenomena and processes in the informa-
tion society are observed from its point of view. One can say that the
development is focalised into the perspective of the public sector.
PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY
The public debate on the information society in Finland has touched
many topics. Kari A. Hintikka (1998) has divided it into four larger
fields or clusters. First, there are problems concerning the basis of the
information society (including, for instance, conceptions of informa-
tion and knowledge, interaction in the information society, the useful-
ness of information networks, etc.); second, issues on network
economy and change in working life; third, democracy, everyday life
and learning; and fourth, markets of knowledge and communication.
82 Chapter 3
What I would like to comment on here is the value aspect or the
moral aspect of this debate. Democracy and equality are fundamental
values that almost everybody shares. Because they are exceptionally
well accepted, they are used as points of departure in argument. Basi-
cally, as we all know, there are two opposite lines of argument con-
cerning the nature of the information society in general. The first line
tries to show that societies are always unequal and that the current
social change into the information society only increases this unjust
condition. The second line of argument tries to assure that the infor-
mation society can and will increase democracy. These two values are
so central that they are frequently referred to in official reports on the
information society.
Beyond this  “either/or” discussion, the values of equality and
democracy are also used to demonstrate that the speaker is in need of
more resources. For example, the public libraries are given a special
role in the Finnish strategy towards the information society. Their
assignment is to give all citizens free access to the Internet. Almost
everybody agrees on this and this is justified by using the values of
equality and democracy.
It also appears that most representatives of the libraries are will-
ing to take part in this new task. They argue, however, that they can-
not accomplish this obligation because libraries do not have suffi-
cient resources. The same structure of argument is also common
among teachers and other people working in educational institu-
tions. When defending citizens’ relationship to the information soci-
ety as a right, the values of equality and democracy are commonly
invoked. It is argued that everyone’s civic right is to have access to the
information society, whatever it may mean.
The concept of the information society is also used as a topic in
cultural criticism. I would like to define this criticism as an extensive
and diffuse critique of alienation. Its main target is not only technol-
ogy or information technology as such, but behind them, there is a
larger concern about the nature of modern society and modern cul-
ture. So, in this respect the information society and information tech-
nology are used as a scapegoat to illuminate different unpleasant
phenomena in our society.
The typical model of cultural criticism in this debate is con-
structed by usage of conceptual dualities. The duality between reality
and virtuality is quite commonly used. Usually, the speaker worries
that the difference between the real and virtual becomes obscure. The
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real can indicate many things, such as concrete reality, the nature and
experience of it, face-to-face social communication, competence to do
something with one’s own hands, awareness of sound social values,
etc. Speakers commonly declare that by creating virtual reality infor-
mation technology distorts our conception and experience of reality
in one way or another. In their argument, information technology is
the ultimate technological instrument that marks the final phase of
estrangement. Another frequently used conceptual duality is the po-
larity between active doing and passive being. This is expressed, for
example, by saying that information technology prevents children
from actively learning things, instead, they just passively adopt
knowledge.
This is a nostalgic critique of culture. It is constructed by evaluat-
ing positively some undefined past, where values had a constant and
certain nature. This construed past is then used as a normative crite-
ria by which the present circumstances are judged. In this perspec-
tive, the present and future seem to be nothing but deviations from
that normative standard. That is why there is also a strong feeling or
sense of loss and confusion in this criticism. It is usually expressed in
phrases like “nothing is real and solid anymore”. This model of criti-
cism is problematic in so far as it claims that it could be possible to
define some accurate criteria in judging what is an unalienated and
concrete relation to reality. It is also difficult to define at what histori-
cal moment that relation existed.
It is quite clear, that the information society and information tech-
nology are moral issues. It has been claimed (e.g. Hintikka 1998, 30),
that whenever a new technology is introduced to the wider public, it
always causes some kind of a moral debate. A recent example of this is
the urban legend telling how mobile telephones can be harmful by
heating their user’s brains. Another example is the debate on whether
it is acceptable to use mobile telephones in public places or not. This
moral aspect can be understood as a normal phase in a general model
or curve of adopting technological innovations (on the diffusion of
innovations see Rogers 1983). This model describes the innovation
process as a pattern, where people begin to use a new device more
and more. Depending on how many people already have become ac-
customed to it, the debate on that device also changes. So it is typical,
that in the early phases both uncritical hype and overstatements
about its pernicious effects are normal. Later on, when the innovation
has been more extensively adopted, the discussion also becomes
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more diverse, until it loses its charm altogether. Kari A Hintikka has
analysed the Finnish debate on the information society from this per-
spective, and it seems that at least parts of it follow exactly this curve
of social diffusion of technological innovations. (see Hintikka 1998
and 1999)
However, I would like to point out that most technological inno-
vations do not lose their moral aspect even when they are well
adopted into culture. For example, we still speak and argue about
cars and television in moral terms, even though they have been a part
of our everyday life, at least since the beginning of the 1960s. We have
the tendency to stress how cars are for us merely useful transport de-
vices rather than a remarkable source of feelings and experiences. In
the same way, most people say that they prefer watching news and
documentaries rather than soap operas on TV. The explanation for
this behaviour is, of course, that it reflects some crucial values in our
culture. It is respectful to show interest in such values as utility (in the
case of automobiles) or reality (in the case of television), and con-
versely, it is an indication of bad or inferior taste to say that cars or
soap operas can be a source of enjoyment. Because we regularly do
speak about technological objects in this way by using different value
patterns, I do not believe that the information society or information
technology could somehow stop being a moral issue in our culture. It
is more likely that their moral aspect will only be articulated in some
new way.
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There is widespread agreement that, at the end of twentieth century,
we were confronted with one of the rare intervals in history where
major events occur with great rapidity, causing dramatic economic
and social changes (Gould 1980, 226). Sometimes it is argued that the
changes occurring together with the disappearance of the industrial
society will be even more dramatic than those caused by the replace-
ment of the agrarian by the industrial society, as the change process
will take place in a much shorter period of time. In the current public
and political debate on industrial transformation, the notion of Infor-
mation Society or information economy has taken centre stage to-
gether with the publication of the very influential Bangemann Report
(High Level Group on the Information Society 1994) and following
political initiatives in various countries, although it is not undis-
puted (Lyon 1988, 17).
THE TECHNOLOGY-PUSH APPROACH
The analysis of the emerging information society is dominated by a
technology push approach. The discussion on a new technological
revolution clearly indicates this. As the Bangemann Report states:
“Throughout the world information and communication technolo-
gies (ICTs) are generating a new industrial revolution already as sig-
nificant and far-reaching as those of the past” (1994, 4).
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The dynamics of the current transformation process, however,
cannot be revealed from the quantitative increase in the applications
of modern ICT. What really characterises the current transformation
process is the fact that all sectors and industries are increasingly in-
terpenetrated by information work and that human work will occur
more and more through ICTs as the intermediary. Instead of arguing
that the information society will replace the industrial society due to
technological changes, as was done in the earlier debate (Bell 1973),
we can conclude that the existing socio-economic structure will be
transformed by processes of informatisation.
In the last few years , according to Robins and Webster, there has
been a decided step away from prioritising technology as the centre-
piece of change and therefore also from technological determinism.
“… nowadays the focus is on information – rather than information
and communication technologies – as the key source of change”
(1997, 3). The role that modern ICTs play in the transformation of so-
ciety is regarded as a minor one when compared to the major part
played by information. Information and knowledge are an important
asset now that the economy is becoming more uncertain, which is
mainly caused by the increasing global competition.
One can of course argue that in many ways all human societies
have been information economies in that all economic activities de-
pend upon human beings and their ability to bring information  to
bear on their tasks. “In fact, all tasks to which human labour is ap-
plied, inherently involve some measures of information processing.
This might be in terms of receiving instructions (communication),
checking to see in what state the materials are (perception), perform-
ing calculations or other mental acts (transformation of information
or whatever” (Miles and Robins 1994, 9). This means that the appro-
priate distinction is not between an industrial and post-industrial
economy but between two forms of information-based industrial,
agrarian and service production.
However, when we use the term “information society”, we are not
talking about a historical universe. The term “information society” is
used to characterise a new and unprecedented kind of social and eco-
nomic formation. The development of a technology-based informa-
tion space, in which phenomena of the real world are represented in
symbolic artefacts, can be seen as the key aspect that distinguishes
the emerging modern information society from the traditional one.
This information space can be characterised by the following aspects:
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• transformation of all information created in the production
process into a common digital form
• integration of different information systems into one technical
system
• world-wide extension of information networks (Boes 1996).
In the following, we will discuss the two key developments
which both contribute to the increasing interpenetration of work by
information activities: the growing need for knowledge-intensive
business services and the introduction of a new organisation logic.
GLOBALISATION AND KNOWLEDGE-INTENSIVE
BUSINESS SERVICES
It is often argued that globalisation is the most important factor be-
hind the current socio-economic transformation. Globalisation
means more than just an increase in transborder trade and direct in-
vestment: it signifies an increasing interdependence and interpen-
etration of economic processes on a world-wide scale. Castells de-
fines the global economy as “an economy with the capacity to work as
a unit in real time on a planetary scale”. (1997, 92).
Globalisation has contributed a lot to the stiffening of competi-
tion as national monopolies or oligopolies have collapsed. However,
regarding the emerging information society, the fact that
globalisation at the same time results in the establishment of new
competition criteria is even more important. Price, quality and time
can be seen as entrance barriers to the global market; economic suc-
cess, however, depends upon the capability of companies to be first at
the market with new products which meet the taste of their customers.
Under the conditions of global competition, innovativeness and
customisation are becoming the key criteria of economic success, par-
ticularly as the dynamics of technological progress accelerates and
the life cycles of many products are shrinking across a broad spec-
trum of industries.
“Quicker innovation”, as Lash argues, “… entails that a far
greater proportion of the production process than heretofore must be
accounted for by a knowledge-intensive ‘design process’ and a
smaller proportion by the ‘material process’” (Lash 1994, 119). But
innovation also depends upon the research potential of the company.
90 Chapter 4
Although the result of basic research conducted in universities and
state research institutes are publicly available, it takes constant in-
vestment effort in theoretical research for companies to be able to in-
terpret and use abstract knowledge. Companies can hardly make use
of the public good “new theoretical knowledge” if they do not con-
duct research themselves.
In some way, we can see similar trends in the service sector. Serv-
ices are often characterised as activities in which output is essentially
consumed when produced. However, due to modern ICTs, many serv-
ice activities can nowadays be embodied in artefacts, which means
that the direct relationship between production and consumption
can be broken up (Soete 1996, 48). This also implies the increased
tradeability of these services. In this case, their attraction for custom-
ers depends very much on the contents. Therefore, the design of the
contents will become the main value of service activities. But still,
when services are no longer immediately consumed, to do research to
improve existing or developing new services becomes worthwhile.
This means that not only in manufacturing but also in service proc-
esses knowledge-intensive research and design processes are becom-
ing more important.
The fact that more work is going into design and research proc-
esses is only one aspect of the changes in the structure of work caused
by the globalisation process. As customisation becomes increasingly
important, more work will also go into marketing. Furthermore, the
globalisation process makes high demands on the management func-
tion. Planning becomes more difficult under the conditions of in-
creasing uncertainty. The same holds true for the function of organi-
sation, as the restructuring of manufacturing and services is becom-
ing a process of learning and continuous improvement. We also have
to mention the increasing demand for further training. Continuous
incremental improvement as well as permanent organisational adap-
tation and renewal can only be realised if workers get the chance to
improve their knowledge through lifelong learning. There is, we can
conclude, an increasing demand for knowledge-intensive business
services, including both indirect work and management work,
whereas direct production or service work may decrease.
Besides these changes in the structure of work, the nature of the
production process is also changing. Customers no longer accept
highly standardised mass products, instead they ask for more indi-
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vidual solutions. This process has been commonly understood in
terms of “diversified quality production” (Streeck 1989) and “flexible
specialisation” (Piore and Sabel 1984), in which increasingly special-
ised consumption entails more flexible ways of production. Accord-
ing to Kern and Schumann, the system regulator is becoming the key
figure in manufacturing, who - instead of performing standardised
tasks - is more engaged in problem solving processes (1984). A similar
trend has been identified in the service sector, where the concept of ‘a
service out of one hand’ also transforms work into some kind of a
problem-solving process. It is not only that the production of things
and services has become infused with symbols insofar as knowledge-
intensive services have become central to many production processes
but, at the same time, the core production processes themselves have
become more information-intensive.
It is important to mention that there are also opposite trends. We
should definitely not conflate the processing of data and their ex-
change between people and the acquisition of knowledge. When we
differentiate between the notion of information and the need for
knowledge, it becomes quite obvious that the concept of information
society and that of knowledge society can have very different mean-
ings. Processes such as processing and transmitting data are less de-
manding and less knowledge-based. We also have to look at the con-
cept of innovation more closely. Very often diversification and inno-
vation are based on the standardisation of the parts of the whole
product. It is obvious that there is no general trend towards knowl-
edge-based information work. Instead, we can expect some kind of
polarisation with increasingly knowledge-based jobs, on the one
hand, and more repetitive information work on the other
THE NEW ORGANISATION LOGIC
Globalisation also causes the developing of a new organisation logic.
Here we will first describe the logic of the traditional Taylorist/
Fordist organisation model. This model is based on the assumption
that a more or less unlimited demand for highly standardised con-
sumer goods exists. At the same time, due to national monopolies or
oligopolies, companies do not have to worry about foreign competi-
tion. We can characterise the environmental situation as placid, se-
cure and simple. As it is possible to anticipate the market trends for a
longer period of time, the production process can be organised in a
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highly standardised, fragmented and formalised way. In order to se-
cure the adherence to the formal rules and detailed regulations, bu-
reaucratic control structures are established.
The traditional production model is linked with a specific form of
information flow; it contains channels in which only a vertical flow of
information is possible and through which the acting of hierarchi-
cally arranged units is controlled. Actually, this model has some kind
of built-in mechanisms to block information flows; due to its bureau-
cratic structure and the far-reaching division of labour, the model
both hierarchically and vertically produces too many interfaces
which become a hindrance to communication and information ex-
change. There is a risk that within the traditional production model
too much information gets lost, particularly as in the bureaucratic
control system the broad middle management is mainly dealing with
the routine filtering of information.
In a globalising economy, where innovation competition is domi-
nating and customers no longer accept standardised mass products
or services but ask for individual solutions to problems which they
themselves cannot always define exactly, markets become unstable,
insecure and complex. Companies have to abandon the traditional
Fordist production model and apply new organisational structures
and channels of information flow that can cope with uncertainty. The
following elements can be seen as important for a new organisation
logic: systemic globalisation, vertical de-integration, functional or
process integration, which can also overstep the borderlines of com-
panies, discursive co-ordination as well as the freeing of agencies
from bureaucratic rules to allow for self-organisation and self-control
(Schienstock 1997).
We have argued earlier that as one of the consequences of a
globalising economy we can observe the breakdown of national mo-
nopolies and oligopolies. Firms are increasingly confronted with for-
eign competitors on their “home market” while they themselves start
to globalise their production. On a borderless market, companies can
no longer rely on expending their exports only; they have to increase
their direct foreign investment and to produce internationally. Nowa-
days, even medium-sized companies organise their production on a
global scale. Ernst and Lundvall stress the importance of systematic
globalisation. For them globalisation not only has a quantitative but
also a qualitative aspect: this means “a shift from partial to systemic
forms of globalisation. In order to cope with the increasingly demand-
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ing requirements of global competition, companies are forced to inte-
grate their erstwhile stand-alone operations in individual host coun-
tries into increasingly complex international production networks”
(Ernst and Lundvall 1997, 11f).
The strategy of vertical de-integration is mainly associated with
downsizing and outsourcing. Big companies reduce size and become
leaner to get the same entrepreneurial dynamism, innovativeness
and informalism as small companies have, and to be able to react as
quickly and flexibly as small companies can. Downsizing often takes
place together with outsourcing. In companies nowadays more and
more functions are becoming the subject of ‘make or buy’ decisions. If
units cannot compete with offers from outside suppliers, they are at
risk of becoming outsourced. Not only peripheral but even functions
that can be considered as core businesses, as, for example, design,
become legally independent through outsourcing. However, former
organisational relationships do not automatically turn into market
relationships. Instead, outsourced parts are still often linked very
closely with and economically controlled by the core company, based
on long-term exchange agreements.
The establishment of cost and profit centres is another strategy to
reduce vertical integration. More autonomy is given to the firm’s divi-
sions, while, at the same time, they become fully responsible for costs
and profits. Agreements are signed between headquarters and costs
centres in which output, the quality of the product, the time of deliv-
ery and costs or profits are fixed. The tasks and responsibilities of the
headquarters, on the other hand, are reduced quite significantly. Ac-
cording to Hedlund and Rolander, in so-called ‘heterarchically’ or-
ganised companies responsibility for product groups, functions and
specific territories can be decentralised in such a way that many units
have a say in the company´s decision-making process (1990). Loose
coupling and direct negotiation among sub-units particularly con-
cerning transfer prices is typical for a profit centre organisation.
A consequence of the introduction of costs and profit centres is
the flattening of hierarchy, as organisation levels between headquar-
ters and the centres become obsolete. The reduction of the organisa-
tional levels of bureaucracy, however, continues further down the hi-
erarchical ladder as companies become more aware of the disadvan-
tages of such a large bureaucracy: slow information exchange and
even loss of information, lengthy decision-making processes and a
non-innovative business culture in particular. All these conse-
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quences of large bureaucracies will become serious problems in an
economy where success in business depends very much on the
innovativeness of the companies.
The most important aspect of an organisational strategy of func-
tional integration is the introduction of group work. Work groups of-
ten become responsible for self-contained production processes with-
out a fixed division of labour among the members of the group. Work
groups have to organise themselves; they are expected to continu-
ously optimise the way in which they organise their work. At the
same time, by monitoring each other, work groups should also con-
tinuously improve their co-operation and information exchange.
Learning by doing and learning by interacting are important aspects
in group work.
Group work necessarily involves reflexivity. As Lash puts it: “It
entails self-reflexivity in that heteronomous monitoring of workers by
rules is displaced by self-monitoring. It involves (and entails) ‘struc-
tural reflexivity’ in that the rules and resources (the latter including
the means of production) of the shop floor no longer controlling work-
ers, become the object of reflection of agency. That is, agents can refor-
mulate and use such rules and resources in a variety of combinations
in order chronically to innovate” (1994, 119). There is a tendency to
construct rather than simply adopt roles prescribed by management.
The group or team approach is also often applied to organise de-
velopment and design processes. A new style of innovation manage-
ment reintegrates research and development with engineering, de-
sign, procurement, production and even marketing. The development
of new products, quality control, market assessment and price calcu-
lation – all these activities are performed within a cross-functional
team consisting of members from various departments. The idea be-
hind such teams is that all products are designed with manufactur-
ing in mind but also to speed up marketing.
Furthermore, large companies completely restructure their sup-
plier chain by reducing the number of suppliers drastically. At the
same time, a new division of tasks takes place; suppliers have to pro-
duce complete systems which can be assembled directly without any
contribution of the core company and they have to take over addi-
tional tasks, particularly in research and development. This means
that the innovation process will become more like a joint undertaking
of networked firms. Besides this, customer firms as well can take part
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in the co-construction of new products in order to avoid marketing
problems.
Decentralisation and responsible autonomy, of course, always
carry the risk of co-operation turning into competition. Although top
management and other superiors can no longer rely on the traditional
command and control mechanisms, they still have to co-ordinate
business processes. But they have to turn to more ‘soft’ measures,
such as creating a company vision and developing an organisation
culture, organising platforms to exchange information and to de-
velop long-term strategic plans as well as to strengthen co-operation
between autonomous parts. Here we can speak of discursive co-ordi-
nation as a new way of governing business processes. This new way
of governing can also be applied in the relationships between core
companies and their suppliers or customers.
Based on what has been said so far, we can characterise the new
organisation logic as mainly relying on the governance mechanism of
networking, which integrates both the flexibility advantage of the
market and the stability advantage of bureaucracy. The network ap-
proach is actually extended to the relationships between companies
and so-called supporting organisations. To survive in innovation
competition, companies can hardly rely only on themselves; they do
not innovate in isolation. Instead, they look for co-operation with or-
ganisations that can support them in their innovation activities. Uni-
versities as well as private and public research institutes, technology
transfer institutes and state agents in research and technology policy
are seen as the most important knowledge-providing organisations
that companies co-operate with to increase and accelerate their inno-
vation activities. Also, investment banks, education and training in-
stitutes and business associations can directly or indirectly influence
companies in their innovation activities.
The new organisation logic, we can conclude, manifests itself in
the following three network structures:
• an intra-organisational network structure which develops be-
tween sub-units replacing the bureaucratic governance re-
gime; this increasingly includes global production networks
as companies break down their value chains and locate dis-
crete functions in different regions all over the world
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• an inter-organisational network structure which develops be-
tween companies replacing the market as the traditional mode
of co-ordinating exchange
• a network between companies and support organisations to
increase and speed up innovation activities within compa-
nies.
TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES
Although modern ICTs cannot be seen as the driving force behind the
unfolding of the new organisation logic, one cannot argue that mod-
ern ICTs do not matter at all. Our hypothesis here is that the new or-
ganisation logic develops together with the changing forms of apply-
ing modern ICTs. Here we will distinguish between the following
perspectives: ICTs as a tool, as a control device and automation tech-
nology, as an organisation technology, as a feedback device, and as a
network technology.
As all other technologies, ICTs can firstly be characterised as tools
to work with (Eason 1988). The introduction of modern ICTs then re-
fers to single sub-processes or tasks only. Technology from this per-
spective is visible and tangible; technology is a machine, a piece of
apparatus, or a device. The tool approach is based on a materialistic
concept of technology. As tools, modern ICTs are intended to support
people in their work, the aim is to give the person some advantage in
pursuing the task – to enhance the task performance, for example, or
to work more rapidly and more exactly.
Eason speaks of modern ICTs as hand tools. However, the compu-
ter or the microprocessor is not meant to manipulate the material con-
ditions of the product but syntactically manipulate its internal state.
Therefore, the computer is characterised as ‘brain technology’
(Krämer 1989). Because of the fact that it can duplicate and process all
symbolic artefacts and that it can easily be reprogrammed, which
makes it a very flexible tool, the computer is in some way a unique
tool.
In the beginning, computers were introduced to facilitate routine
tasks, such as administrative data processing, accounting and statis-
tical analysis. Later on, computers could also be used to assist in de-
sign and planning and to support managers in their decision-mak-
ing, as it became easier to quickly rehearse various alternative op-
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tions. Eason gives some examples of modern ICTs as a tool: “Word
processing enables the unskilled typist to produce good quality out-
puts because there are no messy errors corrected on the paper. An in-
tegrated work station gives the full power of a publishing house to a
single operator; to present type in many fonts, integrate it with tables
and diagrams, vary the size of the characters, etc. Planning with net-
work control software means it is possible to vary an element in the
plan and examine its impact on the whole plan. Similarly, a
spreadsheet enables the financial planner to change a single estimate
and quickly see its implication for overall costs. Not only does com-
puter-aided design enable designers to build a three-dimensional
model that can be examined from any angle but it makes it possible to
test the effect of changing an element of the structure.” (Eason 1988,
19).
Modern ICTs are very powerful tools since they can store huge
amounts of information and process them within a very short time.
They increase an organisation memory dramatically, which can be
defined as stored information from an organisation’s history that can
be brought to bear on present decisions. (Wash and Ungson 1991, 61).
Sometimes it would not even be possible to conduct specific tasks
without ICTs as powerful tools. This is particularly true for informa-
tion-intensive services in the banking business. From what has been
said so far we can draw the conclusion that modern ICTs as a tool can
make companies more competitive not only regarding costs and
prices but also time and quality.
It is important to mention that, due to technological innovations,
a platform for using modern ICTs as a collective tool is developing
(Baukrowitz et al. 1994). In the case of a decentralised work group
computing model working jointly on a complex task and co-
ordinating directly reciprocal sub-processes will be possible. For ex-
ample, workers, even if they are spatially separated, can jointly de-
velop a new product or a new market strategy. ICTs are also used as a
collective tool when a maintenance problem cannot be solved on the
spot by the service technician responsible and he has to ask special-
ists working in the company for support. In this case, the aim of the
system development is not to replicate whole work processes techni-
cally but to support collective work behaviour through a collective
tool and joint access to information.
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While, on the one hand, ICTs can become powerful tools in the
hands of the workers to support them in their work, they can also be
used by the management as control devices. Due to modern ICTs, it
becomes possible to directly monitor the work process and individual
work behaviour as well as to control work progress. Therefore, when
needed, the management can intervene in the work process and de-
mand a change in work behaviour.
ICTs also make it possible to transfer the knowledge of skilled
workers into machinery and thereby to eliminate human labour. “The
most important impact of new ICTs”, according to Soete, “is that they
move the border between tacit and codified knowledge. They make it
technically possible and economically attractive to codify kinds of
knowledge which so far have remained in tacit forms” (1996, 49). The
codification of knowledge leads to the automation of production
processes. To codify tacit knowledge, however, is often not easy, be-
cause it is complex, and it is especially difficult and costly to codify
knowledge when the reality it refers to or is operated upon is chang-
ing rapidly (Ernst and Lundvall 1997, 8). So far, automating human
skills has proved to be economically viable only in relation to rela-
tively simple tasks, but nowadays attempts are increasingly made
also to transfer expert knowledge into data and expert systems.
Ernst and Lundvall, however, also argue that the elimination of
human labour is only one aspect of the automation process, the codi-
fication of tacit knowledge and its transfer into modern ICTs also cre-
ates a demand for new activities and skills. “The very growth in the
amount of information which is made accessible to economic agents
increases the demand for skills in selecting and using information
intelligently (1997, 28). Modern ICTs, although they depend on codi-
fied knowledge, simultaneously create new demands for tacit knowl-
edge.
Furthermore, ICTs are conceived of as organisation technologies.
Thus, they integrate work processes conducted by human beings and
machines into one total process (Brandt et al. 1978). Here, however,
we will use a more dynamic concept interpreting technology as a
strategy to design production processes aiming at controlling whole
production systems. We can use the term “technisation” (Barley
1994) to stress the strategic aspect. Concerning the integration aspect,
the fact that ICTs are open technologies that can be hooked up with
relative ease to other technological systems (Mackay 1995) is impor-
tant to be mentioned here. “The growing convergence of technologies,
99From Technological Control of Production Towards
a Meaning-Based Co-Ordination of Action
especially in the area of micro-electronics, offer a great technological
potential to integrate or merge functions, processes and divisions
(van Tulder and Junne 1988, 82f). By abstracting from the specificity
of the work process the computer can systematically integrate the
work process as a whole.
Technological integration becomes possible through large main-
frame based technology concept. In this case, access to the database is
regulated centrally. Users can no longer decide how to proceed in
their work process. Instead, the sequence of their acting is unequivo-
cally prescribed by the technology as they are integrated in an auto-
mated production process.
Modern ICTs have created the vision of a factory without human
beings. Calculable operations are taken over by machines and inte-
grated in process overlapping CIM architectures. The technological
integration can also cross the border of companies as, for example, in
JIT systems. Modern ICTs, therefore, become the core of systemic forms
of organisational restructuring; instead of focusing on single work
places a holistic approach is applied, which means that the business
organisation as a whole is the target of technisation.
The application of modern ICTs is seen as leading to some kind of
a technology-based hyper-Fordism. Systemic forms of organisational
restructuring, however, by no means imply such kind of technology
based hyper-Fordism. Instead, they only imply an organisation per-
spective from above, taking the whole into account. Systemic restruc-
turing does not mean either that a technology deterministic perspec-
tive is applied. On the contrary, we can argue that modern ICT-based
systems have to become much more flexible, as they have to be
adapted to changing demands from the market. When the market de-
mand is becoming specialised and there is a trend towards rapidly
changing consumer preferences, ICT-based production flexibility is
rather important, which at the same time causes a breakdown of the
Fordist production structure.
100 Chapter 4
Actually, modern ICTs can be seen as rather open technologies
concerning organisation forms. As Naschold puts it: “Information
technologies due to their structure of a hard ware and soft ware com-
ponent are depending on the development of a separate social model
of production. The regulation of social relationships is an endog-
enous and functionally necessary part of the development of the tech-
nological system…” (1986, 232).
This, of course, does not mean that technisation and organising
are strategically independent. On the contrary, there is a strong mu-
tual dependency but not a one-way determination, as is assumed by
technological determinism. Neither technology nor organisation is
fixed but both change in relation to each other; therefore, the design of
information technology and the design of organisation forms are
largely becoming the same task. Modern ICTs offer opportunities to
manipulate both the communication technologies themselves as well
as the organisation contexts in which they are embedded according
to specific aims. They provide, as Fulk and DeSantis argue, more than
traditional technologies “occasions” for structuring the production
process according to other drivers of change such as innovativeness,
cost-saving, control or quality (1995, 337).
Besides technisation and organising we can identify en-
culturation as the third strategy of integrating work processes. This
aspect of cultural integration becomes particularly important in de-
centralised organisation structures in which the agency is freed from
organisation norms and the dictating control of machine pace, and in
which self-organisation and direct co-ordination dominates. In such
a structure, there is always the risk that organisation members pursue
departmental or subgroup aims and interests without taking the
overall goal of the whole company into account. A “strong” business
culture is seen as a possible tool to integrate workers socially, to make
them share the overall values and to see the “world with the eyes of
the company” (Berger 1993, 16). Sometimes also the term “vision-
based management” is used. Common values are seen as the core of
the business culture. The intention of creating a strong business cul-
ture is in the first place to commit workers to the company; they
should identify themselves with the company and see the company´s
aim as supporting their own interests. Building up trust relation-
ships may be seen as the most important function of a strong business
culture.
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Furthermore, modern ICTs can be conceived of as media connect-
ing people with each other as well as with machines as more and
more communication within and between companies is technically
mediated. The media perspective is dealing with non- formalised
communication in the first place. Here the focus is not upon the capa-
bility of modern ICTs to substitute for tacit knowledge, from this per-
spective the emphasis is on their potential to reinforce human interac-
tion and interactive mode, etc.” (1997, 28). For modern ICTs as media,
the following aspects are particularly important:
• the dramatic increase in the speed of communication, with
high volumes of data moving from one location to another at
rates unimaginable even a decade ago
• a sharp rise in communication bandwidth, with more infor-
mation of multiple frequencies travelling at the same time
down a common line
• the possibility of combining text, voice, video, data, and/or
graphics within a multimedia communication system (Fulk
and DeSantis 1994).
One of the major impacts of modern ICTs as a medium is a further
acceleration of the innovation process as workers can for example co-
construct a new product. Furthermore, ICTs provide workers with a
technical infrastructure on the basis of which they can continuously
reshape their relationships among each other. In some way, we can
argue that modern ICTs can replace organisation rules. The function
of organisation rules is to create stable relationships between people
and of people with machines to secure continuous production. How-
ever, in a technical network, working people can continuously pro-
duce, reproduce and also change their relationships at the same time.
There are, however, limits for modern ICTs to function as a medium;
the exchange of distance-sensitive knowledge, for example, still
needs face-to-face contacts.
The newest trend concerning the media perspective is the integra-
tion of company internal digital information systems into a public in-
formation structure. Two technological developments are important
here: interactive multimedia telecommunication applications, on the
one hand, and the use of the Internet for commercial purposes includ-
ing the development of new services on the other. From the viewpoint
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of companies, the Internet offers an interesting platform for advertis-
ing theirproducts and services. At the same time, a great demand for
new information and communication services is developing. We can
expect that in the future interactive multimedia applications will be
developed, which will support tele-co-operation within companies,
co-operation within supplier networks and, increasingly, communi-
cation and co-operation with customers.
Proceeding on the assumption that modern ICTs will primarily be
used to connect people with each other in their work and to support
the exchange of tacit knowledge in the future, one might criticise the
current debate on information society for the fact that too high an im-
portance is attached to information and information technology as
key factors in economic and social transformation. “What character-
ises the current technological revolution,” according to Castells, “is
not the centrality of knowledge and information, but the application
of such knowledge and information to knowledge generation and
information processing/communication devices, in a cumulative
feedback loop between innovation and the use of innovation” (1997,
32).
It is the immediate feedback between knowledge generation and
knowledge application in processes of learning by doing and learn-
ing by interacting that becomes the key aspect of the emerging infor-
mation or knowledge society. We can here speak of some kind of spi-
ral movement. Through learning by doing, new knowledge occurs
and is directly applied in the production process, and, therefore,
leads to an acceleration of the innovation process. Innovation be-
comes a normal part of work, which creates new opportunities for
learning. As such, a spiral movement is at the very core of individual
and organisational learning and, therefore, it might be even more ap-
propriate to talk about a learning economy.
The following table lists the various functions of modern ICTs in
a schematic way and illustrates the aim related to single functions.
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CONCLUSIONS
Above we have presented alternative views on modern ICTs. These
views can also be interpreted as “Leitbilder” of applying these tech-
nologies. Here we will differentiate between “technological control of
production”, on the one hand, and “meaning-based co-ordination of
actions” on the other, as two different “Leitbilder” of developing ICT-
based systems (Boes 1997). In the case of the first ‘Leitbild’, the aim is
to eliminate or at least to control human labour by transforming tacit
into codified knowledge. This makes it possible to reduce alternatives
of acting drastically; the workers have to follow fixed and standard-
ised sequences of acting, controlled by the pace of the technical sys-
Metaphor Function Aim
ICTs as a tool support for workers in increase quality and
the work process rapidity, improve
capability to cope
with complexity
automation elimination of human costs saving
technology labour
control device monitoring and steering avoid defects,
the work process adaptation
to environmental
changes
feedback support learning innovation
mechanism processes
organisation integration of tasks, organisational
technology functions and processes fexibility,
transparency,
medium, network creation of technical rapid exchange of
technology connections among information
people and with and knowledge
machines
Table 1: Alternative perspectives on information technology.
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tem. This “Leitbild” fits with the logic of the traditional Fordist pro-
duction model.
In the case of the second “Leitbild”, control is not an aim for ap-
plying modern ICTs. Instead, the information system represents ob-
jects of reality and options of their processing. Work, in this case, can
be characterised as interpreting the meaning of symbols. Tacit knowl-
edge is seen as a valuable resource, as it is crucially important for
developing new and more efficient ways of acting. ICTs, in this case,
become media which open up the opportunity of permanent commu-
nicative connectivity. They are not used to eliminate tacit knowledge
by transforming it into codified knowledge but to support its rapid
and continuous exchange among workers. This allows for a collec-
tive interpretation of information and the development of joint ways
of acting.
Our arguments so far clearly indicate that the development of the
new organisation logic is associated with a changing view on mod-
ern ICTs. The traditional perspective sees modern ICTs mainly as a
tool which not only supports the individual employee in his work but
also replaces human labour and functions as a control device in the
hands of the management. Furthermore, the traditional perspective
interprets modern ICTs as a strategy to integrate and automate whole
production processes, the consequence of which is that employees
are steered by the pace of the autonomous technical system in their
work. This view on modern ICTs fits very well with the logic of the
traditional Fordist production model aiming at eliminating and con-
trolling human labour. The application of modern ICTs then leads to
some kind of hyper-Fordism. The interpretation of modern ICTs as a
collective tool and as a medium that connects people fits with the new
organisation paradigm characterised by the logic of intra- and inter-
organisational networks.
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Information Occupations, Informational
Work and Social Divisions
The Landscape in Finland and Hungary
RAIMO BLOM
HARRI MELIN
 PETER ROBERT
In this chapter we ask what kind of structural changes has taken
place in the work organisation due to computers and the use of new
technology in general. We also ask if there are social divisions to be
seen in the labour markets due to technological change. The main fo-
cus is in the informational positions in the labour process. We use Fin-
land as an empirical case. Here we follow the methodological idea of
analysing the most developed case.
Our chapter is a contribution to the theory of information society
with a strategic case study. We also present data concerning the devel-
opment of the information society in post-socialist countries. In this
respect our main focus is with the Hungarian case.
American sociologist Daniel Bell published nearly 30 years ago a
book titled The Coming of  Post-Industrial Society. A Venture in Social
Forecasting (Bell 1973). At that time nobody talked about the coming of
the information society, sociologists were interested in consequences
of automation. Bell’s book was an important milestone in the popular
discussion concerning the information society. In the book Bell pre-
dicted that in the post-industrial society the most important economic
branches will be services and most important social groups will be
professional and technical occupations.
Today many journalists, politicians and researchers share the
idea that we already live in the information society. Newspapers are
full with articles how “the information society is with us” or “how
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the information era requires life long learning” or how “the informa-
tion society will change the leisure time”. But what do we actually
understand with the concept “information society”? There seem to be
as many definitions as there are definers. However, almost all seem to
accept that networking and globalisation are vitally important in the
new times. An other joint notion is that information will play a key
role in all spheres of life.
During the last years the discussion concerning the information
society has increased enormously. Newspapers, TV and internet are
full with articles and programs about the information society. Infor-
mation society is considered to be the inevitable future of European
societies. Also social scientists have actively been discussing about
the topic. On the basis of the above mentioned discussions we raise
some basic questions connected with the coming of the information
society. In the following we ask:
1. What do we understand with “informatisation” and what are its
socio-historical foundations? (see Blom 1988, Lyon 1988, 1994;
Martin 1995).
2. How is the information society linked with a more global societal
change? (see Freeman-Soete 1994; Freeman et al. 1995, Castells
1996)
3. What does the change mean at the level of positional structure (a) as
a change in the division of labour (information sector, information
occupations; see Lyon 1988; Blom 1988; Paakkolanvaara 1988;
Tilastokeskus 1997) and the world-wide polarisation of skills (Free-
man et al. 1995) and (b) as a change in the foundations of power
and power resources (Heap et al. 1995, 101–178; Korvajärvi 1992
and Kortteinen 1992).
The change occurs also inside the occupational and working po-
sitions as the transformation of qualification demands (skills and
education) and the change has its effects on work and reproduction
situations. The change towards information society is a significant
part of development strategies (Freeman et Al. 1995) of different soci-
eties. It is generally expected to be a significant route to the success.
Finally the transformation has its effect on the theories of structure
and social change of modern societies (see Lyon 1994; Webber 1995;
Martin 1995; Heap 1995).
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THE LANDSCAPE
Theory and policies
Information technology is penetrating the whole society, it can be
found in almost all of societal processes. This global change is caused
much of dreams and fears discussed under the tittle “information
society”. The information society is enthusiastically hailed already
by such well-known authors like Toffler (1971), Bell (1973 and
Naisbitt (1982). For example Bell (1973, 26, ref. 19) writes about new
society based on knowledge that the “development of new forecast-
ing and ‘mapping’ techniques makes possible a novel phase in eco-
nomic history – the conscious, planned advance of technological
change, and therefore the reduction of indeterminacy about economic
future”.
In his book The Rise of the Network Society Manuel Castells (1996)
has presented a very sophisticated thesis about the structural change
that is occurring in the global context (see also Kasvio in this volume).
Instead of the information society Castells talks about informational
society. In informational society the production, delivering and
processing of information is an important source of power. All eco-
nomical activities are organised in forms of networks. Networks are
the most effective for of production, delivering and processing of in-
formational products. Informational society is also global. All ele-
ments of production, consumption and circulation (capital, labour
force, raw materials, management, information, technologies and
markets) are organised in global scale.
“The information society” has been an important strategy in Eu-
ropean level White Paper of 1993 (European Commission 1993). The
so called Bangemann report (High Level Group 1994) suggests the
development of whole Europe to an integrated information society
through market-driven revolution. The Report promised a lot. among
other things “a more caring European society with significantly
higher quality of life and a wider choice of services and entertain-
ment” and “more efficient, transparent and responsive public serv-
ices, closer to the citizen and at lower cost. All that works against the
creation of divided society according to the access to and acceptance
of technological development. In a word, social integration and cohe-
sion is ensured. Later in Action Plan reports (1994, 1996) the strategy
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was put to legislative tasks, economic means and problems to be
solved. The questions moved from the improvement of economic envi-
ronment and information technological network to those of informa-
tion security and intellectual property rights.
All these scenarios has increased both hopes and fears. The big-
gest threat that has emerged is connected with employment. What is
the future of work in information society? On the other hand hopes
are also connected with work. The wishes are there after reached
those of the getting free of monotonous and heavy work and the in-
crease of autonomy and equal communication at work and the com-
ing to the new phase of direct democracy.
Information work and information workers
In his book on information society Frank Webster (1995) has analyti-
cally distinguished five different definitions concerning the informa-
tion society. According to him there are:
 1) technological,
 2) economic,
 3) professional,
 4) spatial and
 5) cultural perspective.
Though all these perspectives are interesting and they have their
value of their own, there is still demand for a sociological analysis. Of
course there is a lot of theoretical literature, but we are short of con-
crete sociological research dealing with changes in occupational
structures, division of labour, labour process.
The existing theoretical approaches share one common feature.
They all see the growth of information as a basic reason behind all the
changes that are occurring all around the society. These changes are
considered to be important especially in the economical basis and in
the working life. A radical change is taking place a change from the
industrial society towards an information society.
In most theories the structure of economy is supposed to develop
so that the share of services becomes more important than the share of
industries. This kind of scenario was presented already by Daniel
Bell at early ’70s (Bell 1973). According to Bell information will be the
engine of the coming service society. The traditional means of produc-
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tion will be replaced by intellectual technology. Also the structure of
the labour power will be changed dramatically, the core will consist
of highly educated experts and other white collar employees. The
majority of the labour force will work in information occupations in
stead of traditional industrial jobs.
Also other well known approaches to the information society do
share the same vision about the changes in economy and in occupa-
tional structure. Alvin Toffler (1981), Yoneji Masuda (1981) and John
Naisbitt (1982) all present a similar kind of positive utopia about the
coming information society. All things in the modern society will de-
velop towards positive solutions. There seem to be no losers, every-
body is winning.
First systematic theories about information society and informa-
tion work are presented by Fritz Machlup (1962) and Marc Porat (see
Webster 1995). In his book The Production and Distribution of Knowledge
Machlup divided information occupations into eight groups:
1) transporter (postman)
2) transformer (secretary)
3) routine processor (book keeper)
4) discretionary processor (supervisor, nurse)
5) managerial processor (manager)
6) interpreter (interpreter, translator)
7) analyzer (historian, librarian)
8) original creator (researcher)
Machlup divided information economics into: education, media,
information technology, information services and other activities.
According to him this division allows a statistical analysis of the sig-
nificance of different sectors in national economy (see Webster 1995,
11).
The most widely used analysis about the development of infor-
mation economy and information work is by Marc Porat. Porat’s
article The Information Economy: Definition and Measurement is about
USA entering the age of information society. He divided information
economics into primary and secondary sectors and to third sector
which remains out of these two. To the primary sector belongs all
those branches which value could be easily measured. The rest was
part of the secondary sector. By using these kind of criteria Porat esti-
mated that at the end of the 1970s almost half of the American
112 Chapter 5
economy was a part of the information economy (Porat 1977, see also
Webster 1995, 12).
Porat divided the information occupations into three groups. Into
the first group belongs those whose main duty was to produce and
sell information (e.g. scientists, teachers, journalists). The second
group consists of those who collect and distribute information (e.g.
managers, secretaries). The third group only used information tech-
nology, their main duty was to support the work of the two other cat-
egories.
At the end of the 1980s Statistics Finland published a report
about information work (Paakkololanvaara 1988). The report was
heavily influenced by Machlup’s work. In this report information
work was divided into producers, distributors, users, processors, op-
erators and fixers. Put together the information work was about one
fourth of all employment. According to recent calculations about half
the Finnish wage labourers are information workers. (www.stat.fi)
At a higher level of abstraction the talk about information work
information occupations can be connected to the growth expertise
and professionalism. We are more and more depending on special-
ists. Production processes in different branches of economy are so
complicated that a single worker just simply cannot cope all details.
Occupation structure becomes more and more complex and informa-
tion penetrates all occupations.
The Development of Information Society in Finland
Sociology can discuss different topics either on abstract level or gi-
ving concrete examples. In the following we use Finland as a case in
point. Why Finland, which is a small country in the periphery of
Northern Europe? Analysis of information society  focused on Fin-
land might sound surprising. In many respects Finland is the best
example, a true laboratory. Comparative analysis show that in Fin-
land the information society is most developed on the earth.
In April 1997 Statistics Finland published a research report With
Information to Information Society. The report is full with information
concerning the development of information society in Finland. The
statistics are impressive. It seems that Finland is the leading country
in the world to develop the information society.
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There are more mobile phones users than in any other country. In
Finland we had 29 mobile phones per 100 inhabitants in 1996. At the
beginning of the year 1999 there are more mobile phones than tradi-
tional phone connections in the country. Finland is also the leading
country in using Internet: we have about 65 Internet connections per
1000 inhabitants. According to latest calculation every second Finn
has access to Internet either at work or at home. So in Internet-connec-
tions and in mobile telephone connections Finland is at the top.
(Tilastokeskus 1997, 27–47)1
The coming of the information society can also be seen in occupa-
tional change. According statistical calculations about half of all
wage employees are working in so called information occupations
and the role information industries in our national economy is grow-
ing rapidly.
According to surveys concerning the capacity of information
technology to fulfil the needs of business life Finland is also the
number one in the world (The World Competitiveness Year-book
1996). In other indicators, like micro computers per capita, Finland is
also near the top (seventh in the world in 1995; ibid., 9). In addition
the use of information technology is relatively cheap in Finland
(Tilastokeskus 1997). In short, the infrastructure of information tech-
nology is well-developed in Finland. This is also the result of the
world ranking of countries using many indicators of the information
technology infrastructure (Towards the Third Revolution 1996).
Today the Finnish media seem to be convinced that we are al-
ready living in the information society. In daily newspapers, radio
and TV there are news, stories and articles about living, working, or
surviving in the information society. It is not only media that is pro-
moting the idea. Also our schools are engaged with the project. All
around the country there is a real euphoria among young pupils and
their teachers about the coming of the information society. All the el-
ementary schools and high schools are today equipped with work
stations linked with internet.
The discussions about the change of the epoch and the coming of
a new era are familiar in the field of social sciences. Researchers have
discussed for more than a decade about structural changes that are
1. Newer statistical data from Statistics Finland is available. In 1999 there was 65 mobile
telephone connections per 100 inhabitants;  number of Internet connections was 121
per 1000 inhabitants.
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taking place. Concepts like post-modern society, risk society or net-
work society are all attempts to catch the change. Idea about the infor-
mation society is in line with these theories.
However the discussion about the information society has been
more visionary. There are futurological, political and sociological
contributions. There are also governmental programs on this topic.
For example the Finnish government has produced for a couple of
years ago an official program on making Finland into an information
society. In the Finnish case the official information society strategy, as
it is called, has three major elements:
• renewing Finland into a information society
• developing information industries
• investing into research and knowledge
In the program the state authorities assume that the information
society will be accomplished after the following tasks have been
done: Firstly information technology and information networks
should be widely used as tools to modernise both private and public
sectors. Second task is to increase the role of information industries so
that they have became an important branch of economy. Thirdly we
have to invest into information and media know-how. According to
the program we must also provide the whole population basic know-
how and possibilities in using information society services. Finally
our information infrastructure have to be built as competitive as pos-
sible.
This program was renewed at the beginning of the year 1999. In
the newest program the main emphasis was put on welfare, interac-
tion and employment (see www.sitra.fi). The good aims are supposed
to be reached by using different networks. The program also gives a
couple of key projects which will be prioritised. Among these are per-
sonal navigation in internet, electric services and new learning envi-
ronments.
Into the Finnish scientific discussions information society ap-
peared in mid 1980s. First contributions were either full with futu-
rologist optimism or technological determinism about more or less
inevitable coming of the information society. What is interesting to
notice is that the first contributions were presented by engineers.
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Sociological discussion started at the same time. At the first phase
the discussions concerned the condition of information society in
Finland, the main points in the international discussion and the
emergence of information occupations. Matti Kortteinen published a
book, where he said that information society will be a totally new so-
cial formation, in the information society the focus of production is in
making information goods. (Kortteinen 1985, Kortteinen, Lehto,
Ylöstalo 1987, Paakkolanvaara 1988)
During the 1980s the discussion concerning the information so-
ciety were wide and open. Contributions were blurred with many
kinds of theories explaining structural change. (e.g. Virtanen 1987)
Heavy emphasis was also put on the changes that new technologies
would have on wage work. The most usual way of presenting the
emergence of new information society is to show that a wholly new
industrial branch has grown, so called fourth sector, and its economi-
cal significance and its share of economically active population is
increasing rapidly.
So far all the major structural changes that have occurred in Fin-
land have been changes between branches of economy. During the
post-war period there was a major shift from agriculture and forestry
to other branches, and after 1975 a minor change from industry to the
service sector. The changing relative strengths of different branches
can be seen both in the changing structures of social classes and
strata and in the changes in the occupational structure. It is possible
that the on going structural change has different effects in this respect
and that it will primarily affect the division and organisation of la-
bour within the different branches.
What about the information workers? In the Finnish context the
most sophisticated statistical calculations are presented by Elli
Paakkolanvaara who has followed the development of information
occupations in Finland. According to her calculations the growth of
information occupations between the years 1980-85 was clearly
faster than the growth of the whole employment. During that time the
whole employment grew 4 % and information occupations 15 %.
(Paakkolanvaara 1988, 67)
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Between the years 1980–95 the number of employees working in
the information occupations has increased with 20 %, while the total
employment has decreased at the same time with more than 230 000
persons. In percentage the decrease in total employment has been
about 10%. Statistics also show that the relative size of the informa-
tion sector has grown even more than 20 %.
According to the statistics 44 % of the wage workers were actu-
ally working in information occupations in the year 1995. In the infor-
mation sector there were operating about 16 000 private companies,
and information sector made over 12 % of the turn out of all Finnish
companies. The value of the information sector production increased
over 40% between the years 1991–94, at the same the growth in aver-
age was 5%. Increasing share of R&D funding is allocated to the infor-
mation sector, being in the middle of the 1990 more than one third of
all R&D investments.
These figures seem to convince us that Finland is already an in-
formation society. But is it really, what do sociologists say about the
coming of the information society? It is quite obvious that technologi-
cal change has been rapid. What we may call as technical infrastruc-
ture of the information society, has grown rapidly, the number of mo-
  1980 1985 1995 1980–1995 (%)
Producers 224 282 334 49
Distributors 100 117 137 37
Users 109 132 151 39
Processors 215 229 213  -1
Operators
and fixers 109 108  75  -31
TOTAL 757  868 910 20
Source: Statistics Finland 1997
Table 1. Information occupations 1980–1995 (in thousands)
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bile poste is indicating this. But still only one third of the households
owns a mobile phone, and the situation is the same with pc:s. If we
then look at Internet, only about 15 % of house holds have technical
equipment necessary for using Internet, and a quarter of the popula-
tion does not even know what the Internet is all about.
One visible feature of the growing significance of the information
society has been the development of industrial production engaged
in this sector. Finnish statistics show that the output of the manufac-
turing production in the information sector has increased rapidly. If
we compare the development of the number of firms, financial turn
over and number of employees between all firms and firms in infor-
mation sector, the result is that information sector is really growing
far more rapidly than manufacturing production in average. For ex-
ample, the number of all firms in Finland decreased a bit between the
years 1993–96, at the same time the number of firms in information
sector increased with 15 %. The situation is the same if we look at turn
over, the growth in the information sector was more than two times as
big as in manufacturing in average (Statistics Finland 1997).
The above mentioned growth figures are impressive. In spite of
this, the biggest and most important firms in the Finnish economy,
except for Nokia, are still working in the traditional branches such as
paper and pulp or machine building. And in these branches the Finn-
ish corporations are among the biggest ones both in European and
global context.
The rapid growth of productivity has also been connected with
information production. In general the productivity of Finnish capi-
tal has not increased as it was predicted. Of course there are examples
of rapid growth (like Nokia) but in general there has not been any
revolutionary change.
The growth of the information sector has not changed the general
image of Fordist work organisation in Finland. Managerial hierar-
chies are not disappeared and post-fordist practices are still rare.
Also such divisions which are based on gender or regions are playing
an important role in workers work situation.
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The Development of information society in Hungary
Data presented about class division indicate that social structure of
modern societies changes over time and there is a variation among
nations with respect to their industrial development and level of
modernisation. Modern societies are on the way from being indus-
trial ones to being post-industrial ones, - or using the term by Esping-
Andersen (1993): post-fordist. In post-industrial societies the increas-
ingly dominant service sector tend to influence the distribution of la-
bour force and the labour market processes. Crompton, Gallie and
Purcell (1996) emphasise the importance of technical development,
especially the spread of computers which “deskills” the simple
white-collar work and “upgrades” the blue-collar work by decreas-
ing the formerly characteristic division between them. This is the
process how modern nations move to the stage of information society.
Information society is definitely less developed in post-commu-
nist countries compared to Western market economies. Taking some
indicators we can compare the same five post-communist countries
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) with respect
of availability of certain modern consumer items in their households.
Two items, personal computers and satellite connection can be con-
sidered as indicators of “level of information society”, and two other
durables (video, microwave) serve as a basis of comparison.
Table 2. Proportion of some modern consumer items in five post-
communist societies (%)
Source: Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989. International
Comparative Survey, 1993. Principal investigators: Donald J. Treiman and
Ivan Szelnyi (UCLA).
Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia
PC 1.4 5.8 8.6 13.2 6.4
Satellite 1.7  8.8 20.6 11.4 13.3
Video 23.7  24.0 37.5  53.7 22.5
Micro 2.2  8.1 14.8  5.1 7.5
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These data indicate that availability of personal computers in
private households is the highest in Poland and Hungary takes the
second place. However, one-fifth of the private households have sat-
ellite connection in Hungary and this is much higher proportion than
the same rates in the other four countries. Of the two other durables
used for comparison, video is more widespread than the ‘information
items’ in all of these societies, while the availability of microwave
varies a lot among countries. E.g. in Hungary more household has a
microwave than a personal computer (and this is the typical situation
in these countries) but the case is just reversed for Poland.
In a more recent household survey in Hungary some questions
were included about the availability of the consumer items in private
households. These data indicate a moderate increase by 2 % in avail-
ability of personal computers in private households in Hungary over
5 years. The data-set does not contain question on satellite but an-
other question on internet connection were included. About 1 % of
private households is connected to internet in Hungary. If only those
households are counted where computer is available, one-tenth of
households have internet connection. (The proportion of those
households having a video did not increase over 5 years but more
than twice as much households have microwave than earlier.)
The availability of ‘information items’ in Hungary varies by both
regional differences and social status of head of household. For meas-
uring the latter feature, education of head of household is applied.
The more urbanised the place of residence, the higher the proportion
of households who possess personal computer. The same holds for
households with internet as well. The Budapest households own
twice as much PCs or internet connections than the national average.
Education has even stronger impact of being integrated into the infor-
mation system in Hungary. If the head of household has a tertiary
school diploma, the percentage of having a personal computer in the
household is three times larger than the national average.
INFORMATION WORK:
SECTORS AND POSITIONS
In the following we are analysing more closely the development of
information society. Our focus is in the sociology of work. We are in-
terested in the impact which the new information technologies have
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on work. We ask can we talk about new social division that is based
on informational position in labour process?
In the following presentation Information workers (= IW) are de-
fined to be those wage workers who use information technology at
work, whose level of vocational training is at least upper intermedi-
ate, and whose work requires designing of important aspects of one’s
work practices. ADP-users are wage workers who use micro compu-
ter or computer at work, but both or one of the two additional require-
ments given to the information workers is missing. Finally Others are
those who do not use information technology at their work. The dis-
tribution of Finnish wage labourers according the previous criteria is
as follows:
1994 2000
* information workers (IW) 25 % 39 %
* ADP-users 22 % 30 %
* others 53 % 31 %
In public sector there are more IW (55%) than in private sector
(45 %). In the case of Users the situation is the opposite. In private sec-
tor the percentage of users is 63 and in the public sector only 37 %.
Also according to industrial branches there are clear differences
in information positions. In financial sector there is 20 % of IW.
Manufacturing, services and trade are between 12 and 15 per cent
and the other sectors are clearly lower in relative numbers of IW.
In the case of users the situation is different. The financial sector
is still in the top (29 %), then come transport (24 %) and manufactur-
ing (20 %). Although the differences of informatisation between sec-
tors can be found statistically the formation of information society is a
process of the penetration of information activities into all economic
sectors and industries.
The question posed in the paper is about new social division as a
consequence of the development of information society. Unlike many
analysis it is not an analysis of skills (Freeman et al. 1995) or occupa-
tional structures (Castells-Aoyama 1994) but 1) the analysis of a com-
bination factors forming the work and reproduction situation, and 2)
the structuration of those factors in different positions of information
work.
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In seeking the answer the change in work and reproduction situ-
ation of different groups (information workers, users of information
technology at work and non-users) in 1988 and 1994 is also analysed.
Finally the form of differentiation or division is asked. Is it a polarised
structure as suggested by many authors (about the literature, Castells
& Aoyama 1994, 8) or more like a continuous hierarchy.
The main features discussed in the following are autonomy, au-
thority and intensity of work together with some other aspects of
work situation and climate.
The most general hypothesis about the effect of the progress of
information society to working life is that of positive change. What
was expected to happen is the rising development of autonomy and
independence, qualifications and skills and the levelling of power
hierarchies and the improvement of socio-cultural atmosphere. At the
level of groupings according to positions of information it means that
the information workers (IW) should be in better situation than the
ADP-users (Users) and those outside the both above mentioned posi-
tions (Others)
The difference between IW and other categories (Users, Others) is
very clear in all main autonomy indicators. The exception is supervi-
sion which is also a different matter, i.e. the question of control. The
IW is as much (or more) controlled in productivity and in the quality
of work as the other categories.
In the design of product the line of group differences is a curve
were the users are in worse position than the category of Others (non-
ADP-users). The Users’ position is positive compared with the Others
in the possibilities to decide the pace of work or what to do (work
tasks).
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Table 4. Authority and position of information work (%)
Table 3. Autonomy and positions of information work* (%)
Information
workers ADP-users Others
1988 1994 1988 1994 1988 1994
In position of
supervision 41 54 21  23 24 17
The content
 of  activity of
 supervision
- tasks 53 93 31 88 33 82
- means of work 41 77 27 67 27  70
- intensity of work 37 66  21 65 23 56
Decides about:
- amount of
personnel 2  4  2 0 1 1
- the budget 2 3  2 1  2  0
- problems of
 gender equality - 7 -  1   -  3
 Information
 workers ADP-users Others
1988 1994 1988 1994 1988 1994
Design of product
or service (much) 44 47 24 15 30 33
Solving of
non-routine
problems (much) 47 53 23 17 24 18
Decides:
- arriv./leaving time 27 28 12 15 15  15
- take a day off 24 29  19 17 17 12
- slow down pace 80 74  66 64  61 52
- choose task 65 73  45 45 37 35
Under supervision:
- productivity 81 84 75 76 74 75
- time used/
assignment 17 20 27  31  32 34
- quality of work 81 84 79 82  77  76
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Table 6. The most important thing in present job and positions of
information work (%)
Table 5. The Intensity of work and position of information
work (%)
Information
workers ADP-users Others
1988 1994 1988 1994 1988 1994
Physically
strenuous
(often or always)    7 12 12 16 44 48
Mentally strenuous
(often or always)    65 71  52  45  53 47
Time pressures
(often or always)    72 70 58 62 62 66
Too much work   62  64 47 44  50 52
  Information
  workers ADP-users Others
A good pay 6  9 10
Safe & secure work 26 48 44
Simple & easy work 1  2  1
Interesting & full
of change 48  31  29
Possibilities for
advance in career 2 1 1
Possibilities to own
initiative 9 3 4
Personal relations 6 3 7
Something else 2 3  4
Total (%) 100 100  100
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The differences between IW and other categories has even in-
creased in work autonomy during years 1988-1994. this change is
more marked in positive, creative aspects of autonomy (design of own
work, non-routine problem-solving) and its is lacking from the super-
vising control. The work productivity of IW is more controlled than
that of the other groups.
The positions of supervision and decision making are the indica-
tors of power in the enterprise and work place level. In the holding of
those positions there is a clear difference from IW to other categories.
The same is true also with the decision making. Even from under-
standable reasons there are few persons of those positions where one
can him-/or herself decide some key aspects of work process and or-
ganisation.
The differences between IW and other categories have slightly in-
creased from 1988 to 1994. In 1994 IW is 2.5–3 times more often in the
positions of supervision than the other categories.
The picture about the intensity of work is rather clearly reverse
compared with that of autonomy. IW is the group who has the most
mentally stressed work from all, most time pressures in work and
most often too much work. The mental strenuousity of work has even
increased more in the category of IW than in other categories between
years 1988 and 1994. The physical strenuousity separated the cat-
egory of “others” from the IW and the users.
To sum up: the IW-position do not take away the strenuousity of
work and the work pressures. This in the line of other studies con-
cerning Finnish working life (Ylöstalo & Kauppinen 1996). The story
told by our results says even more. IW is even in the van of the inten-
sification development of working life.
The IW is also clearly different in 1994 what comes to total profile
of the things assisted important in one’s work. Safe and secure work
is the main thing among ADP-users and among non-users. In IW-
group the focal point is interesting work and possibilities to be initi-
ate.
The differences of income are very marked between IW and other
categories and what is most important the differences has clearly
grown between 1988 and 1994. In the year 1994 the users get under 70
per cent from the incomes of IW and the group of “others” under 65 %
from it.
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Also the other indicators give the same picture. Sufficiency of in-
comes and also the career possibilities are better in the group of IW
than in the other categories. The difference between users and non-
users is seen only in the case of incomes and the difference is changed
in same degree in both categories.
The previous analysis has proved that there are real differences
between the information workers and other wage employees. The
main results are summarised in the following scheme:
Table 7. Reproduction and rewards and position of information
work (%)
 Information
 workers ADP-users Others
 1988  1994 1988 1994 1988 1994
Incomes (index,
entire population
=100) 127 135 102  94 95  86
Sufficiency of
incomes (the
difference of “less
than needed” and
“more than
 needed”)  -  0  - 14  - 13
Career possibilities
(decreased minus
increased during last
5 years) - 7  - 14 - 14
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In the scheme the information workers are compared with the users
(IW/U) and the non-users (IW/O).
+  = the difference is in present situation 20–40 % or over 10 % in
change
++ = the difference is  in present situation over 40 %
-  = the difference is negative for IW.
The division line of the differences between groups is between the
group of IW and the two other categories. The only exceptions where
there is also significant difference between Users and Others are au-
tonomy of design (astonishingly in favour of Others) and the physical
strenuousity of work, what is key element of the work situation of
non-users.
In nutshell the IW differs from the other groups in two respects.
They have clearly higher incomes and favourable work conditions.
The latter means the work with stimulating contents, autonomy and
(some) authority. The important things in their work, relatively speak-
ing, are not security and pay as in the case of other groups but inter-
esting work which offers possibilities to own initiate.
The generalised interpretation of the situation is as follows. The
economic depression is so hard a fact that it structurates the (work
 PRESENT SITUATION CHANGE 1988–94
  IW/U IW/O   IW/U IW/O
Autonomy: design +
Autonomy: high
problem-solving +  + + +
Authority + + +
Intensive work:
physically -
Intensive work:
mentally +  + + +
Incomes ++ ++ ++ ++
Security and pay
vs. interesting work ++  ++ no change data
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and) reproduction situation in all groups compared. The organising
issue of the structuration is the worries about reproduction in every-
day life. The differentiation between groups can be seen after this. The
IW have the positive pattern of overtime work possibilities and au-
tonomy for improving  economic situation. The working life of Users
and Others is in contrast organised by power relations, struggle for
autonomy and decision making powers at work and the avoidance of
dull routine work.
It is often believed that IW has a wider meaning than that related
to work situation. If so it must as a social category differentiate itself
from the categories of Users and Others also by means of social iden-
tification and consciousness.
Social Portrait of Information workers
Even the emphasis in this article is the differentiation of work situa-
tions, an outline of the social portrait of IWs is also needed for the pic-
ture of social differentiation.
We analysed the differences of IWs from Users and Others in the
light of dummy correlations with some variables depicting social
identification and attitudes. The IWs, Users and Others got as
dummy variables the values 1 or 0. The identification and attitude
variables, 23 together, measured class identification, attitudes to in-
come distribution, “capitalist logic”, the need of state intervention
and ways to success in the society.
Relatively few of the variables got significant correlation with the
measures of information positions. Still the social portrait of IWs ap-
peared to be rather clear.
To the portrait of IWs belong the following statistically significant
features.
- income differences justified   .23  (vs. -.03 Users and
           -.17 Others)
- identifies with working class -.28  (.11 and .15)
- identifies with middle class  .22  (.00 and -.19)
- state intervention: enterprises -.18  (.00 and  .16)
- state intervention:
  unemployment -.26  (.02 and  .21)
- non-profit attitude -.14  (.01 and  .11)
- success: being ambitious   .11  (.05 and -.14)
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IW differentiates itself from the other categories mainly through
two features: protocapitalist attitudes and middle-class identifica-
tion. They believe in profit motive and are against more equal income
distribution. They also trust on ambitiousness for success in life. They
are against state intervention both in the case of large enterprises and
unemployment.
IWs really differentiate themselves from the Others. It can be seen
clearly from the opposite directions of correlations, all of which are
also significant (at the level of .01, 2-tailed) The category of Users is
mainly without any profile of its own. The only significant correla-
tion is the identification with working class against the negative cor-
relation of IWs.
If the picture of IWs at work was that of better working conditions
and incomes, the social portrait is that of modern (wage labourer)
petty bourgeoisie near the sense given to it already by Nicos
Poulantzas (1975).
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY: A NEW SOCIAL DIVISION?
Social divisions are an essential part of sociological analysis of social
differences and social justice. Social divisions are changing all the
time. Sociology used the concept of social class to describe the most
essential social divisions in the early industrial society.
New theoretical evaluations concerning post-modern era, risk society
or information society together with recent experiences of economic
recession have raised questions concerning the nature and type of
social divisions. These issues have also had a strong influence on
debates concerning the relevance of different conceptions in the field
of social divisions.
The most important reason behind the re-evaluation of social di-
visions is social change. Different processes of social change has
meant that new social divisions have emerged. Analysis concerning
the coming of information society has raised the question about the
restructuration of industrial branches, occupational change and
changes in global economics (Castells 1996).
In this section, the class structure of modern post-industrial soci-
eties is overviewed and presented. Several publications in recent so-
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ciological literature in the 1990s questioned the relevance of class in
modern societies and argued that the class concept was ‘dying’
(Clark and Lipset 1991; Pakulski and Waters 1996).
However, advocates of persistence of class suggest that the social
structure of modern societies should be based on class structure - ei-
ther of a neo-marxist or of a neo-weberian type. Of the two possibili-
ties of these classical theoretical traditions in sociology, neo-marxism
or neo-weberism, the latter one is chosen for describing the social
structure of information societies. The class schema to be applied has
been developed for modern post-industrial (service) societies by
Goldthorpe (Goldthorpe 1980; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992).
This categorisation (labelled the EGP class schema) was de-
signed to distinguish positions which differ in terms of labour market
position, the position in the production units and employment rela-
tions. The EGP schema separates three major class situations: em-
ployers, self-employed workers without employees, and employees.
Employees naturally represent the largest group of labour force. Em-
phasis is placed on employment relations which can be a service rela-
tion or a work contract or a relation between the two.
According to Goldthorpe (1982) one can speak of a service rela-
tion if the employer requires not simply the employee’s labour, but
rather his/her special knowledge and skills i.e. employee’s market
capacity. A service relation is a kind of employment relation where the
employee’s responsibility and loyalty towards the employer are vital.
To ensure this, the employer provides greater autonomy and inde-
pendence in work, flexible work hours, greater job security, a system
of fringe benefits, the possibility and promise of professional ad-
vancement and career as well as other promotional advantages. In
contrast, a work contract does not offer decision-making possibilities,
independence, autonomy or flexible work hours to the employees.
This contract specifies a well-circumscribed amount and type of work
being strictly controlled and compensated by strictly defined amount
of wage.
Obviously, the content of work cannot be independent of the em-
ployment relation insofar as the service relation creates a class of peo-
ple living from salaries (the so-called salariat) which includes man-
agers and professionals, while in the case of work contracts we can
speak of a class of wage-earners, i.e. workers among whom we can
draw further distinctions according to qualification or whether they
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work in agricultural or non-agricultural sector. The difference be-
tween service relation and work contract crosscuts the traditional dif-
ference between manual and non-manual work. In the case of clerical
jobs or workers of service sector we can speak of an intermediate link
between the two types of employment relations.
The EGP class schema looks as follows:
I.       Higher grade professionals, administrators, and officials; mana-
gers in large industrial establishments; large proprietors
II.      Lower grade professionals, administrators, and officials; higher-
grade technicians; managers in small industrial establish-
ments; supervisors of non-manual employees
IIIa. Routine non-manual employees (administration and commerce)
IIIb. Routine non-manual employees (sales and services)
IVa.  Small proprietors, artisans with employees
IVb. Small proprietors, artisans without employees
IVc. Farmers and smallholders (self-employed workers in primary
production)
V.      Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual employees
VI.    Skilled manual workers
VIIa. Semi- and unskilled manual workers
VIIb. Agricultural and other workers in primary production
(See: Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 38–39)
In praxis, researchers usually apply various – mostly slightly col-
lapsed – versions of the EGP classification. The next table displays
the class distribution in nine societies from the 1970s.
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ENG FRA FRG HUN IRL NIR POL SCO SWE
I+II  25  21  28  15  14  18  18  21 24
IIIab    9  10    5    7    9    9    2    9   8
IVab    8  10    7    2    8  10    2    6   8
IVc    2  11    4    1  22  10  25    3   5
V+VI  33  24  37  31  20  26  31  33 30
VIIa  22  21  18  30  21  24  19  25 22
VIIb    2    3    1  14    7    3    3    3   2
Total 101 100 100 100 101 100 100 100 99
Year 1972 1970 1976 1973 1973 1973 1972 1974 1974
Source: Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 193.
By the class distribution presented in Table 8, in the early 1970s,
service societies were most developed in England and Germany
where the proportion of service classes (I+II) is the largest. The same
proportion is the smallest in the communist countries (Hungary and
Poland) and in the European periphery (Ireland, Northern Ireland).
There are characteristic differences in respect of self-employment
(IVab). The percentages are the smallest in the two communist coun-
tries. In Hungary, the proportion of self-employed farmers is also low.
Similarly low percentages of self-employed farmers can be observed
in the most industrialised societies (England, Germany, Scotland,
Sweden) as well. The proportion of self-employed farmers is large in
Poland where agriculture has not been nationalised, and in Ireland
where agriculture played significant role in national economy at that
time.
Comparing skilled workers (V+VI) and unskilled workers (VII)
larger differences can be seen in the more developed and industrial-
Legend: ENG=England and Wales; FRA=France; FRG=Federal Republic of
Germany; HUN=Hungary; IRL=Irish Republic; NIR=Northern Ireland;
POL=Poland; SCO=Scotland; SWE=Sweden
Table 8. The EGP class distribution in nine societies (men aged 20–
64) (%)
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ised societies (England, Germany, Scotland, Sweden, also Poland),
and smaller differences are shown for the less developed and indus-
trialised societies of the 1970s (France, Ireland, Northern Ireland,
Hungary). Hungary is unique with its high proportion of agricultural
workers (VIIb), too, which is a consequence of lower industrialisation
as well as the nationalisation of agriculture in the country.
Today all three Nordic countries are wage labour societies. Vast
majority of the economically active population are wage labourers.
The size of the entrepreneurial population is biggest in Finland,
where one fifth belong to different entrepreneur groups. This is
mainly due to large agricultural petty bourgeoisie, but also other en-
trepreneurial groups are relatively large.
Nordic countries share a lot of joint structural elements. Among
the most important ones are: 1) Open economies: export and import
play an important role in the national economy. 2) In each of the coun-
tries ‘the main export sector’ has a special role in the economics. This
sector varies from country to country. 3) Social democratic parties
have had a special role in the government coalitions for more than 50
years. 4) Trade union affiliation is at high level (more than 60%) and
unions have had an important role in the industrial relations. 5)
Women’s labour market participation is at a very high level, 50% of all
wage labourers are female. 6) In the welfare models the state has had
an important role also as a producer of the services. 7) Economic crisis
hit the countries at the beginning of the 1990s. The crisis was espe-
cially deep in Finland and in Sweden. (Cf. Kosonen 1998)
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Table 9. The distribution of classes according to Goldthorpe’s
typology in Finland, Sweden and Norway (%) (1)
 Finland Sweden Norway
Service class (I)      15     16      21
Lower grade
professionals (II+V)      21      23      23
Routine
non-manual (III a+b)     10      16      18
Petty bourgeoisie
(IV a+b)        6        5        5
Farmers (IV c)        8        1        1
Skilled workers (VI)      17      14      13
Non skilled
workers(VII)      23      25      20
Total    100    100    100
(1) The table is based on comparative survey data gathered in Finland, Norway and
Sweden during the years 1994–1995. There are both men and women included.
The development of the class structures in the different Nordic
countries has followed some what different paths. Norway and Swe-
den have been fore runners what comes to the growth of wage labour-
ing population. Both in Finland and in Denmark the share of the petty
bourgeoisie have been relatively big. During the 1980s and 1990s the
most important feature has been the growth of the wage labouring
middle classes.
Today the Nordic countries are quite close to each others. In Fin-
land there are more farmers than in other countries. In Norway the
wage labouring middle class is bigger than in Sweden and especially
in Finland.
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Table 10. The EGP class distribution in five post-communist
societies
Men, aged 20–64 (%)
Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia
I+II   17   28   19   18   26
IIIab     3     3     4     5     5
Ivab     5     7     7   11     4
IVc     2     1     2   10     1
V+VI   27   29     3   30   37
VIIa   35   27   24   22   23
VIIb   11     5     5     4     4
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Women, aged 20–64 (%)
Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia
I+II    28    24    28    26    29
IIIab    18    27    27    28    25
IVab      3      4      6      6      3
IVc      1      1      1    13      1
V+VI    12    12    14      9    13
VIIa    26    28    24    16    22
VIIb    12      5      2      2      7
Total  100  101  100  100  100
Source: Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989. International
Comparative Survey, 1993. Principal investigators: Donald J. Treiman and
Ivan Szelnyi (UCLA).
In the referred monograph by Erikson and Goldthorpe, the EGP
classification is applied for more developed and industrialised and
less developed and industrialised market economies as well as for
communist societies of the 1970s. Since that time more than 20 years
has gone and this time interval has brought significant changes in the
social structure of these nations. Moreover, the validity of the schema
has probably increased by the system transformation in the post-com-
munist societies (cf. Robert 1998). In the next table we present more
recent class distributions of post-communist countries from 1993.
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First, comparing Hungary and Poland by changes in time in re-
spect of class distribution of male earners, the proportion of service
class (I+II) increased for Hungary from 15 % to 19 %  over 20 years. It
is not surprising that the self-employed class (IVab) has much larger
share in 1993 than in 1972/73; it used to be 2 % and it has increased
up to 9-11 %. In 1973, skilled- and unskilled manual worker class
(V+VI & VIIa) had about the same size in the Hungarian occupational
structure. By 1993, there is a significant difference in this respect, the
proportion of skilled manual worker class is definitely larger (37%)
compared to the proportion of unskilled manual worker class (24%),
– due to the modernisation of the Hungarian industry over 20 years.
Finally, the agricultural worker class (VIIb) almost disappeared from
the Hungarian social structure, their rate used to be 14 % in 1973, and
it dropped to 5% in 1993.
Comparing the five post-communist countries in Table 10, the
service class (I+II) seems to be the largest in the Czech Republic and
Slovakia. There is no significant difference in this respect between
Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria. The Bulgarian class structure dis-
plays the lower economic level of the country. The proportion of agri-
cultural worker class (VIIb) is still high (11 %), and the rate of un-
skilled manual worker class is larger (35 %) than that of skilled
manual worker class (27 %). (The unskilled manual worker class is
quite large in the Czech Republic as well.) The self-employed class
(IVab) is the most extensive in Hungary and Poland where this class
started to develop already in the 1980s. Self-employed farmer class is
a characteristic group in the occupational structure only in Poland.
Comparing the upper and lower panel of Table 10, three signifi-
cant gender differences can be observed. First, women are over repre-
sented in routine non-manual class (IIIab). Second, women are under
appreciated in skilled manual worker class (V+VI). This latter feature
holds especially for Poland. Third, women are over represented in
service class (I+II) in Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria. There is no room
here to go into the details of question of gender-segregated labour
market but service class occupations in professional and administra-
tive sphere seem to be more feminised in these three societies than in
Czech Republic or Slovakia.
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Information workers in the class structure
What can we then say about information work and class structure?
Already in the ’70s sociologists predicted the growth of the intelli-
gentsia. Among others Alwin Gouldner (1979) wrote a book about
‘new class’ of intelligentsia. According to this kind of theorising
knowledge will replace capital in power relations. This would mean
that information workers will be a part of the elite in the future infor-
mation society.
In the following we analyse the class position of information
workers using Finland as the case in point. We use the same class ty-
pology as in the comparative part. According to general assumptions
about the effects of new technology to the labour process we may say
that those who are involved in information work are more often in
managerial and autonomous positions than wage labourers in gen-
eral. On the other hand informationalisation of the labour process
also means a decrease of routine work and routine workers.
Table 11. Information workers in the class structure (%)
IW USERS OTHERS TOTAL
Service class 27    3    6    11
Lower grade
professionals 63  16  13   26
Routine
non-manual   5  34    8   13
Skilled workers   5  24  28   21
Non-skilled workers   5  23  45   29
Total 100 100 100 100
N 177 153 372 703
There seem to be a clear division between information workers
and other wage workers in the class structure. Vast majority of the
information workers belong to the managerial and professional
groups. More than one fourth are in the service class. And only 15%
are either in routine non-manual work or in a worker position.
On the other hand more than 80 % of the ADP-users are in a lower
middle-class position or in a working class position. Only one fifth
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belong to professionals or to the service class. There is big difference
between information workers, users and other wage workers. Clear
majority of those who are neither IW or users belong to the working
class (73 %).
If we then look the composition Goldthorpean class groups ac-
cording to the relation to information work, we can see that 62% of the
service class are IWs. The figure is the same with lower grade profes-
sionals. ADP-users makes 58 % of routine non-manual workers. Non
users makes 70% of skilled workers and 82 % of non skilled workers.
Also the social profile of information workers differs from the
other groups. Tentatively can be said that their profile is one of the
modern petty bourgeoisie in Poulantzasian sense. They have the
middle class identification and pro-capitalism attitude pattern when
the other groups have working class identification and non-capitalist
attitudional orientation.
To sum up the general structural changes in the working life,
which also set frames, and is influenced by new technology, to the
information work we mention the following contradictory elements:
1) The share of managers, especially lower grade managers, has
grown during the 1990s, which contradicts the expectations
concerning the manifestations of thinner and lighter organisa-
tions.
2) The work autonomy has grown mainly in industry, in services
the change has been almost negligible.
3) In all sectors the physical and also mental strenuousity of work
has decreased, but at the same time work has generally become
more intensive in terms of pace of work and work load.
4) In terms of social groups, managers’ work in industry has be-
come more routinised and intensive, but their decision making
power has increased in some respects. In services similar im-
provement has not taken place. Skilled workers have benefited
from the growth of work autonomy, in other respects their situ-
ation has remained same as it was in 1988. For unskilled work-
ers past years have not brought practically any changes in any
aspect of work.
These results tell about the present conditions in the Finnish
working life. Old structural divisions still exist. Productivity com-
bined with increasing strenuousity and increasing managerial con-
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trol seems to be the current trend. But this is only one part of the recent
developments. At the same time we can see the growth of networking
and the growth of information work. Also the number of small firms
has increased in all branches. These developments indicate that cur-
rent situation is full with contradictory processes.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have discussed the processes of social change. Our
main focus has been on the coming of the information society. During
the past 20 years several theoretical constructions concerning the in-
formation society has been published. Our thesis however is that
from sociological point of view social changes has not been so dra-
matic as many theorists has predicted. There is change, e.g. new tech-
nical device, new forums etc., but there is also strong structural conti-
nuity.
Empirically we have analysed the consequences of new informa-
tion technology. We asked whether new social divisions are based on
the information work position developing. Further, it was asked if  the
polarisation or continuous hierarchy is the kind of pattern that the
new social division proceeds.
In the literature the polarisation model is suggested to be applied
in national and also in the world-scale development (see Castells and
Aoyama 1994, Castells 1996; Freeman et al. 1995). There are also op-
posing results. For example Castells and Aoyama (1994, 23) argue
that “the polarization of occupational structure of informational soci-
ety (...) is not apparently born out of data, if by polarization we mean
the simultaneous expansion of the top and bottom of the occupa-
tional scale”. The same is noted by Castells also in his later works (see
Castells 1996). The results obviously depend on the phenomena and
data available. The occupations are not the best possible way to meas-
ure polarisation or differentiation. Skills and qualifications can be
better.
In our study the main object has been work and reproduction
situation; as an analytical strategy it means a combination of many
variables. This is different target compared both with the skill levels
and occupational structures. All this implies to a more complex ana-
lytical setting. It is also possible to compare both the levels of vari-
ables like incomes or autonomy and the structuration of the work and
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reproduction situation, ie. the patterned relation of variables in differ-
ent informational work positions.
The results suggest that there really is a new social division. The
division line is between information workers against both ADP users
and non-users. The main positive features of work and reproduction
situation are those of information workers, namely work autonomy,
contentually interesting and satisfying work, higher incomes and
more authority. In their situation the mental intensity of work is more
or less natural relative of those positive elements. It is also further con-
firmed by the different social portrait of IWs compared with the users
and non-users of information technology.
At the level of work process, we can speak about the formation of
information society. The results concerning the change of the situa-
tion are in line with the current picture, and maybe the trend of
change is even the most important matter, because it can tell us some-
thing about the future. If, what is evident, the information society is
only under formation, there is a fear of the continuous trend of polari-
sation of the work and reproduction conditions according these lines.
When the structuration of work and reproduction situation is
asked the line of differentiation between IW and other wage labourer
groups is confirmed. Now, however, the impact of the economic de-
pression of the 1990s is in fore front. The experiences of economic dif-
ficulties and deprivation seem to have the same pattern in every
group.
Information workers are in different class position compared
with ADP-user and other workers. Information workers typically be-
long to the service class or in professional groups, while the other
groups present routine non-manual workers and manual workers.
Both the Finnish and EU-European projects of information soci-
ety are widely believed and powerfully supported by national and
EU-elites as developmental strategies and in spite of beautiful prom-
ises just this can be the reason to expect the strengthening of the new
division. If we add the high unemployment figures and the increas-
ing possibility of marginalisation in the European context, it is not
easy to see any direct highway to the society of equals.
To conclude our discussion we take up some theoretical and
practical problems that has to be solved:
1. The international differences in the formation and stability of
information society. There are huge differences between even
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European countries, not to mention the gap between the most
developed and “undeveloped” countries.
2. The coming of information society means new kind of relations
between education and labour markets and the emergence of
new kind of educational type (see Castells 1997). The real infor-
mation society requires a broader educational qualification than
narrow expertise. This far national strategies have mainly been
based on narrow expertise.
3. The limits of information strategies. This far the information
society projects has been very technological and based on short
term economic calculations. E.g. the current crisis of the Asian
countries is at least partly due to narrow understanding of so-
cial change.
4. The analysis of information society and changes linked with it
must be analysed as a part of broader analysis of social change.
Information society is one step in general social change similar
“revolutions” have occurred earlier and will occur again. We
have to give realistic frames to change.
The questions for the future research which follow from our
analysis are (1) to specify the polarisation in relation to societal divi-
sion of labour (industrial and public and private sectors, export and
other industries, regions, etc.) and in relation to class and status, gen-
der, age and other social divisions; (2) to analyse in details the nature
of the knowledge and power contained to the high positions of infor-
mation; and (3) to clear up what the new social cleavage means in
terms of social cohesion and the social consciousness and conflicts
producing the social cohesion and integration.
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Latecomer Strategies and Information
 Society Visions of Post-Socialism
 ICT Policies in Eastern and
Central Europe of the 1990s
PÁL TAMÁS
INFORMATION SOCIETY:
LOCAL AND UNIVERSAL DEFINITIONS
How do we define the information society? The information society is
the society currently being put into place, where low-cost information
and data storage and transmission technologies are in general use.
This generalisation of information and data use is being accompa-
nied by organisational, commercial, social and legal innovations that
will profoundly change life both in the world of work and in society
generally.
In the future there could be different models of information so-
ciety, just as today we have different models of industrialised society.
They are likely to differ in the degree to which they avoid social exclu-
sion and create new opportunities for the disadvantaged. In referring
to a East European IS (=Information Society), we wish to emphasise,
in line with the European Union’s white paper Growth, Competitive-
ness, Employment, the importance of the social dimension which char-
acterises the European model for this reason we stress that it is essen-
tial to view the information society as a learning society. The learning
process is no longer limited to the traditional period of schooling.
The social integrationist vision explicitly rejects the notion of
technology as an exogenous variable to which society and individu-
als, whether at work or in the home, must adapt. Instead it puts the
emphasis on technology as a social process
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by meeting real or imagined needs changes those needs just as it is
changed by them. Society, in this view, is shaped by technical
change, and technical change is shaped by society. Technical inno-
vation – sometimes impelled by scientific discovery, at other times
induced by demand – stems from within the economic and social
system and is not merely an adjustment to transformations
brought about by causes outside that system. (Sundqvist report,
OECD, p. 117) 1.
An example illustrating the importance of such social
embeddedness can be found in the recent history of the formerly
Socialist countries of eastern Europe. Strikingly, these countries expe-
rienced very little growth and development, despite massive invest-
ment in science and technology and higher education, in the 20 years
before the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the start of the transition
process. Clearly, the lack of economic integration, and more specifi-
cally the lack of a market to separate the technically from the economi-
cally feasible, pushed science and technology into isolation. But the
failure of the science and technology system in market terms was only
one facet of that isolation. Another, which we highlight here, was the
absence of any social and organisational integration of technological
change. As a result, to a far greater extent than in the so-called “capi-
talist” societies, science and technology came to be imposed on soci-
ety in general and workers in particular, and consequently failed to
produce efficiency improvements on the shop floor. Technological
disenfranchisement went hand in hand with political disenfran-
chisement.
At the process level, rather than an externally given factor for
change, the technologically driven convergence of new information
and communication technologies can be best described as a process
of change which is “flexible in use”, i.e. its actual implementation
and economic success will be crucially dependent on the particular
conditions of application and use. Ultimately, the latter will be a pre-
requisite for economic success and the creation of new jobs. At the
product level, it is clear that the commercial feasibility of a new proc-
ess or product is an essential condition for successful economic inte-
gration. But other contexts, social, ethical and socio-political, also
play an important part. Here too, the literature points to a lack of con-
1. The Sundqvist report is known as one of the first OECD reports on the socioeconomic
aspects of new technologies.
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sideration of user needs as the single most important factor in the fail-
ure of innovative action.
If we accept the argument that developing technological capabili-
ties does involve a complex, endogenous process of change, negoti-
ated and mediated both within organisations and at the level of soci-
ety at large, it is obvious that policies cannot and should not be lim-
ited to addressing the economic integration of technological change,
but must include all aspects of its broader social integration. We thus
reject the notion of technology as an external variable to which society
and individuals, whether at work or in the home, must adapt.
In our interim report we emphasised the lack of social integration
in the current European information society debate and criticised the
technological determinism of much of the expert policy language as
limiting the scope for policy action. It is an illusion to think we would
be able to govern the speed of such change. Consequently, the only
relevant policy issue is one of liberalising and deregulating. At the
social level, while there could be “local” employment destruction, the
cost of such destruction is minimal when compared to the aggregate
employment “price” rigid societies might have to pay in terms of loss
of competitiveness when failing to adopt the new ICTs quickly
enough. (“Building the European Information Society For Us All...”,
p. 2);]. The apparent lack of public support for the information society
was in part a reflection of the predominance of technological consid-
erations in the European policy debate.
GLOBALISATION EFFECTS OF
ICT IN COUNTRIES OF TRANSITION
For many political leaders of the region, dealing with globalisation is
not an exercise in the “politics of helplessness” so much as one in the
“politics of accommodation”. Few are the governments that are hos-
tile to markets and that have not acquiesced in the logic of global com-
petition in a neoliberal era. The business of government is everywhere
increasingly organised along the lines of the government of business.
Less evident – by default, if not by design – is that this process is at the
cost of the authority of governments. But citizen allegiance does not
vanish. It is transferred to other sources. Primordial identities – eth-
nic, religious or linguistic that do not conform to understandings of
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the “left/right” variety that consolidated in the heyday of the welfare
state – begin to take precedence over more inclusive loyalties.
The attitude of corporate actors is well understood. States are ex-
pected to evacuate, doing so via the deregulation of markets, the liber-
alisation of trade and investment barriers and the privatisation of
assets. It is in essence a normative economic theory for the enhance-
ment and consolidation of globalisation. What is more interesting is
the new contest to influence the structures of international govern-
ance between the old and new multilateralisms: top-down, state-
driven activities of the existing international institutions, on the one
hand, versus the GSMs, attempting to “reconstitute civil societies and
political authorities on a global scale, building a system of global gov-
ernance from the bottom up”, on the other.
Governments are learning that securing the support, or neutrali-
sation, of opposition is now as important in the development of inter-
national policy (in areas such as trade and finance) as it is in domes-
tic policy development and implementation. The presence of these
new actors in international politics means that traditional actors
must secure a balance between wider consultation and accountabil-
ity, on the one hand, and an ability to resist the pressures of lobby
groups, on the other.
Economists tell us that the two key elements of globalisation – the
greater economic integration of the international economy and the
revolution in communications and technology – are, of themselves,
essentially neutral. But if globalisation is to offer more public goods
than “bads”, then governance – the means by which societies deliver
collective goods and minimise collective bads – is, as several recent
reports tell us, as important as ever and more important than much
economic theory concedes.
Are we entering a new phase in a cycle of regulation and re-regu-
lation? In the 19th century, self-regulating markets came to be seen as
socially destructive. Similarly, Jeffrey Williamson shows how the first
wave of globalisation before 1914 resulted in a marked growth of in-
equalities within nations and suggests that this was “at least partly
responsible for the inter-war retreat from globalisation which ap-
peared in the rich industrial trading partners”. Is this happening
again at the end of the twentieth century? Moreover, even if the so-
cially destructive effects of markets are recognised, is it possible to put
the genie back in the bottle? Can we reinvent the role of the nation-
state as regulator and arbiter of some kind of fairness without under-
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mining the strength of markets as economic growth generators? Prob-
ably not. The internationalisation of many policy issues that were
once the domestic preserve of governments will invariably render this
aspiration pietistic.
While the reach of interstate co-operation is often much more sig-
nificant than sceptics concede, there are limits to even the most opti-
mistic prospects for co-operation after hegemony. In this context, ra-
tional choice-driven economic analysis leaves us short of policy solu-
tions. While policy issues are globalised, our ability to deal with them
is not. The major factor in explaining interstate co-operation is still
the domestic decision-making processes of the major actors. Domestic
political preferences, rather than the actions of other countries (cheat-
ing and relative gains), remain paramount in explaining interna-
tional co-operation.
There is a deficit in the relationship between the de facto processes
of economic integration (the essence of economic globalisation) and
the de jure international institutional mechanisms that would pro-
vide the necessary tools for the management of the problems arising
from globalisation. An issue for the future is the manner in which the
major international institutions develop. Will they, indeed should
they, maintain some kind of Weberian bureaucratic neutrality? Will
they remain vehicles for the pursuit of state interests, as traditionally
defined in a realist understanding of international relations? Or, will
they become sites at which to accommodate the multiple demands
and interests of state and non-state actors throughout the widening
policy communities and civil societies of states? These are important
normative and analytical questions, yet they are questions which cast
massive policy shadows. They are also questions that cannot be an-
swered satisfactorily in tight disciplinary fashion. Notwithstanding
the superiority of markets as agents of distribution, exchange and
wealth enhancement, the political contest over the implications of
globalisation is in its infancy. The importance of politics and govern-
ance in the management of these processes has never been higher, ei-
ther at the level of the national state or that of an international system
that creates not only winners but also large categories of losers.
Because it becomes more difficult for the state to compensate
those members of its community disadvantaged by globalisation, the
consensus on how society is organised within the spatial jurisdiction
of nation-states is strained and the continued process of liberalisa-
tion is threatened. Moreover, to the extent that globalisation offers in-
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ternational mobility to the new powerful actors (especially MNCs,
multi-national corporations), it reduces the incentives for them to
address these issues within national communities. They can move,
thus making the management of these processes all the more difficult.
The practical question facing policy makers will be how to de-
velop the appropriate institutions, domestic and international, to
address the questions identified above. This is a more complex task
than is assumed in much of the economic literature. What makes
good economic sense does not always make good political sense. First
best solutions – that is, economically efficient ones – may not always
be politically feasible and most economists studiously ignore those
sociopolitical and cultural dimensions of politics and international
relations that, much more than economic ones, are likely to condition
the prospects of continued liberalisation. Economic theory makes lit-
tle provision for states to exercise an exit option on a particular issue
that might threaten the fibre of the national identity. Too often such
issues are seen as closet protectionism. Yet international institutions
must secure converging policy positions by agreement and willing
harmonisation, not by force. To argue as much is not a call for a free
riders’ charter, but a call for tolerance and an acceptance of genuine
difference that is often missing within the liberalising discourse of
mainstream economics. It is also a call to recognise the limits of trying
to explain or prescribe policy in these issue areas using the tools of
only one specialised discipline. It is, in short, a call for a balanced
diet.
DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGIES
Theorists of industrial policy are increasingly advocating what has
been called the “high-road” industrial development strategy. New
approaches define such a strategy as “one in which the aim is to de-
velop an economy characterised by a high value-added profile in the
output of goods and services, a high skills profile of the work force
and high wages amongst citizens”. The alternative ‘low-road’ strat-
egy is associated with opposite features.
Countries taking the “high road” are supposed to embark on a
route of continuous innovation, learning and upgrading. This idea
has principally been advanced by institutional and evolutionary
economists employing concepts such as “systems of innovation” and
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“clustering”. The “high-road” concept also has a strong spatial con-
notation. The presumed relevance of agglomeration (at whatever
scale) for competitive advantage has partly been inspired by new
ideas in economic geography, echoed in the literature on “new indus-
trial spaces”.
Elements of the “high-road” strategy have made inroads into the
new industrial policy debate in the Central European debates of the
1990s. Policy makers in tandem stress the importance of indigenous
enterprises, innovation, upgrading, co-operation, linkages and net-
working. Related to this, Porter’s clustering concept also has received
a warm reception.
This is not to say that the “high-road” concept is universally ac-
cepted as the best strategy for development. According to critics, ideas
such as “strategic cluster-building” carry the danger of undesirable
and wasteful intervention. This may partly explain the limited formal
policy response to Porter’s clustering concept in the neo-liberal envi-
ronments of  the first wave of post-socialist reformers. Many of the
theoretical insights that make up the “high-road” concept are sup-
ported by empirical findings from a limited number of  industrialised
core economies.
At least in Hungary, but also in Poland and the Czech Republic,
there is growing dissatisfaction with “foreign” models and calls are
made for, at the least, adaptation of these models to the local situation.
Two issues – the small size and open character of the economy, and
the significant role of subsidiaries of foreign multinationals in the in-
dustrial structure – in particular are often brought to the fore. The rel-
evant geographical scale of clusters (production networks) differs by
sector and some are bound to cross national borders. As to the second
issue, Porter and other industrial policy expects does not impute a
strong innovative role for foreign subsidiaries. However, actual Cen-
tral European research shows that the degree to which entire clusters
are localised and the level of upgrading and innovative activity
within those clusters varies strongly.
At the same time in the 1990s as production conditions in the
Newly Industrialising Economies (NICs) altered fundamentally and
new strategies were put into place by states, many multi-national cor-
porations (MNCs) from the core economies have started to modify
their global and regional strategies. Moreover, with the ongoing Euro-
pean Enlargement the region rapidly became an important growth
area and market in its own right, and in the new situation the signifi-
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cance of the region for many MNCs was no longer derived from cost
advantages alone but also from its strategic importance. Many MNCs
have changed towards more comprehensive and regionally focused
operations. MNCs from the core economies have transferred a wider
range of product lines. Additional manufacturing processes (involv-
ing “intelligent”, new information processing steps in the production
chains), non-manufacturing functions, as well as other labour proc-
esses to the region. In order to maintain competitiveness in an in-
creasingly “crowded market”, particular types of production have
been geographically reallocated (transferred towards more cost-effec-
tive locations in the region). In this environment the evolution of the
operations of large MNCs is marked by both a (much) more extensive
plant structure-linked to a geographically (much) more dispersed
pattern of operation, and the rapid growth of multi-functional non-
production units. The tendency of increased localisation has given
rise to procurement networks, whereby large branch plants, carrying
out final assembly, have become flagships which are involved in or-
ganising such networks.
In essence, what is found in the region as to activities in produc-
tion chains, functions in the value chain of firms and in the commod-
ity chains of a range of industries has tremendously changed. This is
significantly impacting the function(s) performed by “places” (dy-
namic “geographies”), reflecting the local and regional configura-
tions of firms and industries, as well as the local, national and re-
gional forces shaping these configurations.
It should also be observed that in Central and Eastern Europe a
range of ‘other types’ of internationally operating non-manufactur-
ing firms or corporations have become more prominently present.
Given the trends noted above, a number of the strategies pursued
by some Central European states have proved successful. In the proc-
ess of geographical reorganisation, labour-intensive routine assem-
bly has been shifted out of Hungary or the Czech Republic to other,
more suitable, locations in the region. Linked to this, firms have en-
gaged in product-line substitution, low value-added products with a
relatively low technology content being replaced by higher value-
added products with a substantially higher technology content.
In the course of the 1990s firms in more technology-driven indus-
tries in the process of internationalisation have targeted Central Eu-
rope as a production base.
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In discussions about the global-local (and internalisation-exter-
nalisation) dimensions in the organisational aspect of production
systems employed by firms, implicitly the focus often has been on
main producers in industries and large establishments, be they trans-
plants or local firms.
Spatially, in tandem with the upgrading process more and more
companies have relocated product lines out of their Central European
plants to Eastern European localities. As expected, most of the reloca-
tion concerned lower end products. As relocation will continue in the
years to come, it is to be expected that more establishments will inter-
nationalise. This most reflects the fact that internationalisation is an
outcome also of expansion strategies which (necessarily) have as-
sumed a regional scope. In relation to this, it was observed that the
factors underlying internationalisation are two-fold. One factor is the
cost push. The second factor – growing in the nearest future perhaps
vin its importance – is the following of clients in order to stay in the
market, or maintain market share (market pull).
The global dimension remains, and the global-local configura-
tion seems to be transformed into a global-regional-local configura-
tion (from the perspective of the main producers). This may not neces-
sarily have any consequences for “local content”.
Thus, in the process of restructuring, the production system and
localisation appear to be reshaped. The relocation by main producers
and the market pull responses of suppliers, coupled with the main
prospect of contraction of local production in the supply segment
(rather than stability) also because of the cost push, may imply that
for the near future hollowing out of the branch as a whole is a possi-
bility which may turn into reality.
Earlier we pointed out the regionalisation process in Central Eu-
rope, more and more stimulated by the “high-road” strategy of the
governments, possibly leading to some “hollowing-out” of the manu-
facturing base. Manufacturing industry is taking advantage of the re-
gional differentiation in comparative advantage within the different
segments of the growth frontline, thereby creating a new division of
labour within cross-national/regional networks. The presence of re-
source complementarity in close geographic proximity provides an
excellent environment to carry out activities along different segments
of the value-chain without losing the beneficial effects of geographi-
cal proximity.
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POST COLONIAL INFORMATION SOCIETIES
 IN EASTERN EUROPE
Post-colonial societies may be divided into two types: those with a
long recorded history and civilisation prior to their reduction to a co-
lonial status and those which were perceived by Europeans as sav-
age due primarily to the “undeveloped” state of their technology and
the lack of a state organisation. “Uncivilised” societies were per-
ceived as both original and unspoiled as well as undeveloped and
savage, based on the model of the archetypical, European myth of the
Garden of Eden and “original sin”. The apparently rival accents of
the noble savage and the unredeemed natural man derive from this
same source. It may still be necessary to emphasise that the percep-
tion of this difference was lodged more in European cultural history
than in the characteristics of the colonised societies that were selected
as emblematic. However, its consequences were extremely significant
for the subsequent development of colonialism.
A danger arises at this point that such reflection will take the form
of a mere “experiential catalogue”. Northrop Frye used this term to
suggest that Canadian literature tended to simply list experiences as
if this were adequate to constitute a cultural tradition. He suggested,
by contrast, that it is only when experiential contents are formed into
a universal mythic pattern that a contribution of more than local in-
terest is attained. The problem, of course, is that such supposedly
universal myths, are by no means self-evidently universal. It may be
not only experiential content that is new, but the form of structuring
itself. To this extent, Frye is right: unless the new, cultural experience
transcends a catalogue and becomes a structuring form, we have sim-
ply the extension and deeper imperialism of European culture – new
grist for the old mill. From this demand for an interplay between the
experiences rooted in social history and the forms of thought, issues
the possibility of post-colonial culture by ex-Europeans. Without this
kind of reflexivity, we fall back to West European models at a later
date. Our experiences are neither simply contingent, nor immediately
universal, but concern the possibility of a universalising articulation
from a particular location.
Eastern Europe the communication theory has no such immedi-
ate reference. Nevertheless, it is a theory of communication worked
out from the periphery, which argues that it is the undervalued, or
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unrecognised media that sustain the balance required by a viable
civilisation. Media theory is thus a critique of institutions. Moreover,
the biases of institutions tend to be invisible to social scientific analy-
sis, since the social science disciplines are built upon and generally
justify the prior institutional arrangements through incorporating
their presuppositions into the basic theoretical propositions. For this
reason, media theory is also a critique of the disciplinary organisa-
tion of thought. The centre systematically misrecognises the condi-
tions of its own existence. It fails to understand that it does not sus-
tain itself of itself but only through its relations to the periphery, on
which (in a reversal) it is “dependent”. In the light of these themes,
which bear considerable resemblance to contemporary post-structur-
alist and deconstructionist ones, it is important to notice that Innis’
defence of time and oral tradition is not merely a re-establishment of
key assumptions of European thought – today usually called phono
and logo-centrism. The paradox is this: even when a conventional,
West European, “metaphysical” assumption is rediscovered in a co-
lonial context, the context of (re)discovery confers a different meaning
– neither as an assumption, nor as autonomous, since its constitution
through the periphery has undermined its self-evidence and inde-
pendence. In this manner, the Eurocentrism of European culture be-
comes (at least potentially) simply European and clears a space for a
discourse beyond “the West”.
ICT MYTHS AND TRENDS OF DEVELOPMENT
In the social iconography of our times, no symbol is more potent than
the computer. Information technologies in general, and computing in
particular, are widely understood as key engines of social change,
driving the inexorable transition from the world as it was to the one
that is emerging. Two beliefs seem to underlie this view. First, a con-
viction that computerised ways of doing things are vastly more effi-
cient – quicker, more powerful and authoritative, more cost-effective –
than their conventional counterparts. Second, and much more
vaguely, a sense that computerisation is apt to bring about far-reach-
ing (but unintended and vaguely understood) transformations of so-
cial relations.
As bases for such beliefs, most people would probably point to
some widely-noted trends – that computing activities have long con-
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tinued to grow cheaper; that they increasingly engage nonspecialists;
and that more and more areas of social life involve computing. Such
understandings go along with a readily believable theory: computing
is spreading because of compelling economic incentives; its
efficiencies draw decision-makers to a never-ending search for new
ways to harness its potential for ordering the treatment of both things
and social processes.
Thus research to date presents us with ambiguous results in
terms of efficiency models of the extension of computing. But there are
theoretical alternatives to these models. Kling takes a highly skeptical
attitude toward the quest for efficiency as the key impetus to compu-
terisation. Instead, Kling and Iacono view the diffusion of computing
as the result of what they call a “social movement”. In their words,
“During the last 20 years, CMs [computerisation movements]
have helped set the stage on which the computer industry expanded.
As this industry expands, some computer vendors and their trade
associations can be powerful participants in specific decisions about
equipment purchased by a particular company ....”. But vendor acti-
ons alone cannot account for the widespread mobilisations of com-
puting in Eastern Europe of the 1990s. They feed and participate in it;
they have not driven it. Part of the drive is economic, and part is ideo-
logical. “Collective behaviour” may be a more exact term for what
Kling and Iacono have in mind here than “social movement”. The
force that they identify as driving extension of computing is a diffuse,
socially-propagated and self-sustaining enthusiasm – embodying
unshakable assumptions of the beneficial tendencies of the techno-
logy, and resisting any critical confrontation with evidence.
Among contemporary students of organisations, these skeptical
approaches have their parallel in what has come to be called “the
New Institutionalism” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Proponents of
this rather diffuse set of doctrines cast their position as an alternative
to strictly economic models of organisational change. Many impor-
tant innovations in organisations, they insist, cannot reasonably be
accounted for by anything so simple as cost-benefit calculation. For
one thing, costs and benefits are simply not sufficiently clear-cut; the
nature of choices to be made, and the identities of those who choose,
are open questions. To simplify a bit, one might say that, for the New
Institutionalists, the key question is what kinds of costs are consid-
ered, and who pays them.
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In this view, organisations are self-justifying and mutually mi-
metic. Efficiency and cost-effectiveness may indeed represent the
coinage of public justification for many organisations; accordingly,
no one should be surprised to find that innovations are presented in
such terms. But often there is nothing remotely like clear-cut evidence
available to reflect on the cost-effectiveness of any particular innova-
tion. The best substitute for such evidence, for public consumption,
may be to demonstrate that one’s own organisation displays the same
publicly-visible features as other organisations of the same kind.
Whether these institutional features are precisely more cost-effective
than various institutional alternatives is perhaps an unanswerable
question. But it is clear that their presence helps keep up an indispen-
sable appearance that the university in question is acting like other
universities to which it would like to be compared. The example is
easily extended to other organisations and other forms of innovation.
Whatever the deep forces underlying the press to computerise,
these are not apt to be consciously known or directly professed by the
actors involved. Instead, these forces arise from diffuse, culturally-
entrenched and unexamined convictions that computing offers solu-
tions to virtually any it is, and when and how it arrives – apply as
equally to the 21st century as they do to globalisation, as if the two go
together quite naturally in some millennial dynamic. There is a sense
of inevitability on the one hand, and on the other, considerable trepi-
dation.
The economic dimensions of globalisation are featured in chap-
ters by Saskia Sassen and Gary Gereffi. Sassen juxtaposes the global
economy of “flows” (of capital and services), advanced by informa-
tion technologies, with the new geography of centrality of regulatory
nodes, stemming from the centralisation of command and the provi-
sion of services in global cities. The significance of her juxtaposition
is that states remain important vehicles of the global economy, in the
sense that, being spatial and legal organisations, states accommodate
and contribute to the elaboration of new transnational regimes regu-
lating these flows (rather than withering away). Gereffi reviews the
shifting ground of development strategies, under conditions of
transnationalisation of production. Referring to various case studies,
his focus is on the global scale of the ladder of industrial develop-
ment, represented spatially by commodity chains. Development,
here, involves climbing the ladder by technological upgrading and
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adapting the institutional practices of successful upwardly mobile
states, such as the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs).
NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS AND THE
EMERGING NEW INFORMATION ORDER
Many studies in the economics of innovation have pointed out that
technology is best understood from a system perspective. Even appar-
ently simple products embody very different types of knowledge
which are not always available to a single organisation and are not
always embodied in goods that can be purchased on the market.
Many firms access valuable knowledge both through market ex-
change (e.g. through the purchase of capital or intermediate goods or
licensing agreements), and through less formal contacts with suppli-
ers, customers, universities, government agencies and other organi-
sations. It is a well-known fact that firms with little innovative activ-
ity may enjoy a satisfactory economic performance because of the ca-
pabilities they acquire from upstream suppliers. The same applies at
the sectoral level: some fast-growing industries, for example in the
service sector, do not themselves produce technological innovations
to any significant degree. The economic environment in which firms
operate is therefore crucial for the development of their technological
capabilities. This fact is increasingly acknowledged, and the terms
“national systems of innovation” (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1992;
Archibugi, Howells and Michie, 1999) and “technology systems”
(Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1996; Simonetti, 1998) have been intro-
duced in order to analyse the complex webs of interactions between
institutions and industries in the innovation process.
Interdependence, thus, plays a key role in the generation and use
of technology. However, its conceptualisation and measurement are
still at a rudimentary stage, due no doubt to the rather elusive nature
of technology. Indeed, the literature on the economics of innovation
has highlighted a number of issues that relate to the nature of technol-
ogy and are connected to the nature of interdependence.
In current society the cost and power of information technology
means larger institutions such as major corporations and govern-
ment have much greater information access and processing capabil-
ity than individuals. In current society individuals make most deci-
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sions based on intuition with little access to databases. Operational
information policy would greatly reduce the asymmetry between in-
dividuals and institutions. With the expanding social nervous sys-
tem database entrepreneurs would create numerous databases for
individual decision making. These database entrepreneurs would
have the resources to obtain negative information such that their cli-
ents would make more informed decisions. With much more power-
ful home computers and distributive processing through the social
nervous system, individuals would be able to analyse their alterna-
tives systematically.
The public acceptance of a more open informational policy de-
pends on a majority of citizens gaining from the change. Given a sys-
tem of social inheritance, the motivation of all citizens is modified. As
he inherits his share of the capital stock, everyone simultaneously
plays the role of consumer, producer and public. As a consumer, the
individual would like to acquire goods at the competitive market
prices. As a producer, however, he would want the highest rate of re-
turn, and as a citizen he would like an effective government. Not only
are these goals in conflict, but their resolution will change as new
knowledge is acquired about the environment, more efficient produc-
tion technologies, and consumer needs.
The right to learn provides the framework for creating opera-
tional information policy governing decisions based on current
knowledge. Operational information policy should promote market
efficiency, government effectiveness and the ability of principals to
evaluate agents.
Our methodological questions were to map interaction patterns
brought about by the predominant channels through which a soci-
ety’s information travels. Does information in a culture move from the
periphery to the centre or vice versa? Does the culture value informa-
tion as a scarce commodity by storing it up or is it treated as an abun-
dant commodity? Does information move towards increasingly
larger spheres of influence pushing cultural borders outwards? Or
the reverse?
Innis concluded that two general orientations were present in a
culture at any time: 1) An orientation stressing short distant patterns
of communication which is largely dependent on interpersonal inter-
action and local communication; and 2) an orientation stressing long
distance patterns of communication which is largely dependent on
communication technologies.
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A bias towards long distance orientations leads to the undermin-
ing of many localised features of cultural and social life. Replacing
local sources of information with distant ones leads to a change in
what and how people think. Short distance contact emphasises local
interests and can lead to a withdrawal from contact with others fur-
ther afield. This may set new frameworks for bias.
A society’s biases with regards to a particular technology may
affect both itself and other (especially geographically adjacent) socie-
ties. In this manner, bias establishes the power to define reality – a
conceptual and practical position with consequences at various lev-
els of social interaction.
THE TRAJECTORY OF TECHNOLOGY
Technological change is marked by broad uncertainty within defined
constraints.  The constraints are set by the ‘natural’ limits of the op-
erative scientific paradigm and of the production capabilities avail-
able to exploit it.  The uncertainty stems from cost/performance/
functionality trade-offs, customer preferences given alternatives, and
changing general business conditions which broadly affect the ca-
pacity to produce and consume innovations.
In that sense, technology development is a path dependent proc-
ess of learning in which tomorrow’s opportunities grow out of prod-
uct, process, and applications activities undertaken today. Rather,
technical progress involves additional, often subtler insights that
coalesce only in conjunction with experience in development, pro-
duction and use. The process is simultaneously cyclical, incremental,
and highly interactive – rather than a dramatic breakthrough, a leap
up to the next rung in the ladder of technological progress, advances
are driven through iteration and cumulative learning-by-doing in
production, learning-by-using in consumption.  This iterative, cumu-
lative activity helps to produce ordered development paths within
the broad patterns of constraint and uncertainty that mark all indus-
trial innovation.
Differently positioned actors can make different choices and es-
tablish different lines of progress.  They can evaluate the attendant
risks and uncertainties differently, apply different capabilities to their
technological effort, receive different signals from customers (and fi-
nancial markets) in response, and go down different development
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paths.  They can, in other words, mount differing technological trajec-
tories – that is, differing progressions along the economic and techno-
logical trade-offs available within the broad fabric of constraint and
uncertainty.
These ideas about technological progress can be extended, with
care, to the modern industrial economies which rely upon the genera-
tion and adoption of industrial innovation for growth.  Their devel-
opment is characterised by the ability to effectively exploit technology
within given patterns of constraint and uncertainty.  And again, the
capacity to exploit technology varies with context – in this case, the
community and market context of the economy within which technol-
ogy evolves.
As the example implies, domestic capacity to exploit a technology
lies in the particular capabilities for production and use of the tech-
nology resident in an economy. Broadly speaking, an economy’s par-
ticular mix of capabilities embodies that economy’s potential for the
learning-by-doing and by-using that underlie technical progress.  In
turn, the exercise of the available capabilities determines how much
of the potential for technical progress is actualised.  Since capability
differs from economy to economy so does the potential for learning
and technical progress, and so ultimately does the actual realisation
of technology development paths.
In short, different national mixes of production capabilities – i.e.,
different national capability-sets – carry with them the potential for
very different national technology trajectories.  Although technolo-
gies and the capabilities they embody diffuse across national board-
ers in a relatively open world economy, divergent national trajectories
can persist under two conditions: if cumulative learning and
progress down a particular development path can accrue and be re-
tained locally for extended periods, or if local capabilities to absorb
technology from abroad differ significantly.
The speed and degree to which technical know-how flows across
national boundaries thus depends crucially upon the character of  lo-
cal capabilities.  In other words, successful diffusion of technologies
from one economy to another is not automatic even in an open world
economy.  National technology trajectories can either converge or di-
verge depending upon whether or not the relevant national capabili-
ties underlying them are effectively accessible.  In this context, “effec-
tive access” exists when technological capabilities are available in
the required amount and quality, in a timely fashion, and at a com-
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petitive cost.  Conversely, the capabilities are not effectively accessible
when unavailable at the appropriate quantity, quality, timing, or
price.
The supply base is the resident domestic capability to supply the
component, machinery, materials and control technologies, and the
associated know-how, that producers use to develop and manufac-
ture products.
The supply base shapes the possibilities confronting producers
in two ways.  First, different architectures of supply can either enable
or deter access to appropriate technologies in a timely fashion at a
reasonable price. Second, different architectures of supply imply dif-
ferent opportunities to engage in the interaction and support (be-
tween suppliers and producers) that are necessary to effectively ex-
ploit the technologies that are accessible. These points are worth a
closer look.
Now consider a starkly contrasting supply architecture, one in
which domestic producers are similarly dependent on international
markets for supply of technology, but those markets are relatively
closed to trade and investment. They are simultaneously oligopolistic
and geographically concentrated. Opportunities for support and
learning by interaction are available only to customers with a signifi-
cant local presence in the supplier’s heart-land, and on terms largely
dictated by the supplier. This kind of supply architecture would sig-
nificantly constrain producers abroad who were dependent on it,
and would have great potential to eliminate opportunities for the de-
pendent foreign economy to capture spillovers and other externali-
ties.  From the perspective of the distant economy, most of the relevant
production activities lie abroad, as do all of the leading edge activities
that generate most of the spillovers.  The pace of domestic technical
progress – the ability effectively to exploit the machinery, materials
and component technologies which underlie all electronics – is effec-
tively controlled from outside the domestic economy.  Opportunities
to capture externalities are reduced.
Thus, a given supply architecture can either reinforce domestic
capabilities to exploit technology or undermine them (when the rel-
evant domestic activities move abroad). By altering the locational
logic of industrial investment, the architecture of supply is, in effect,
dynamically allocating national (or regional) opportunities to exploit
technology over time. A given supply architecture could permit tech-
162 Chapter 6
nology to diffuse internationally at any moment in time, but still bias
new investment over time to the locations where it is spatially concen-
trated.  A given supply architecture also represents a spatial distribu-
tion of opportunities for long-term economic performance associated
with the effective exploitation of technology.
Domestic development trajectories depend upon domestic capa-
bilities to exploit particular technologies, the cumulative industrial
trek down unique development paths for those technologies, and the
degree to which related relevant technologies diffuse through the ar-
chitecture of supply and become available for domestic use.
Genealogy matters in delimiting these variables:  the emerging
trajectory rests partly on the past development trajectory from which
it is evolving.  Indeed, the capacity to continue to exploit technology
rests on available production capabilities and accumulated know-
how from past development paths.
In the post-war period, the state socialist Eastern Europe chose to
emphasise investment in production over consumption, creating
macroeconomic conditions for rapid growth.  Policy generated stimu-
late new investment through a variety of state incentive schemes and
reserved the growth in domestic demand for producers by closing the
domestic market to foreign firms.  Dynamic scale economies domi-
nated, making the pursuit of market share a necessity to sustain short
term profits.
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
The growing interest for information infrastructure has produced a
rich variety of studies and analyses of information infrastructures.
Surprisingly enough, there do not exist many studies about the
Internet that try to spell out in some detail how the design process
actually takes place. There exist several overviews of the historical de-
velopment of the Internet, but they contain little or no evidence of how
or why various design decisions came about. Star et al. seek through
a series of studies to develop a deeper understanding of what an in-
frastructure technology, as opposed to an artifact, is. Star and
Ruhlender (1996) discuss the adoption and use of an information in-
frastructure supporting a community of researchers. Neumann and
Star (1996) discuss the multiplicity of viewpoints of an information
infrastructure. Bowker and Star (1994) describe how standardised
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classification schemes in medicine highlight some aspects of the phe-
nomenon while downplaying others. Similarly, Kling (1991) develop
a notion of infrastructure that is to capture the many hidden re-
sources that need to be mobilised to get an information system to actu-
ally be used.
Lehr (1992) points to the bureaucratic and procedural differences
in the ways standardisation bodies organise their work. These are
argued to play an important role for the outcome, namely, the stand-
ards. For instance, the OSI effort represents a clear-cut alternative to
the evolutionary approach underlying an emphasis on transition
strategies. OSI is designed monolithically from scratch, that is, with a
total disregard for existing information infrastructures, the installed
base. It has been fiercely criticised exactly for this (Hanseth et al.,
1996; Rose, 1992c).
The literature on large technical systems is illuminating in de-
scribing how infrastructures are established but tends to bypass how
to facilitate changes (Summerton, 1994). A particularly relevant con-
tribution is Hughes (1983), which gives a historical account of the
electrification of the Western world around the turn of the century.
Hughes’s work is important but it does not address the dilemmas of
scaling explicitly. It would be illuminating to reinterpret his account
by focusing on the issues of transition strategies, the role of the in-
stalled base, and gateway technologies.
Recently, there has been attention to development strategies suit-
able for information infrastructures (Kahin & Abbate, 1995). These
strategies do not deal with scaling but address issues such as the role
of government intervention and industrial consortia.
Grindley (1995) argues for the importance of the installed base of
products. This emphasises the need for products to be backward com-
patible; that is, that they interact with earlier versions of the product.
In other words, this protects the installed base of earlier versions of
the product. Backward compatibility plays the same role for products
as transition strategies for information infrastructures (Hinden,
1996).
A possible strategy to support a scaling information infrastruc-
ture different from enhancing a smooth transition is the use of gate-
ways. This is a potentially useful mechanism for scaling information
infrastructure that plays practically no role in the Internet. It is pretty
much written off within the Internet community (Eidnes, 1996;
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Stefferud & Pliskin, 1994). Using gateways is interesting but is not
pursued in this article. Consult, for instance, David and Dunn (1988)
for a discussion of gateway technologies from an economic perspec-
tive. Hughes (1983) describes several employments of gateways in the
history of electrification, and within the digital library initiative there
is some attention to the role of gateways.
As society is propelled from industrial to information age by the
dual forces of converging digital technologies and globalisation, gov-
ernments are finding it difficult to keep pace with change and to de-
fine the appropriate policy response.
Old rules and frameworks are rapidly becoming obsolete as new
technologies transform the industrial landscape.
As a result, it is no longer possible to keep the network industries
separate from the broadcasters and publishers, which means that
current regulatory frameworks governing telecommunications and
broadcasting,  and publishing must be transformed in order to allow
new businesses to take off.
The Information Society has become a visible policy element in all
Eastern and Central European states at different levels, including city
and regional ones.
But for the Internet and its successor global network of networks
to transform itself from being a global information and communica-
tion space into a genuine economic, social and cultural space, a
number of problems associated with its use must be overcome.
Such measures would have to respond to essentially three re-
quirements:
• If the future environment for global communications is to be
an open network such as the Internet, and this is to develop
into a virtual space for business and electronic commerce,
then users (businesses and consumers) need to be convinced
that confidential commercial information, as well as pay-
ment systems, are safe and secure. In some cases, they also
need to be certain of the identity of their correspondent or the
originator of any transaction.
• If the Internet is to also become a virtual legal space, used for
the exchange of contracts, legal formalities, and for public
administration, users need to be confident that the integrity
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of electronic documents and data can be guaranteed, that
they can be used as legal evidence, and are sufficiently pro-
tected from being tampered with or maliciously transformed.
Measures will need to provide legal security and trust in the
medium.
• If the Internet is to develop into a virtual space for learning,
parents need to be reassured that they can exert parental con-
trol over the content to which their children can have access.
Tools should be placed at their disposal should they wish to
protect their children from what they may consider as inap-
propriate content, such as pornography, racism, paedophilia
networks and violence. Furthermore, the content of some
forms of network communication could be in conflict with
national laws, habits, and cultures.
THE ROLE OF  ICT IN GROWTH
OF PERFORMANCE
Turning now to the role that ICT plays in the economy, directly as a
producer of final consumption and investment goods, and indirectly
via the utilisation of these investment goods in the production proc-
ess, it should be observed that the contribution of the information and
communication technology to output and productivity growth can
take three main forms: 1) acceleration of productivity growth in the
ICT-producing sectors themselves and an increase of their weight in
the economy; 2) capital deepening driven by rapid investment in ICT
equipment; and 3) ICT-using sectors enhancing their efficiency by
harnessing new technology.
In the United States, over the 1990–97 period, the ICT industry
enjoyed an annual average labour productivity growth above 10 per
cent (compared with a 2.3 per cent annual average in the manufactur-
ing sector) and accounted for about 40 per cent of total manufacturing
labour productivity growth. International comparisons of the contri-
bution of ICT industry to manufacturing productivity growth is lim-
ited by the fact that some countries, including the United States, use
hedonic price deflators for computers and others do not. This is likely
to have a significant impact on measured productivity in the indus-
try. However, available data suggest that, although generally higher
166 Chapter 6
than the manufacturing average, labour productivity growth rates of
ICT industry have been smaller in most of the other OECD countries
(for which data are available) as compared with the United States.
In the Central European countries, the share of IT capital goods in
total investment expenditure rose steadily over the 1990s, and ac-
counted for 5 per cent of total non-residential gross fixed capital for-
mation in the Central European countries in 1996. The share of com-
munication equipment also rose, though less rapidly, and accounted
for around 5 per cent of total non-residential investment. This fast
growth is due to an annual decline in IT price indices of about 10 per
cent, reflecting rapid quality improvements and technical progress
embodied in these capital goods.
The rapid investment in information and communication tech-
nology assets led to a positive compositional effect, in all Central Eu-
ropean countries, and over both time periods shown, i.e. capital serv-
ices have grown at a more rapid pace than the capital stock. ICT as-
sets are relatively short lived and, on the assumptions adopted, their
marginal productivity in each of the few periods of their service life
has to be high enough to finance depreciation and capital losses.
Available evidence suggests that the capital composition effect in the
United States is likely to have increased significantly in the past few
years due to a marked boost in ICT investment. The growth rate in
both hardware and communication equipment almost doubled in the
1996-99 period compared with the first half of the 1990s.
The second point is that the positive quality/composition effect
implies a stronger contribution of capital to output growth (at the
same time, measured multi-factor productivity growth would decline
by the same amount, see below). In other words, the measurement of
capital services shifts some of the growth effects from multi-factor
productivity growth to capital.
CYBERPOLITICS:
THE NEW EASTERN FRONTIER
The new information technologies, in giving rise to the explosive
growth of the Internet, opening the cyber domain, and fostering a
worldwide infosphere, have really created a vast new territory. In
doing so, they have reopened “the frontier.” And Central Europe,
with its historical behavioural models in the “in-between-zones” and
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its utopian future vision inherited perhaps from socialist ideologies,
understands how to profitably settle and exploit a frontier. Thus,
there is a strong cultural component to some new democracies seiz-
ing the possibilities offered by the cyberfrontier. Understanding why
this frontier analogy has now regained its relevance helps us recog-
nise many of the deep transformational changes that are occurring in
the region. Frederick Jackson Turner, one of the most distinguished
American historians of the nineteenth century, outlined his then-star-
tling “frontier hypothesis” asserting that a frontier had existed con-
tinuously for nearly three hundred years. More than a boundary or a
physical space, the frontier was an idea, and an ideal, of boundless
opportunity and an expression of individual freedom. The West, in
particular, also became – and remains – a potent symbol of American
distinctiveness. In a way let us ponder whether these new informa-
tion technologies have re-established a space – and a vision – of al-
most limitless opportunity for those who are prepared to exploit it
and provided as well a fresh source of comparative advantage in
technology. If so, then perhaps what we should be talking about is not
“cyberspace”, but the “cyberfrontier” – a powerfully resonant meta-
phor for this new territory.
In relating the American West and the cyberfrontier, these deeper
emotional linkages flow from the social, political, and economic
manifestations that were generated by the frontier phenomena - and
both need to be appreciated for their implications for the nation at the
Gestalt level.
As did our earlier western frontier, the cyberspace this new terri-
tory will attract many contending parties, and they will bring con-
flicting interests and perspectives on how to define and shape the
character of this new cyber territory. Rather than attempting to ad-
dress all possible implications, this chapter focuses on a more limited
set of issues that the frontier analogy can offer – a different perspec-
tive from one grounded in the modern post-industrial era:
a) How the cyberfrontier will cause fundamental restructuring  of
economies and societies that exploit it?
b) How should we resolve the conflicting equities and guarantee
the maximum opportunity for exploiting this new domain?
c) What should be the appropriate role for government: to direct
exploration or provide encouragement for it?
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Turner argued that the availability of the western frontier had af-
fected both developments at home and America’s attitudes towards
the world at large: “The most significant thing about the American
frontier is, that it lies at the hither edge of free land”. The existence of
the frontier significantly lessened pressures for either intensive devel-
opment at home or for overseas colonial expansion and other foreign
adventures.
In this sense too, our present situation on the cyberfrontier resem-
bles that western frontier experience: it is less about reallocating exist-
ing customers and sharing existing markets than about creating en-
tirely new products, services, and industries – and opportunities as
well. The “West” was a place to get away from failure and from too
much control, by social conventions or by government, and it is cru-
cial to recognise the sense of freedom that the frontier represented, not
only to Americans but to those drawn from afar to settle the America
frontier. Great struggles would be fought over governments’ ability to
extend control, in fact as opposed to in law, and these arguments also
mirror many present-day issues of contention over legal regimes and
regulation of this new space.
This recognition of the deeper historical roots will have impor-
tant consequences for the choices we make about American society.
The frontier metaphor provides a powerful framework to relate the
developing features of an information-dominated society to the his-
torical antecedents; our frontier forefathers had also “... dreamed
dreams and beheld visions”.
Not only was there a series of expansions pushing the geo-
graphic frontier continuously westward, but each new expansion
started the cycle of social development anew. With each stage of west-
ward expansion, there was a “... a return to primitive conditions” in
which life-threatening dangers were commonplace. Turner saw a
progression of these stages of frontier exploitation: first by hunters
and fur traders, then cattlemen and ranchers, miners, and then farm-
ers, and finally manufacturing and industry – “a recurrence of the
process of evolution”. As a result, there was also a progression in
stages of settlement and density, each with their attendant develop-
ment of appropriate behaviours, rules and institutions. As Turner
noted, “... one can study the germs of processes repeated at each suc-
cessive frontier ... And the settlement of these and similar questions
for one frontier served as a guide for the next”.
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The frontier provided a “... safety valve for all the discontented
who were trapped by past customs or by present economic hard-
ships”. Timothy Dwight, historian and President of Yale, in 1821 had
characterised the pioneers as social misfits - “too idle, too talkative,
too passionate, too prodigal, and too shiftless to acquire either prop-
erty or character”. The chance to walk away from failure and have
opportunity for a fresh start often acted as a spur for tackling the
hardships of the frontier. The frontier was the land of the “second
chance” (and often third and fourth); it was populated by people of-
ten without history, intent on abandoning their pasts. Many of those
who went forth on the frontier often wished to leave government, fam-
ily, status, neighbours, church, and other entangling relationships
behind. It was the place and chance to recreate identity. The frontier
offered the rare opportunity to be defined by deeds, not by one’s an-
cestors or even one’s own past. It was far more egalitarian – almost all
shared the hardships of frontier life – and less socially stratified than
the more settled east; either sudden fortune or disaster could change
one’s place.
Today, the successive waves of new information technology gen-
erations mirror the episodic stages of our earlier westward expan-
sion; the “high-tech start-ups” that populate each of them represent
our new frontier settlements.  “Whatever.com,” or any Web address, is
the modern equivalent of the miner’s claim or the homesteader’s land
patent. One perceptive governor recently commented, “Our goal is to
create new pioneers. The pioneers of the last century followed the
railroads. The new ones follow the Internet”.
What is striking is how comments made about the earlier Ameri-
can frontier and those who settled it ring about the new cyberfrontier.
These similarities may illuminate the reappearance of “cowboy” val-
ues and fondness for Remington sculptures among the cyber-entre-
preneur set.
We ought not be surprised that this new frontier, like the west, is
again giving rise to a new “net culture” – that is, a distinctive set of
behaviours: from dress, to language, to attitudes, to patterns of action,
to political perspectives, and especially to values. As Turner noted,
“The ‘West,’ as a self-conscious section, began to evolve” and it pro-
duced a culture based on frontier necessities and experience. And
these behaviours and the attraction of the new culture are likely to be
as important as any products produced in this new territory; espe-
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cially important will be the values it fosters. The new cyber- or net-
culture, often exhibited in archetypal fashion in Silicon Valley,
strongly suggests a reversion to our earlier frontier experience, rather
than continuing a pattern of evolution from the frontier through in-
dustrial to an ever more sophisticated (and protected) post-industrial
world.
The frontier experience shaped a view of government’s role that
was more focused on facilitation than on enforcement; and it should
not be surprising if the frontier values, emphasising individualism
and self-determination, lean in that direction. Of particular impor-
tance, therefore, may be the lessons that can be drawn from our fron-
tier experience concerning the process of developing an appropriate
government role and codifying a suitable legal regime.
While “hardy pioneers” may have populated the frontier, govern-
ment’s contribution to creating the necessary infrastructure had been
crucial. Government financed exploration of the new territories.
Cyberspace similarly rests on an enormous and complex infrastruc-
ture put in place by a combination of government and private actions
– from new information technologies that provide the physical un-
derpinnings to policy, legal, tax, intellectual, and regulatory frame-
works that enable contesting claimants to adjudicate conflicting equi-
ties. And in both cases, government contributed substantially to mak-
ing settlement of the frontier possible and to encouraging Americans
to venture forth.
The cyberfrontier shares this characteristic of choice with the
west. Therefore, it should not be surprising to find these same proc-
esses of concentration and amplification at work in the self-selected
population that has first embarked out on this new cyberfrontier – the
“early adopters,” as they are known. This self-selection process is one
important aspect of what makes a frontier special. But active partici-
pation in a frontier experience is a matter of choice; the frontier draws
those who have made a conscious decision to explore new territory,
whether physical, conceptual, or virtual.
When the changes are extreme or widespread, entirely new cul-
tures can develop that go beyond merely incremental changes to old
forms. One only has to think about the dramatic changes in business
practices and social etiquette caused by the widespread proliferation
of the telephone to perceive the creation of a new culture and the need
for appropriate new institutional arrangements. In similar fashion,
the fast-paced adoption of e-mail by both businesses and consumers
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over the past decade is now triggering a rapid evolution of new cul-
tural norms that are appropriate to this new medium.
During this first stage, settlers were often isolated from each other
and individual self-defense (by families) was the norm since no or-
ganised, or outside, means of assistance or protection existed.
In the second stage, clusters of population were created with the
arrival of more settler families. Along with denser settlements, a sense
of community developed. As trust increased through the develop-
ment of personal relationships, a collective responsibility for recipro-
cal assistance and protection was accepted by most members of the
settlement. Furthermore, it is worth stressing that we began our na-
tional existence with a militia-based military force and depended,
until only very recently, on citizen-soldiers, not professionals, to fight
our wars.
Finally, in the later stage of these frontier settlements, the commu-
nity often recognised the need for the professionalisation of many key
functions. It then formally delegated its inherent law enforcement
powers with a grant of authority to a sheriff appointed by the commu-
nity. Functions delegated often became the sole duty of the hired pro-
fessional, and individual citizens then avoided participating in these
activities, even when they had previously performed them as a com-
munity responsibility.
As discussed previously, our western frontier analogy suggests a
broad spectrum of governance forms and institutional structures that
could be adopted as paradigms for the new cyberfrontier. Each carries
significant implications for patterns of further development and gov-
ernance. How appropriate each may be is to some degree conditioned
on one’s assessment of where the new frontier stands on that evolu-
tionary development path. These forms range from: 1) leaving protec-
tive measures in individual hands as a matter of retaining personal
responsibility (individual self-defense); to 2) accepting the responsi-
bility for protecting the community’s interests and retaining the au-
thority in the community’s hands (collective self-defense); to 3) shift-
ing the authority for community regulation to the government (for-
mally delegated authority). While many outside the cyber-commu-
nity argue for more government intervention and control over this
new frontier, most members of this new frontier community would
prefer only limited and very judicious intrusion by government, espe-
cially as most believe that few outside this frontier understand its dis-
tinctive characteristics – in particular its rapid rate of change. Thus,
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whether we accept as most appropriate choice for our form of govern-
ance the post-industrial or frontier analogy is an important decision.
As a result of self-selection, our new cyberfrontier has concen-
trated certain historically American traits as it evolves its distinctive
culture. Thereby, it has magnified the inherent differences in attitude
between itself and the rest of the country. At the same time, the diffu-
sion of those traits throughout American society has been more rapid
and accepting than elsewhere in the world. We should expect that
there will be significant disagreements and even open confrontation
with other nations in making the transition to Information Age socie-
ties. These types of transformational changes take time.
Working out our arrangements for the Information Age will likely
take a substantial period of time for both internalisation of appropri-
ate new behaviours and codification of rules and procedures; adapta-
tion to revolution is, by necessity, a long-term process. How we
choose to realign and balance these three critical powers will tell us
much about our views of the social contract.
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part three
changing social environment

The Blurring Dividing Line between Public
and Private and the Redefinition
of the Public Sphere
MÁRIA HELLER
The appearance and rapid spread of new information and communi-
cation technologies (ICT) has changed not only individual communi-
cations practices but also the lay and scientific representation of so-
cial communication. Communication is no longer seen as just one of
the spheres of social life; it is increasingly seen by social scientists as
a basic social category, a driving force of social integration (Habermas
1981).The theories of information society (Machlup 1962; Bell 1973;
Masuda 1980; Toffler 1990; Porat 1977; Webster 1995; Castells 1996–
97) treat communication, and the societal dimensions of its changed
position and significance, within a dual concept that overlaps sociol-
ogy and communication science. They investigate the sociological
and communicational conditions for, and consequences of, the
evolvement of information society from this common ground.
Rapidly developing new ICTs have resulted in a significant
transformation and expansion of the definition of the communication
situation itself, and in overall changes in the social representation of
communication. A more comprehensive, more generalised image of
communication is evolving and includes widely diverse types of di-
rect and indirect communication. In contrast with previous scientific
frames of reference, we are witnessing the evolvement of a theoretical
trend, focusing on the notion that the various forms of communica-
tion (direct, inter-personal and all types of media-related mass com-
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munication) are to be treated in a common theoretical framework. In-
creasingly dominant within it are studies of relationships (similari-
ties and differences) among the various forms of communication.
Media-relayed communication offers an opportunity to access
communication events over a wide berth of space and time. Increas-
ing use of new ICTs is widening the notion of the public sphere and
bringing about an abstract interpretation of access, as well as a mass
opportunity to actually access information. Many researchers
(Keane, Meyrowitz, Flichy, etc.) believe that the vast acceleration in
the development of technological possibilities has led to a second
transformation in the structure of the public sphere, following the
first structural transformation described by Jürgen Habermas (1962).
According to John Keane, several overlapping public spheres (micro,
mezzo, macro) are evolving, precipitated by the new multitude of
communication devices. Joshua Meyrowitz says that the public
sphere brought about by the new tools of communication has broken
down what were once firm boundaries between private and public.
Behaviours and topics once limited to the private sphere have become
public, primarily through television.
Indeed, the spread of the mass media has expanded the circle of
visible, accessible communication events and has had a powerful in-
fluence on opening up the private sphere. This development mainly
concerns a non-personal, non-physical presence, in other words,
public access is relayed by the media, primarily the mass media,
where audience participation is passive. However, the dissemination
of the latest communication technologies have supplied the portion
of the public open to innovation with media devices that also en-
hance private, personal communication opportunities such as mo-
bile phones, mobile Internet, WAP (wireless application protocol),
and DPA (digital personal assistance).
Prior to these developments access to private communication
was either through physical presence (direct face-to-face contact) or
through the very first of the media-relayed connections: the written
word. Printing resulted in a sudden and vast expansion in accessible
acts of communication, creating a typical way of exposing the private
sphere to a public audience. This includes most of artistic communi-
cation, which evolved in parallel with, or according to Habermas,
before the public sphere focusing on public topics. As secular narra-
tive genre including the novel took shape, general human public
themes were soon followed by thematisations of events in private life
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(the picaresque novel, romantic histories, portrayals of private lives
masked as historical novels). These developments made a significant
contribution to redrawing the boundaries between the private and
public spheres, to bringing about audience self-reflection, and to con-
structing the audience itself. This type of communication is, however,
quite symbolic: the private sphere appears through universalistic
transformations, thematised through sublime artistic filters, artisti-
cally constructed. In the later development, though the wilfully
shaped, artistically designed private sphere still exists on television,
commercialised mass art and reality transformed on lower levels of
symbolisation (soap operas, weekly serials) have increasingly domi-
nated the medium. Meanwhile, the private sphere has come forward
through an even newer development involving the participation of
anonymous speakers and a rise in the expression of private opinion
(talk shows, debates with well-known or anonymous participants,
growing appearance of no-name lay persons in news broadcasts,
call-in shows). This trend pretends to relay public opinion in a me-
dia-type format, but what we are seeing is no longer a consensus of
public opinion in the normative sense, or even a public opinion con-
cept presented as an aggregate of private opinions compiled by opin-
ion polls through representative surveys. It is, instead, an illusion, a
substitution of one form of public opinion, a non-representative arbi-
trary look-alike, or in the best of cases, possibly a presentation of a
plurality of opinion.
The need to distinguish between active and passive participation
in the public sphere is becoming increasingly urgent since the public
sphere itself is changing shape under pressure of the new communi-
cation technologies. Habermas’s theory of the public sphere (1962)
does not thematically separate active and passive access, nor does it
explicitly discuss the connection between interpersonal, direct inter-
actions and indirect media-relayed communication. In the emptied
public sphere of the 20th century as investigated by Habermas, the
consumer is no more than a passive participant in a media-domi-
nated pattern of communication. Habermas, however, does not dis-
cuss the direct channels of interpersonal communication in the era of
the contemporary public sphere, or consider the possibility of active
participation in the public sphere. The Habermasian theory postu-
lates an interrelationship, a simple melding of active and passive ac-
cess, in the era of the classical public sphere. He saw public debate in
the newspapers and among a speaking, savvy audience as organi-
182 Chapter 7
cally interconnected, or put another way, he believed that the first in-
stitutions of the mass media were tightly linked to a public sphere
based on direct interactive communication. He saw the active, con-
versing public sphere (clubs, salons, scientific circles, etc.) as closely
connected to the public sphere of the press, debating the themes of the
political public sphere just as the newspapers. The idea assumed ac-
tive, broad access to the issues of the political public sphere on the one
hand, and on the other it postulates that these two configurations,
direct interaction and indirect media-related communication, were
closely interrelated with traversable boundaries. Habermas sees the
roots of appearance in the public sphere and the evolvement of an
active communication competence in the literary sphere, which
elaborates the thematics of individual autonomy and the modes of
discussing them, as well as the competencies to manage personal and
psychological relationships and problems. This is why Habermas as-
sumes that literature as a public sphere precedes the political public
sphere despite the absence of reliable evidence. In many respects, the
elaboration of the relationship between the literary and political pub-
lic spheres has remained implicit in Habermas’ theory of the public
sphere. It is clear, however, that in this theory, societal activity and the
communications of civil society constitute the political public sphere
and the boundaries between the two are traversable. Here, we can,
therefore, touch on one of the normative aspects of Habermas’ public
sphere theory.
Even in the initial period marking the appearance and develop-
ment of new communication technologies the abstract representation
of the public sphere began to change, and there was a decisive trans-
formation in the behaviour of public sphere users, and in their modes
of accessing it. In even the first (limited mass media) of the three
phases of mass media development distinguished by Eli M. Noam
(1996) audience participation in the public sphere is viewed as pas-
sive, though this passivity becomes far more dominant in the second
phase, that of the multi-channel media. With the historical growth of
a public sphere operating through the media-relayed implements of
indirect communication, we enter a period of time in which the only
access to an increasingly broad range of communication events is
passive. Initially and typically of the first phase, there was a concen-
tration of attention around the public issues raised by the media (few
radio and television stations, generally government controlled). The
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second phase saw a significant growth in the privately owned media,
which triggered a decentralisation of attention, a fragmentation of the
audience. (Angelusz 1998, 2000) One part of the evolution was the
hollowing process described by Habermas, when real discussion of
significant public matters was replaced in the media by a choice of
topics of consumer culture attaining high public interest. The out-
come was audience alienation, and the overall dominance of a pas-
sive consumer conduct. In the second phase defined by Noam, which
still dominates the present-day global media, we have witnessed an
extreme mixing of information, news, and real public affairs with en-
tertainment, items of interest to the voyeuristic audience, topics in-
tended for purely passive consumption (infotainment).
The third phase, the era of the cyber-media, is currently taking
shape and brings about the opportunity for active participation. As
the new ICTs spread, many analysts see hopes for a fundamental
change in the act of communication, a reverse in the erosion of the
public sphere, a reappearance and re-institutionalisation on a higher
level of a democratic public sphere that actively involves large audi-
ences. The new ICTs are establishing many new forms and genres of
communication and disseminating them with lightning speed, both
transforming communication habits and escalating communication
opportunities.
THE PUBLIC SPHERE: FOCUSING ON EACH
 OF THE THREE PHASES
The era of limited mass media
In the era of limited mass media, there were comparatively few mass
media devices in the public sphere. Nevertheless, the significance of
the media had grown in comparison to the classic era of civil society,
and it now carried added weight and importance. This was a time
when most of the audience had access to one and the same means of
mass communication, and when most of the audience actually be-
came a recipient of these acts of mass communication. The period was
typified by the sharing of a joint experience, by the integrating experi-
ence of common participation in a uniform public sphere. The topics
raised by the mass media had an enormous power of attraction, and
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offered people a chance for a common experience with readily acces-
sible communication tools and common topics of conversation.
(Luhmann 1971) The public sphere brought about in this way by the
mass media was strong and uniform, partly because everyone, the
whole of society, was accessible through its means. At this time, the
media had a powerful influence on concentrating and focusing atten-
tion. (Angelusz 1998)
The era of the multi-channel media
The change in the media market, the trend towards the appearance of
a steadily growing number of highly competitive players, radically
altered the public sphere and its mass communication segment in
phase two, the era of the multi-channel media. The most definitive differ-
ence was in the shift and relativisation affecting existing, formerly
stable, clearly demarcated boundaries. (This process of shifting
boundaries has continued in phase three.) The audience became
highly fragmented (Angelusz 1998), dividing its attention among a
wide variety of mass media. In the process, the role in social integra-
tion formerly played by the joint media experience came to an end.
The changes had a strong influence on accepted definitions of
public and private, shifting the boundary between the two. Several
flows combined to induce this boundary-shift:
 a) The issues most extensively discussed in this context are the
different types of ownership in the media market. They range
from purely public to purely private, with a wide range of varia-
tions of the two in a broad grey scale. The complexity of the
situation is compounded by the fact that despite legislative regu-
lation and normative expectations, both government-owned
public media services and privately owned commercial media
are at the mercy of (very differing types of) owner influence. Ana-
lysts and public opinion expected privatised commercial media
to counter the political pressure put on government-owned me-
dia by power politics, particularly in the East European public
sphere.1  In contrast, the public media in Western Europe have a
high level of prestige in the public sphere, thanks to their role in
1. See: The media war and its echo in the press prior to the second free Hungarian elec-
tions in 1994 following the change in political system. (Heller 1996)
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counterbalancing the economic influences on the privately
owned media, or at least to the expectation that they play this
role.
b) The blurring of the public/private boundary is, however, not
only apparent in ownership, but also in tasks and functions.
Increasingly keen competition between various media outlets
has led to dominance of their entertainment function and a de-
cline in, and erosion of, their role in public discourse on public
affairs. Both legal regulators and general expectations consider
discourse on public affairs principally as the task of the publicly
owned public service media. However, regulations almost eve-
rywhere include stipulations mandating privately owned com-
mercial media to fulfil certain public service obligations, though
to differing degrees2. As a result of the high level of competition,
even the public issues presented by the media are designed as
consumption goods and not as issues for active participation or
debate. This tends to put the stamp of entertainment on even
political matters and public affairs.3
The continuing validity of normative values, however, is under-
lined by the fact that the media use a variety of methods to disguise
their tendency to commercialise real public discourse. To prove their
continuous relationship with the public, the audience, the citizen, to
present what they deem to be a media representation of the citizens,
they have magnified the role of the common person, the man/
woman-in-the-street. The trend is particularly strong in the public
2. This is principally true for the electronic media; the very nature of the written press is
such that legislative regulation of this function is less acute.
3. The phenomenon is particularly observable in programmes that present political
themes mixed with entertainment, purely for consumption. Various talk shows fit into this
mould. In addition, the settings of various debate programmes that do focus on political
issues show signs of influence by the entertainment industry. This includes the television
atmosphere of various programmes and the orchestrated on-site images. One infamous
example was a programme on French television called “Durand la nuit”[sic!], which set up
its debaters inside a boxing ring. The setting used in this instance suggested that the real
debate wasn’t sufficiently entertaining, that the programme had to be orchestrated as an
entertainment show. It also precipitated the end of the programme: one of its shows
ended up in a big fight among participants on-stage in direct.
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media, but also in the portion of the commercial media programmes
aimed at meeting legal public service obligations4.
The distinction between public and private, one of the most im-
portant principles anchoring social order in this modern era5 , set the
media right between the two spheres. The shift in the public/private
boundary also has decisively changed the public sphere. The conclu-
sion of the Habermas model is that for the public sphere to operate
there must be a forum accessible to all, where various social experi-
ences can be expressed and exchanged. In this public field, various
views confront one another in rational discourse. The concept em-
bodies the assumption of a normative public sphere, of a platform
that presents various alternatives, does not limit participation, and
thus grants scope to critical control of government policy. In the era of
multi-channel media, it was considered principally the job of the me-
dia to bring about these platforms, since society could be reached
through the media. Therefore, the role of the media was expected to
create the conditions for this rational discourse and to present widely
diverse interpretation schemata. But, these very same considerations
led to the conclusion that the public sphere could not be identical to
the public service media. When government finances the public me-
4. The trend is apparent in Western European public media newscasts, when not only
specialists, authorities, etc. are given a voice in discussing various events, for the micro-
phone is also turned over to “the anonymous little guy,” a representative of the “public,”
for an opinion. (Street interviews, lay witnesses, etc.). The same phenomenon is behind a
growing number of prime time (primarily public) television shows involving debates among
lay people on the most diverse social topics (e.g.: French Antenne 2: Ca de discute: on
homosexuality, family violence, adoption, medical responsibility, etc. There are many other
examples).
5. Transgression of the rules defining this principle is equivalent to breaking the rules of
society, and any means that does this only can be considered legitimate in exceptional
situations such as cataclysms, war, or revolution. Considering something to be legitimate,
of course, does not necessarily mean it has been legitimised successfully. One example of
this could be Hungary, where there have been many private narratives from the time of
Soviet occupation describing how the boundaries of private life and private property lost
their inviolability. There might be a similar analysis of public/private boundaries suspended
because of natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, etc.) when private narratives of suffer-
ing, in other words, the projection of individual suffering onto a mass scale is what gives
the mass media its topic. Narratives revaluing the 1956 revolution in Hungary also are
interesting in that their thematics involve practical applications of the distinction between
public and private that remained valid despite the extraordinary situation: people not
stealing from shops that had had their doors shot open, etc. Periods of revolutionary
situations, of great change, are often connected to attempts to delete old definitions and
create new ones. Under these conditions, the boundaries of the private sphere become
dubious.
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dia, limits or controls upon the public sphere cannot be precluded.
Moreover, the commercial media, dominated by its entertainment
function, are not up to meeting the tasks stemming from normative
principles, either.
c) The concept of public sphere in the Habermas model is based on
separation of public and private. In this model, the only legiti-
mate parts of the public sphere are public affairs and public
interests, while private and group interests are part of the pri-
vate sphere. The concept of an ideal public sphere is one of a
neutral sphere where real consensus can be reached through
rational discourse. This representation of the public sphere is
static and apolitical, and runs contrary to real experience. It does
not calculate with changes in the public sphere, with changing
definitions of public and private, or with the real operation of
society, that is, with the strength of various interests. The exist-
ing public sphere is much more a constant struggle for hegemony
over the legitimacy of categories and definitions. It is not an ideal
field and it is not neutral.
The normative model has been sharply criticised by among oth-
ers feminist researchers. According to feminist philosopher Nancy
Fraser, even though the public sphere is a forum for public affairs, this
does not necessarily mean that only public affairs can be debated in
public. In her views, the workings are exactly the opposite: an issue
only becomes one of public interest after the various social groups
have defined their own group interests and have manifested them in
the public sphere. Many themes that had previously qualified as pri-
vate issues impossible to debate in public entered the domain of pub-
lic communication because of feminist discourse. These topics in-
cluded rape within marriage and many different psychological, legal,
and other issues, which became public topics precisely because there
were public actors able to present them as non-private issues of uni-
versal validity. Feminist discourse did make major changes in the
public sphere, successfully shifting the public/private boundary.
This is typically symbolised by the motto of Women’s Lib: “Personal
Affairs are also Political.” In other words, actors in the public sphere
can make strategic use of the public/private dichotomy, applying dis-
tinction of categories as an effective political-ideological tool either to
legitimate issues, or to revoke their legitimacy. The public sphere
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theory of sociology must pay attention to the constantly shifting
boundary between public and private, and to the battle of the political
forces shaping it. The media, which stands at the boundary between
public and private, plays a major role in this symbolic struggle.
d) Another view to be considered claims that too narrow an inter-
pretation of a rational public sphere touches on only the informa-
tive aspect of the media, while its increasingly growing enter-
tainment aspect is also playing a significant role in transform-
ing the public sphere. The discursive elaboration of certain top-
ics takes place within the genre of entertainment rather than
through rational discussion (e.g.: in programmes such as the
Aid for Africa solidarity, Telethon, or films made within the en-
tertainment industry that focus on subjects such as violence or
paedophilia, etc.) As the entertainment function becomes domi-
nant, the problem of the legitimating force and elaborating power
of the public sphere will be increasingly put forth, and it is con-
ceivable that the role of rational discourse to elaborate and pro-
vide legitimacy for various topics will be forced to yield to new,
emotional or other forms of discourse. 6
e) The growth in social control exerted by the public sphere is an-
other change in the public/private boundary. This process has
become vastly intensified in the third phase, the era of the cyber-
media, as the registration potential of the media accelerates
through participation in networks and technological develop-
ment. Through the use of cyber-media a variety of diversified
information becomes available about users, which can be saved
and used for a variety of purposes, including business, politics,
etc. This raises the issues of data protection, the protection of
personal information, of the private sphere, and of privacy in
general.
f) While Habermas saw an emancipatory function in the public
sphere, Foucault believes that instead of being a liberator, the
public sphere is introducing increasingly effective social con-
trols and power regulation. (Foucault, 1966) Thus, subjects drawn
into the public sphere and subjected to public discourse are no
6. See e.g.: research by L. Boltanski, on media presentation of suffering (Boltanski, 1993) or
studies by P. Paperman on the public presentation of emotion. (Paperman, 1992)
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longer a part of the private sphere, and freedom of privacy no
longer extends to these newly public areas. The ideological game
of the public sphere involving excluding/including, is an im-
portant mechanism for exerting control over the insiders and
excluding the outsiders and the legislation of social rules and
procedures.
g) In phase two as distinguished by Noam, the technological ad-
vances of the media have had a powerful influence on the public
sphere, including its structure, its functions, and its rules gov-
erning public discourse. The prior public sphere had been
strongly dependent on the printed media: the topic definitions,
the agenda-setting, and the rules of communication behaviour
set by the press had essentially defined the public sphere.7  The
evolution and spread of telecommunication changed not only
the content of information, but the modes of communication and
the rules of behaviour for communicating in public as well.
Meyrowitz (1986) focuses on these changes in the deservedly
famous work, “No Sense of Place”.
Meyrowitz (1985) called attention to the radical change in the re-
lationship between the public and private spheres and in the conver-
gence of the two behaviours induced by the mass media. The theory
combines the issues of perception and the technological determina-
tion of codes raised by Harold Innis (1951) and Marshall McLuhan
(1962, 1964) with Erving Goffman’s concept of the various communi-
cative roles played by the individual. According to Goffman’s theory,
every individual has a number of roles, and plays different ones in
different social situations. The various roles do not interfere with one
another. Instead, they are parts of an individual’s repertoire, and each
is employed in a different social environment or situation in the lim-
ited multiplicity in which the individual lives.8 According to
Meyrowitz, Goffman’s theory left very little room for role behaviours
to change. While McLuhan forecast the changes, saying that the elec-
7. We can capture this decisive influence in the universalistic style of discourse, in compul-
sory use of elaborated language, and even in its refusal of emotional argumentation.
8. At this point we have to mention similar theories by other scholars of communication
theory and sociology of language (Gumperz, 1962; Nadel, 1957). They have postulated
similar theories, and also have indicated the existence of role and code repertoires, which
explain the varied social practices of an individual and the sum of the various repertoires
employed in individual societies.
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tronic media would change human behaviour and communication,
he did not explain the reasons behind, or the nature of, the changes.
According to Meyrowitz, telecommunication was more than just
a new tool enabling “situational environments” hitherto separated to
communicate, but was bringing about new media which would radi-
cally change the social situation itself. Social identity, socialisation,
and the systems of prestige and hierarchies in a society are con-
structed through social situations. Once, these situations and the
way they were perceived were defined by space and time relations.
Societal life rested on a firm foundation of segregation, of discrimina-
tion, of exclusion and inclusion. The given societal situation influ-
ences the roles people choose and how they play them, and at the
same time it also triggers the distinction between on-stage and off-
stage behaviour. Earlier, a person was permitted to go off-stage in be-
haviour within her/his own group, when unseen by outsiders and
undesirables, who could not follow inside events or monitor inside
communications or behaviour. When in public, however, when roles
and behaviour were visible, on-stage behaviours were mandatory. As
a result, the public sphere was made up principally of the on-stage
behaviours of the various societal actors, in other words, of official,
formal, and carefully rehearsed behaviours. Goffman and others
thought of the social roles within the concept of “place”, while ac-
cording to Meyrowitz, the electronic media has undermined the tradi-
tional relationship between physical location and social situation. In
the era of written media there were major social differences in access
to the messages, the communication situations. Today, not only have
space-time barriers been bypassed by the telecommunication infra-
structure, but access also has become broader than ever before. Multi-
channel media have expanded access to the audio-visual world be-
cause, as opposed to the written media, its language is easy to learn
and apply. The written public sphere is a more universal, formal, im-
personal one, while the electronic mass media use a language closer
to the particular, it being informal and adapted to personal thematics,
behavioural modes and linguistic varieties.
The mass media enables broad-based audiences to access situa-
tions, groups and actors (and to do so in their own private spaces, at
home and in their recreation areas) from which and whom they had
previously been cut off. This expanded audience can now look into
private situations that it had previously been unable to see, and can
191The Blurring Dividing Line between Public and Private and
 the Redefinition of the Public Sphere
access forms of behaviour and communications, which had once
been hidden from it.9  Meyrowitz differs from Goffman by shifting em-
phasis from time-space limits to obstacles to perception, believing
that the radical change in the new media is precisely in relaxing these
limits.
Because of all these changes, the spread of the electronic media
also changes the audience. Previously limited situations, accessible
only to restricted groups, become open. Various audiences become
mixed and so do the various levels of the public sphere that had pre-
viously been open only to limited audiences. Increased access
through the media offers increasing opportunity to look into the off-
stage behaviour of other groups. This influences the behaviour of the
groups towards one another. As a result, the public sphere has be-
come more dynamic because it is no longer based on only one (on-
stage) behaviour. The result is a change in private and public behav-
iours. The sharp dividing lines between on-stage and off-stage situa-
tions also become blurred. The overall result is a change in the con-
cept of adequate behaviour. “Electronic media have combined previ-
ously distinct social settings, shifted dividing lines between private
and public toward the private, and weakened the relationship be-
tween social situations and physical places. The logic underlying
situational patterns of behaviour in a print-oriented society, therefore
has been radically subverted.” (Meyrowitz 1985: 308).
Meyrowitz has created a new concept of social situation, which
includes physical place as well as the media’s informational setting.
The situations are defined as information systems. While the media are
a technical opportunity to overcome the obstacles of space and time,
9. The metaphor employed by Meyrowitz is truly on target: he describes the world pre-
sented by the media as a building with all the inside walls removed. The most hidden por-
tions of the private lives of others, including locations, events and happenings become
accessible to all. This change has been amplified with the shift to the genres of mass cul-
ture. The trend can be traced through the extraordinary increase in the number of soap
operas, where the day-to-day lives and private stories and behaviour of various social
strata are set before the public. (See: e.g.: Dynasty, Beverley Hills, Dallas, or the Hungarian
soap, Szomszédok (Neighbours), etc.)
   The counter-argument that the written media included private stories, too, is unac-
ceptable. On the one hand, consumption and reception of the written word operates
along a different mechanism and has a different level of efficiency than the visual genre of
mass culture, and on the other, the cognitive stratification of the public section was once
stronger than it currently is. The private stories of the past’s haute culture presented on-
stage behaviour. So the true change came with the electronic media, primarily with the
spread of television.
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the shifts in boundaries that occur create radical change in the social
situations of the participants. As opposed to the written press, they
do not maintain social segregation but undermine it by bringing
about an infrastructure in which it becomes possible to evolve a
“common information environment” for various social groups. Ac-
cording to Meyrowitz, the electronic mass media break down the
hitherto existing correspondence between physical place and social
space. They also change accessibility to physical place by offering
audiences illustrative, colourful, moving images of distant places
and events there, which otherwise would never be accessible to them.
Thus, they create happenings and experience resembling the real, liv-
ing ones so closely that one can almost be mistaken for the other. Since
audiences and publics become mixed, their roles also grow more
similar. Social identity is no longer defined by only one space-time
setting (one’s own socio-cultural group) but is also strongly influ-
enced by the identities of other groups “seen” through the public
sphere, woven by the media into a personalised, emotional and indi-
vidualised fabric, making it easy to copy and identify with. The result
is the decentralisation of identity. Meyrowitz demonstrates the sig-
nificant effects of the electronic media in changing identity and
socialisation processes, and in softening the hierarchies. The
changes put the public sphere into a different perspective. The blur-
ring of the public/private boundary in the public sphere tends to shift
the public sphere closer to the private one. Media-relayed communi-
cations increasingly resemble face-to-face interactions and the rules
of adequate behaviour in different situations and in public spheres of
different breadth become mixed.
Meyrowitz observes the expansion of the public sphere, the
broadening of its public character, with the spread of multi-channel
mass communication. “…many types of information that were tech-
nically ‘public’ in a print culture, yet largely inaccessible to many sec-
tors of the population, are now available to most people through elec-
tronic media.” (Meyrowitz 1985: 8). Meyrowitz describes here an ex-
panding process of democratisation of the public sphere similar to
the democratisation process investigated by Habermas, a process in-
ducing structural changes similar to the ones Habermas described.10
10. The mix-up and disguise of haute culture and mass culture also described by
Habermas (in which valuable literature is poorly executed and the valueless becomes
spectacular and misleading, disguising itself as valuable) has continued. The Forsythe Saga
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Under the influence of the shift in the public/private boundary
and cut-throat competition, the public sphere has already undergone
a significant change in the era of multi-channel media. The most im-
portant manifestations of this are the fragmentation of the audience,
the increase in private topics, the dominance of the entertainment
function, and the weakening of the critical role. The transformation of
the representation of the public sphere already appears during this
time frame: the questions become whether the concept of a single,
unique and uniform public sphere can be maintained. In phase three
of the mass media, as the cyber-media spread, this question becomes
dominant.
Era of the cyber-media
Phase three, the era of the cyber-media, is characterised by the rapid
spread of new media, new information and communication technolo-
gies. Progress accelerates beyond anything in past experience, and
the perspectives offered are totally new. New techniques for commu-
nicating, recording and managing data appear, new communication
devices are harnessed (fax, mobile phone, DVD, interactive television,
e-mail, Internet, WAP, etc.). Digital information management technol-
ogy appears and in many ways revolutionises communication, creat-
ing common frames of accessibility for different types of communica-
tion events, independently of their content or the genre in which they
appear. Network communication brings unprecedented speed to all
communication events, increasing audiences and spanning dis-
tance. The consequence of the change is that many theorists of infor-
mation society have been looking with high hopes upon the public
sphere as it has been changed by new ICTs. Many people await a
growth in audience activity and the appearance of a widely open
public sphere of communication relying on a new quality of mass
activeness now that interactive technologies have appeared.
What is social communication like in the era of the cyber-media?
Many researchers have compared the significance of the changes trig-
gered by new ICTs to the major turning points in history. Knowledge
and information will become vastly more valuable within society in
all aspects of societal reality.
was presented as a television serial just like Dynasty, and the tools of television presenta-
tion were exactly the same for the one as for the other, to give just one example.
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Yoneji Masuda (1980) gives an analysis with some utopian over-
tones defining information society as one in which there is wide-
spread use of electronic networks. The size and significance of the in-
formation sector will grow, knowledge will be deemed more valuable
and the former social hierarchies will be replaced by horizontally
structured institutions. Some researchers of the subject see chances
for the reappearance of participatory democracy within information
society. Others, such as Frank Webster (1995) and Krishan Kumar
(1995) do not believe that the technological changes will bring about
new social formations. They think information society only will
change conditions, to which industrial societies will adjust.
The most extensive analysis to date of information society is
Manuel Castells’ famous trilogy (Castells 1996–97). Castells sees the
significance of social change in a change in the source of productivity.
In information society, information and information-based knowl-
edge will become the most important resource. Thus, the production
of knowledge and the technology of information production and its
transfer will become the most important element of production, the
driving force of further development. According to Castells, this
change became both necessary and possible with globalisation and
the digital revolution. Networks play an increasingly important role
in the organisation of social interaction; an increasingly broad sphere
of social activity becomes built around the Net, and becomes organ-
ised through the Net. However, according to Castells, the audience
sharing in Net communications is becoming increasingly diversified
and segmented, since they shape their acts of communication, their
consumption of the media, and their bonds to the Net, according to
their individual needs. Castells sees the evolvement of two radically
differing audience groups in the process. Only the competent, privi-
leged part of the audience will engage in individual selection and
active participation. This group will take advantage of the freedom
offered by the new technologies and will use “computer mediated
communication” (CMC). They are the people Castells terms interac-
tive. The other group, which is regionally, socially, culturally, etc. dis-
advantaged, will simply become a recipient of non-interactive, in-
creasingly commercialised, consumption-oriented communication
events offered by the entertainment media and requiring no indi-
vidual creativity or participation.
Although researchers concerned with information society paint
quite different images of the future, including the near future, they
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generally agree on their evaluations of the significance of the
changes, and in their identifications of trends. As new ICTs advance,
as communication organised through computer use increases, and as
digital communication and the use of the Net spread, the diversifica-
tion, scope, and significance of social communication will increase.
Significant changes will occur as information becomes more
valuable and as new ICTs become widespread. In fact they have al-
ready appeared on the macro-sociological level (through a transfor-
mation in the social pattern involving shifts in the employment struc-
ture, a change in the relationship between centre and periphery, and
in international and social dimensions where the amount of socially
necessary knowledge has increased and the content of that knowl-
edge has changed) as well as in the concept of culture and the defini-
tion of the public sphere. The concept of the public sphere is becoming
increasingly differentiated. The public sphere that was formerly de-
fined on a national-societal level has also spread onto a global level,
as there has been a huge growth in shares of and opportunities for
communication events that go beyond frames of reference once
deemed primary (national, regional, local).
Many researchers see the opportunity for a new, democratic, ac-
tive public sphere in a world of communications changed by elec-
tronic networks because many criteria of this public sphere are con-
sidered as necessary conditions of an unlimited public sphere. Char-
acteristics of Internet communication are the absence of a centre, and
the lack of a controller or regulatory body or any institutions which
could in any way limit content or access. Although there is a society of
specialists working with advisors of voluntary committees (the
Internet Society), which debates concerns and standardisation is-
sues, there is nevertheless, no mandatory, formal system of standards
or rules. Access to Internet is open; communication within it, the
roads that can be travelled, the accessible and expressible informa-
tion is quite free and unlimited, and rules of behaviour and language
use are liberal and “self-regulated”.
In the new and extended public sphere, the significance of spatial
location, the localisation of a communication situation to a place,
once a limit in accessing communication events, has changed consid-
erably. A look at prior eras will show a continuous decline in the re-
striction of the communication situation to a limited space. During
the era of verbal culture, communication was strictly limited to place.
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One had to be there and one had to participate in a communication
situation to have access to the communication. As the written word
spread there was a significant decline in localisation, in limitation to
place. The written world could be transported and copied, albeit
within limits. Nevertheless, communication was expanded in time
and extended in space. Transmitter and receiver were no longer re-
quired to be in the same place at the same time for an interaction to
occur. Printing further relaxed this bond. In the era of electronic com-
munication, the restriction of place became even less of an obstacle, as
it became technologically possible and simple to produce, transport,
and broadcast huge quantities of photographs, audio-recordings,
films, video-recordings, etc. With Internet, the issue of place regarding
both communication and accessing information has become even
less significant.11
The same trend is occurring with regard to time and access to
communication events. In the era of oral communication, time was a
defining factor, the same as place. Access to a communication situa-
tion was possible only if one was in the right place at the right time.
With the written word, particularly with the printed word, the power
of time declined. It might even be said that the communication situa-
tion stretched out over time, that time limits became relaxed, just as
the limits of place declined. As electronic means of communication
spread and recording techniques improved (film, video, CD, DVD,
etc.) independence from time improved. The Internet relaxed time
constraints even further. In addition, the amount of time needed to
access information, or to perform an act of communication, declined
considerably.
As the above changes occurred, there was a parallel substantial
growth in the numbers of users accessing information and communi-
cation. Even the appearance of the written word resulted in a wide
expansion in the audience, a trend that became stronger with print,
and grew even more with the appearance of the electronic media. The
Net can increase the audience accessing the various acts of communi-
cation even further, while making it possible for users to gain the most
precise, the most personalised access to the various items of informa-
11. It is possible to access huge libraries and databases, and any Internet message becomes
accessible anywhere in the world. With the highly debated yet ingenious Napster pro-
gramme, any work of music ever produced by humankind is accessible to any net-related
computer, anywhere in the world.
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tion or communications.12 As had occurred in past communication
revolutions, the Net makes it possible to access public communica-
tion events intended for masses of people increasingly rapidly and
accurately, while also offering a chance to send and receive personal,
non-public messages with the same increasing speed and accuracy. 13
With Internet communication, access opportunities have in-
creased to such a degree that artificial barriers have to be introduced
to limit access in some cases in order to protect privacy, for instance,
through the use of passwords and encryption. (See, e.g.: Zimmer-
mann: Pretty Good Privacy, 1993)
Very radical changes have occurred in the structure and nature of
the messages themselves. In past communication revolutions the
most common structure of language-coded messages was linear, but
in the various phases of development, the linearity of messages be-
came increasingly complex and differentiated. Breaking up of the lin-
earity characterises the communication defined by the new technolo-
gies. Although it was possible to create non-linear messages in the era
of written and printed communication14 (such as a dictionary or an
encyclopaedia, etc.), this trend has become much more powerful with
the appearance of the electronic media. A radical change from the lin-
ear aspect was hypertext15  (W. Bush 1945; T. Nelson 1964), once again
12. See: search software which make it possible to personalise the meeting of information
and communication needs.
13. An interesting mixture of public and non-public can be found in chat rooms. Anyone
may enter a chat room and chat with others, but it also is possible to hold a private con-
versation with anyone else in the chat room, inaccessible to all others. Chat room visitors
also have the option of excluding a generally disliked person.
14. We are, of course, discussing here messages coded through language
15. Nelson used the word “hypertext” to describe texts that were not sequential, that
contained branch-offs, that required the reader to make choices. As the choices were
made it became possible to investigate such texts in alternative ways, with the reader, the
recipient choosing the alternative routes to travel through the text. In this way the per-
sonal freedom of the reader to make decisions and selections increased. Electronic data
management and digital coding on the Net enhances this freedom, since it offers similar
opportunities not only for written texts, but also offers means for moving among photo-
graphs, images, audios, and motion pictures. This opportunity leads to the inter-
textualisation of culture, blurring the difference between reader and writer, creator and
recipient, since with this increased freedom the recipient is not only able to create a vari-
ety of interpretations of the communicative act of the creator (Eco 1962), but can bring
about variations and transcriptions in the very content and form of a once created text.
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becoming significant with the appearance of the Net.16 The acts of
communication, texts and discourses that can result may have com-
plex deep structures, a widespread system of references, and may fa-
cilitate access designed to correspond to specific user demand. This
structural complexity allows for far greater degrees of communica-
tion freedom than was possible earlier. The new ICTs also result in a
significant change in audience or user attitudes as recipients. While
the eras of oral, written, and printed communication assumed a cer-
tain active reception of the communication content, the appearance of
the electronic media reduced active reception, and weakened the role
of creative fantasy. The virtual reality brought about by the new media
has changed this trend, returning activeness and fantasy to the re-
cipient, and also particularly increases them on the speaker’s side.
One of the most important changes in the era of the cyber-media is
precisely the restoration of active participation. Interactive communi-
cation that was neglected by the multi-channel media, has again ap-
peared to a growing degree, allowing responses, all sorts of feed-back,
a free expression of opinion, and an increase in creative activity.
The appearance of digital and network communication is chang-
ing the structure of the public sphere from a number of aspects. It has
integrated all forms of communication from the most private and per-
sonal interactive communication to the most strongly media-relayed
mass communication situation. Some characteristics of Net commu-
nication on the one hand are linked to the non-public communication
sphere (for instance, limited access private communication events,
likened to correspondence or a telephone conversation, can be con-
ducted through it, but also interactive non-public groups like friend-
ship circles or hobby groups or circles of civil society can use it to dis-
cuss various topics). On the other hand, different other criteria place
the Net among the mass media (there is practically no limit to Web
access, the system is open, and is essentially media-relayed, etc.).
With the spread of Net use, open communication systems are becom-
ing increasingly more dominant, and even the older means of com-
munication are entering more integrated systems (multi-media). Digi-
16. We can make only a brief reference here to ongoing investigations of the author and
A. Rényi concerning discourse theory, in which the erosion of linear, sequential structures
is being analysed using various “texts.” They included programmed textbooks, Péter
Esterházy’s “Production Story,” Ferenc Temesi’s “Dust,” Thornton Wilder’s “The Bridge
of San Luis Rey,” Samuel Beckett’s “Krapp’s Last Tape,” Mihály Kornis’ “Kádár,” and
Kanako-Kato-Shono’s “Alice” CD-ROM.
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tal and Net communication combine the most diverse information
storage and transfer technologies. Spoken and written texts, images,
data, sounds and motion picture technologies can be managed simul-
taneously, within a common integrated media. As a result, it can be
expected that societal communication habits will become trans-
formed and re-stratified, and the public sphere will become restruc-
tured. The mode of cultural reception and consumption will change
as access to culture also becomes transformed. The various cultural
genres and forms are becoming part of a common integrated commu-
nication system, and their relationship to one another will change as
a result.
Radical changes may occur in relations between individuals and
between different social groups. As new ICTs become increasingly
widespread, the open nature of the Net to communication may vastly
increase chances for establishing and maintaining relationships
(both strong and weak bonds, Angelusz 2000). New relationship
forms specific to the Net can evolve, and both the order of magnitude
and the density of various communication events may grow, as fig-
ures already show. More or less stable, limited or broader communi-
cation communities can evolve around specific topics or interests
(Luhmann 1971), with interest in the topics connecting equally active
communication partners.17 All of these possibilities project prospects
for a more open, more active society, more sensitive to using modes of
communication to reach consensus, and suggest the possibility for a
continuously operating, increasingly refined elaboration of common
meanings and interpretations.
As the significance of place continues to decline and localisation
loses its importance, the dichotomic concepts of public/private will
again change. As distance-work becomes increasingly possible via
the Net, there will be changes in the relationship between workplace
and home, changes in the lifestyles and day-to-day schedules of the
various social groups, and changes in the relationship between ur-
ban and rural areas. Internet communication is expected to change
the structure and operation of industry and trade, and can even lead
17. See: the wide variety of professional, lifestyle, entertainment, hobby and identity-based
chat rooms and forums on the Net.
200 Chapter 7
to a radical structural transformation in mass production, mass cul-
ture and the cultural industry as a whole. 18
As the role of information and knowledge grows, relations of so-
cial inequality will change, since the sources of inequality will be-
come restructured. Social power will become increasingly dependent
upon power over information. As the tools of communication and
knowledge are suddenly transformed, the significance and content of
illiteracy also will change. The category of minimum necessary
societal knowledge will expand rapidly, and ability to use the new
tools of communication will increase. Differences in the competencies
of the various social groups may continue to expand. The result can
be significant change in the overall societal patterns. The position
and significance of the various social groups in relation to one an-
other may undergo a restructuring, and the gap between the commu-
nication haves and have-nots within a given society may grow. The
centre and periphery relationships between nations or regions also
may be shaken up. Earlier disadvantages can grow if there are entire
societies or regions cut off from global communication. It also might
happen that membership in the global community is limited to the
elite of a society on the periphery, which can widen the gap within the
given society.
As information society evolves and global communication is
heightened, many new questions have come up regarding the struc-
tural transformation of the public sphere, and researchers are only
now beginning to tackle them. The changes are a watershed, and for
the moment only the trend lines have taken shape. It already appears
clear that the number and proportion of horizontal communication
bonds will rapidly grow. Many scholars are predicting a democrati-
sation of the public sphere, which they see as the result of faster and
easier access to information and the revival of active communication
attitudes triggered by the Net. At the same time, many problems are
cropping up in this altered situation (ethical concerns, new patterns
of behaviour and communication, the redefinition of the boundary
between public and private, legal protection of both spheres, etc.)
Copyright law, data protection, the right to information, and an entire
18.There is a possibility for development focused on meeting the communication and cul-
tural needs of different social groups in a more targeted, personalised way, which includes
more differentiated consumption of culture. There also might be new, more creative cul-
tural configurations relying on consumer activeness.
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range of rights to private sphere and to privacy have to be redefined
and re-regulated along international dimensions.
The appearance of digital culture, accessible over the Net and or-
ganised in an integrated communication system, raises numerous
theoretical and practical concerns. The Net is making a strong contri-
bution to the de-materialisation of culture. With digital storage and
access, the entire body of culture might be conceived as a single multi-
media text. The concept of a finished work has also changed. A work
on the Net is open and defenceless in face of any alteration. Anyone
can rewrite, repaint, retouch, or use any text, discourse or work of art
that up till now has been considered finished and signed. The result
is that any multi-media “text” becomes a unit of inter-textual space
describable in categories of historical events, which can continuously
give rise to problems of authorship. So far, there has always been a
clear distinction between writer (author) and user or interpreter (com-
mentator) in the written, printed and even in the electronic communi-
cation world. This difference fades with the freedom of access
brought about by digital technology. 19
Hypertext structure will increasingly characterise works of cul-
ture, texts and discourse, as a labyrinth-like structure incorporating
references and borrowed “texts”. The internal structure of texts will
become increasingly complex and intricate. There also will be a fun-
damental change in the concept of context, and in the concept of the
broad-based linguistic environment which provides the frame of ref-
erence for the various texts and discourses (Heller & Rényi 1996). The
non-linear structure will become dominant, promoting activeness on
the part of the recipient, since there will be no specific ways to navi-
gate in the texts. The result will be the formation of new strategies of
acquisition of knowledge.
New information and communication technologies are likely to
transform communication opportunities and habits, and to alter the
public sphere. Although there are signs of change in many directions,
the real results are still hard to judge. The present changes project a
more participatory public sphere. The surge in the number of commu-
nication channels and in communication relations, and the chance
19. Anyone can download a text from Internet, rewrite it and upload it again as their own
work. Opportunities and the technology for doing this were far fewer in earlier commu-
nication eras, though theoretically, the possibility has always existed. See: well-known and
infamous cases related to plagiarism, or forgeries of paintings, etc.
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for autonomously selectable modes of access and reception equally
promote the evolvement of a better informed, more active audience,
operating with more reliable data. Civil society can become more
powerful, and communication between various societal groups can
grow, leading to a decline in segregation, exclusion and prejudice.
Broad-based audiences will be able to participate in the elaboration of
common interpretations of issues and the elaboration of consensus.
People will have access to institutions over which civil control would
hardly be conceivable without this open system of communication.
Simply the fact that it will be easier and quicker to access information
can increase the critique potential of civil society, and its opportunity
to exert control over power and the institutions of power. In this way,
one possible trend forecast by researchers is a more open, democratic
society, with knowledgeable citizens who actively participate in deci-
sion-making.
But changes may work out the other way around. As the bound-
ary between public and private erodes, significant public affairs
might become totally mixed up with issues that, although they are of
significant interest to audiences, are nevertheless, spill-overs from the
private sphere. The entertainment function of the media might take
the limelight from the active communication and information-gather-
ing function (since there is no significant increase in leisure time,
growing time constraints are experienced), or may reserve it for access
by limited strata only, increasing societal gaps as a result. The grow-
ing need for competence may also reinforce this trend. There is no
guarantee of a societally even, or anything approximating a just, dis-
tribution of the new competencies or of the unquestionably necessary
higher levels of skill needed to become active users of the new commu-
nication tools, though this might be the key to reducing social differ-
ences.
The registration capacity of the new media also needs to be taken
into account. With advances in ICT, the day-to-day actions of the citi-
zen create a rising number of registrable personal imprints, which are
recorded, saved, managed, classified and compiled into important
databases. Once this information was a part of private life. The media
did not have the tools to register it, but now the data is becoming
available for both commercial and political purposes. While on the
surface it would appear that the individual is enjoying expanded
autonomy and freedom of choice, in reality, the controls are getting
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tighter. At this time there is no effective protection against the registra-
tion capacities brought about by the new ICTs, and there is no civil
control over the storage, dissemination or use of this information,
which means that the boundaries of the private sphere are quite per-
meable and vulnerable.
THE FADING CONCEPT OF AN INDIVISIBLE
PUBLIC AND THE THEORY OF A HIERARCHY
 OF PUBLIC SPHERES
As a result of the latest research on the public sphere, critiques of the
Habermasian normative theory and experience from the changed
communication sphere, a new representation of the public sphere
seems to emerge. A growing number of researchers and theoreticians
believe that the day of a nationally structured and territorially de-
fined public sphere is over, and that the concept and structure of the
public sphere are in a state of flux. What is evolving is a sharply frag-
mented and hierarchic public sphere framework, connected to nei-
ther territory nor nation. The altered media situation does not support
the traditional ideal of the public sphere, the “republic of citizens”
circumscribed by language and territorially defined criteria, which
acts in the “public interest.” The concept of a uniform public sphere
has given way to a mosaic, a hierarchy of overlapping public spheres
of various size.20
John Keane views the evolvement of different sized public
spheres as a historical flow (Keane, 1995), with the Habermasian con-
cept of a public sphere evolving in the first three phases. Keane sees
this development eventually going into a state of profound crisis in
which the one-time concept of the public sphere becomes untenable,
and changes under pressure of latest developments.
20. The paradigm shift occurring with this communication theory is present in lay repre-
sentation, too. Following interviews with active users in various communication venues,
we discovered that the lay user also often feels that s/he is choosing among various levels
of the public sphere, and sometimes shifting from one level to the next. E.g.: after listening
to a newscast on national radio s/he moves on to an Internet forum, then takes advantage
of ICQ for a limited access simultaneous discussion, sends an SMS, and writes an e-mail to
a professional group or to a private contact, etc.
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Keane distinguishes among three interlocked phases in the evo-
lution, refinement and popularisation of the classic public sphere
and related concepts.
a) A significant role in the evolution of the concept was played by
the struggle between an increasingly emancipated citizenry and
Europe’s despotic rulers. The public sphere became a weapon
when fighting for the freedom of the press and various other
public liberties. The normative ideal of the public sphere thus
created was an opportunity for citizens to create an identity in
the shadow of state powers. Keane agrees with Habermas in
that the public sphere thus evolving rested on a Roman (and
Greek) model. Its image of the future was of a world with no
armies, violence, clericalism, or selfish powers. In this phase, the
public sphere was republican and critical, resting upon the con-
cepts of “public virtue” (England), and “opinion publique”
(France). Its ideals were public spirit, rule of law, common gov-
ernment, and freedom of opinion. Its function was protection of
the public interest from decisions made by the rulers in their
own private interests.
b) According to Keane, in phase two the public sphere struggled
against the increasing power exerted by economic monopolies
over production and consumption, as the modern capitalist
economy grew increasingly influential and dynamic. In this
phase the decisive goal was to protect areas of life that are not
profit oriented from economic influences. Keane uses 20th cen-
tury German development to illustrate the importance of pro-
tecting the public sphere, when various bodies used “public
opinion” to further their own ends21 . (Keane, 1984) Keane agrees
with Arendt (1960) and Habermas (1962) that public life, which
up till then had given the citizenry a chance to speak to one
another and define the rules of co-existence, was lost in a public
sphere eroded by economic interest and consumerism. In phase
two of development the reading public which critically debated
culture gave way to a culture-consuming mass audience.
21. Keane (1984) makes reference to Tönnies and Jaspers. In the work “Philosophy is for
Everyman; A Short Course in Philosophical Thinking (1969), Jaspers defends the value of
“unlimited communication,” while in “Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung (1922) Tönnies
warns that it is dangerous to deify public opinion in an era when organised interests are
profiting from manipulation of the public.
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c)  The first two phases involve problems of the territorially defined
state power that is inaccessible to the citizenry, and of the inter-
ests of organised market capitalism. In phase three, the addi-
tional problem of public service appears alongside the other two
categories. Keane disputes the views of Nicholas Garnham and
other members of the Westminster school of communication re-
search, which claim that the “public sphere,” located between
the government and the market, is a place for rational and uni-
versal policies that are distinct from both the government and
the economy. They argue that this normatively functioning space
is guaranteed by the public service media model, which relays
and balances out government and corporate power, and which
cannot be controlled by either profit maximisation or power
maximisation. According to the theoreticians of the public serv-
ice media, the present day evolution of these media has not com-
pletely followed the Habermasian ideals, but it has made it pos-
sible for all citizens to access haute culture, and has prevented
the media industry from satisfying only some segments of de-
mands. They claim that market based media reduce the range of
topics that can be tackled in public. As a result, the number of
institutions of public control declines and completely unequal
societal power relations evolve. The culture-creation mechanisms
of the media represent the dominant groups of society and in
addition, use primarily home-country-based companies to pro-
duce consumer culture, depriving a subordinate audience with
a peripheral identity of any opportunity to criticise the proc-
esses. This is why many theoreticians, including many who are
outside the Westminster school of communication theory, be-
lieve it is important to protect the public service media and guar-
antee central financing for their public service activity through
national taxes.
Keane recognises the advantages of the public service media and
agrees that they offer a clear presentation of the limits of market rheto-
ric and practice, and that for half a century the concept of public servi-
ce reduced media consumerism and prevented entertainment and
hollowness from being pursued to extremes. Although concepts re-
garding a generally accessible, mixed-programme public service me-
dia have had to face serious technical and financial problems, the
model has expanded the horizons of its citizens, and has maintained
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a measure of public life. Different types of national regulation have
allowed the introduction of a balanced amount of advertising, politi-
cal access, newscasting, and entertainment. Keane recognises that
the public media has legitimated the public appearance of the lay
person, the use of the vernacular, and was able to portray certain of
their private actions and lifestyles and preferred forms of entertain-
ment. But he has sharp criticism for public service media views. He
attacks the attempt to alloy a 17th or 18th century ideal with 20th cen-
tury practice, when there is absolutely no proof that even at its height,
the public media actually implemented the objectives and practices of
a rational and universal policy. Keane says that researchers march-
ing under the banner of public service completely ignore the fact that
the public service media are not the only ones to retain public debate,
which continues to exist in the commercial media, too. In his view, the
current public media are fraught with serious problems, and there-
fore, it is a dangerous strategy to link the ideal of the public sphere to
an institution in a state of crisis.
Keane stresses three basic factors when looking at the reason be-
hind the public service media crisis:
•   Centrally regulated, diminishing financing coming from sub-
scription fees weakens prospects for a strong public media espe-
cially when facing critics who support deregulation, for whom
freedom of the press means advertisements and market competi-
tion, and who would free private media owners from govern-
ment supervision. At the same time, financing problems have
made it impossible for the public service media to participate in
the design and introduction of new technologies (teletext, satel-
lite broadcasts, etc.), which have left them behind in the surge of
telecom competition. All these factors have forced the public
media into co-productions, self-privatisation, and other similar
situations, which just feed arguments for deregulation.
 •   Existing public service media outlets have to face the problem of
legitimacy, as well. The audience does not consider its standards
of balance, quality and universality to be representative, though
this is the argument used to defend and represent the public
service media. Public media employees are in crisis because they
have gradually recognised that public taste is fragmented, and
they believe that it is not possible to satisfy the full range of
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public opinion and public taste. In stiff competition, the public
media players are beginning to operate like accredited repre-
sentatives of the “public experience,” which further reduces the
legitimacy of the public media, makes it even less possible to
define audience preferences, and leads to increasing usage of
commercial media by the fragmented audience groups.
•   Technological development has put an end to the argument that
the public media have a natural monopoly within a given na-
tion-state because of the limited broadcast spectrum. In today’s
multi-channel environment, the public media are competing with
the private media. In the meantime, the metaphor of territory,
deep at the root of public service, is also being questioned: active
citizens of an integrated public sphere once lived in a specific
territory of a sovereign nation-state, which belonged to a system
of nation-states defined in a similar territorial way. This system,
which once appeared stable, has dissolved under the influence
of globalisation.
The arguments, which were once the basis for public service me-
dia functions in a parliamentary democracy, (the role they play in
arousing and maintaining public life in a given area, their service to
the entire nation, their creation of national units out of different
groups, regions, classes, etc., their ability to offer opportunities for all
to participate, and their relay of major national events and experi-
ences, allowing all to share in them, which conveys a sense of belong-
ing to the nation and the community), have weakened. The media
also claimed an ability to allow the entire nation to speak to itself in
the public sphere it offered, which also created cohesion and a com-
mon identity. These functions were the foundation for a broad-based
representation of the media as one that was not only financed by the
public, but was also committed to it.
Keane says this view of the public service media has become in-
adequate, particularly since the metaphor of space on which it rests is
no longer valid. There are now network-based communication
spaces that are no longer linked to real, physically, or geographically
definable territories. The one-time ideal of a uniform public sphere
and its republican-minded citizens in a territorially defined space
debating the public good has faded. Instead, today’s public life is “a
complex mosaic of different sized, overlapping, and interconnected
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public spheres” (Keane 1995: 8). Although these public spheres come
about on different levels and sizes of nationhood and societies and by
the means of different mediums, all are arenas of action guided by
power and interest, and they also meet the other criteria of a public
sphere.
This concept of the public sphere returns to an earlier model used
in communication science, in which interpersonal communication
and media communication were treated within a common theoretical
framework (Winkin, 1996), considering that the only difference be-
tween the two was a matter of scale. Today’s “total turnaround” 22 is
due to a number of theoretical considerations23. Treating an entire
field of communication, ranging from direct face-to-face interactions
on through the broadest scale media-relayed public sphere, within a
single theoretical framework is supported by several fundamental
theoretical considerations:
•   One such consideration is the definition of the public sphere as
an operative principle (Heller, Némedi & Rényi 1990, Heller &
Rényi 1997, 2000). This principle guides a process of transfor-
mation in which the speakers execute selective and symbolic
operations to turn issues of a non-public existence into a public
topics. This process brings about acts of communication on vari-
ous levels (public and non-public, interpersonal, media, etc.)
through actions that continuously blend presentation and rep-
resentation.
•   The acts and activities of communication on various levels func-
tion as social organisers and social integrators in the establish-
ment and maintenance of societal relationships, which, in the
final analysis, constitutes society.
•  An integrated theory makes it possible to investigate acts of
communication on various levels using identical considerations
and tools, and as a result, similarities and differences can be
22. The total turnaround is intended to indicate the return to a joint frame when treating
interactions and mass media, instead of staying with the sub-categories into which they
were divided in the 1960s. This turnaround has significantly changed perspectives,
opened new vistas and offers opportunities for new theoretical considerations. (See, e.g.:
Cardon-Heurtin-Lemieux, 1995)
23. In our own model of the public sphere, too, we gave preference to this broad frame-
work (Heller, Némedi & Rényi 1990, Heller & Rényi 1996, 1997, 2000).
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analysed and demonstrated systematically. Thus, the norms and
strategies that went into the creation of the various acts of com-
munication, the reception mechanisms, the interpretation of
meaning, the interpretation of process, etc. can be handled within
a uniform frame of reference.
Keane uses the following definition to describe public spheres
emerging on various levels: “A public sphere is a particular type of
spatial relationship between two or more people, usually connected24
by a certain means of communication (television, radio, satellite, fax,
telephone, etc.), in which non-violent controversies erupt, for a brief
or more extended period of time, concerning the power relations oper-
ating within their given milieu of interaction and/or within the wider
milieux of social and political structures within which the disputants
are situated.” (Keane 1995:8). Using that definition, Keane distin-
guishes among three abstract levels of the public sphere:
• The micro-public sphere: dozens to thousands of people, forming
communication ties on sub-national level.
• The mezzo-public sphere: the communication field of millions of
people within a nation-state.
• The macro-public sphere: communication opportunities for billions
of people on a supra-national and global level.
While it is possible to describe the ideal types of the different pub-
lic spheres in Keane’s theorem, they never appear in pure form, nor
are they, or can they be, completely isolated from one another. Al-
though they are linked by networks and are interrelated and are over-
lapping, the different level public spheres are fragmented, and no in-
tegrative or other trend pulling towards a uniform public sphere will
be able to overcome that. The various level public spheres are hetero-
geneous and differ in size.
Micro-public spheres: these are today’s local equivalents of the old
coffee-house, literary club, etc., communities, where people exchange
opinions on local issues and matters of power. The micro-level is the
fundamental level of social movements. Today, they are less con-
24. Usually connected: in other words, media tools are not always required; face-to-face
communication situations also are included in the definition.
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cerned with the issues of production and distribution, but tend to be
more focused on how post-industrial societies generate and hold
back information, and on how they create and maintain meanings.
For instance, the women’s movement is not only about the wrongs
done to women, for it also questions dominant “male” codes and
fights for recognition of the symbolic differences. These micro-levels
of the public sphere operate like small networks with local connec-
tions. They are based on the principle of solidarity, individual need,
and voluntary and occasional participation. They might be con-
ceived of as tiny societal laboratories where new experience is born.
They use a great deal of communication devices. They question and
transform the dominant codes of day-to-day life, creating alternative
experiences of interpersonal and space-time relationships. They are
highly innovative regarding subjects, causes, and communication
tools, as well as in their use of languages and codes.25  Sometimes they
also become visible in the broader public spheres (mezzo or macro).
Their power lies in their latency. They appear to be private because
they operate far from official public life and the media. The existence
and operation of civil society is closely connected to the micro sphere.
The mezzo-public spheres are the best known and most often dis-
cussed type of public sphere. These public spheres are fields of social
communication on power that bridge great distances and connect
millions of people. Often their boundaries coincide with the borders
of the nation-state, but they might be more limited (for instance the
Basque public sphere), of even larger (German-speaking public
sphere involving Germany, Austria, etc.26 ) The traditional media,
newspapers and much of the electronic media are within the mezzo
level.
Mezzo-public spheres are quite constant, although they are
shaped and influenced by micro-public spheres. The relations be-
tween the two spheres is no a zero sum game, partly because they feed
on the tension between the two, and partly because the mezzo-public
spheres need the micro-public spheres. Accumulated social prestige
25. Keane cites the micro-public sphere of videogames played by children, and there are
many other examples including leisure centres, local civil organisations, and groups of
people from various subcultures. The micro-public sphere creates everyday culture.
26. The common linguistic code can play a fundamental role in demarcating boundaries
and in ensuring participation.
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and the existing system of financing and distribution contribute to
the maintenance of the mezzo-public spheres. Its survival is also pro-
moted by the private media, which facilitate the debate on power. As
the public media are increasingly influenced by the market, the pri-
vate media are showing a parallel movement towards politicisation27.
As we have already seen, the blurring of the boundary between public
and private is a typical consequence.
The sudden growth of macro-public spheres (global and regional)
should be considered a consequence (unintended) of the interna-
tional media concentration. In earlier periods, as we have seen, public
sphere and social communication were organised within a national
framework. The competition of the media market led to concentration,
and the result was that large nations and large companies now have
a far more extensive regional influence than in the past. A global me-
dia market came into existence, though the original intent did not in-
volve creating an international audience. But, rapidly developing, de-
centralised industrial and commercial investments triggered a need
for easily mobilisable professionals and devices, which soon shaped
an international information and communications market with a
high rate of return. In addition, the multinationals that came into be-
ing were quite able to side-step national regulation. All these factors
contributed to the unintended consequence of bringing about an in-
ternational audience. Global communication addressed to interna-
tional audiences bears a new set of characteristics. International
events appear before the macro-public with powerful symbolic force
as they are relayed to a fictive international audience. (Dayan-Katz
1992) This generates new debates on a power that goes beyond the
boundaries of the mezzo-public sphere, thus significantly changing
the structure of the public sphere28 .
27. Examples of this were the appearance of Reagan and Berlusconi in the political arena,
and in the mezzo-public sphere. A similar example might be the way the British tabloids
focus on the private lives of the monarchs and political figures, etc.
28. The most typical representative of this phenomenon is CNN, and the way it selects
and presents the portion of world events it considers worthy of broadcasting. Numerous
examples might be cited. They include building up the Gorbachov-Reagan meeting into a
media event, or the Falkland War and the Gulf War, with strong censorship in both cases
and where at times the reporting consisted of events played out expressly for the media
amidst strong media glorification. The message was not focused on the political happen-
ings nearly as much as on glorifying the media for its live “warcast”. The live broadcast of
the student demonstration at Tienanmen Square was the first time a global media event
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The introduction of new ICTs have led to a rapidly developing
macro-public sphere. But, not only media developments have been
generating the process, for economic flows also have supported glo-
balism. As the multinationals continue to grow, commodities, pro-
duction processes and management strata in charge of them are all
becoming globalised. The subjective decline in distances between
people, groups, places and spaces that result, are the outcome of
stronger international economic and political relations and the
globalisation of communication. Internet has become an important
arena for the macro-public sphere, and its rapid spread is being pro-
moted by economic actors interested in global development, as well
as by the public powers providing government support. Internet com-
munication is significantly changing traditional communication
habits and increasing chances for, and the proportions of, human
connections. As a result of Internet communication, characterised by
its unlimited nature, informality, and global access, there has been a
significant growth in the ratio of horizontal acts of communication;
and the fabric of civil social organisation can become and is becoming
stronger. Mobile communication opportunities including mobile ac-
cess to Internet are offering active and increasingly interactive citi-
zens the opportunity for continuous presence, full availability and
on-line participation.
There has been extensive debate between theoretical and practi-
cal specialists on what representations to use to most accurately de-
scribe the changes. The “highway” metaphor has most recently given
way to the metaphor of “surfing” on the Web, though others have
tried to portray the operation of the public sphere with the “laby-
rinth” metaphor, where the reader, the recipient, travels her/his own
labyrinth, choosing from among the crossroads and nods offered.
Keane is an optimist regarding the opportunity for democratisation
offered by the Net. In Keane’s opinion Internet users are “Net citi-
took place with hundreds of millions of people participating, generating a general global
debate on the issues of power and freedom. As a result, it contributed to shaping a supra-
national public opposition. The demonstrating students recognised the significance of
the public sphere and organised their protest with this in mind, to maximise their inter-
national recognition. But, the forces in power were also quick to learn. The violent military
crackdown, the bloodbath that stamped out the student demonstration came when the
cameras were off, when there was a break in the live broadcast. In this way, the broad-
casting medium, CNN itself, became a participant in the events, because it influenced
them.
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zens” who discourse on power and principles in a new, virtual or
imaginary community.
Keane defines the conditions for a public sphere along the follow-
ing criteria:
•  there must be symmetric, reciprocal relations between the speak-
ing actors, where no group has a monopoly over the means of
communication,
•  the public sphere must not lead to uniformity: mechanisms of
individualisation must be given incentives and diversification
must be recognised,
•  the public sphere must principally create and promote critical
discourse, and control of participants or any form of registration
cannot be part of its tasks.
According to Keane, the theory of the public sphere needs to be
radically redefined. The most important implication is that the public
sphere must not be bound to government protected public service
media for either empirical or normative reasons. The theory of the
public sphere must include the widest variety of public forums
(newspapers, electronic media, networks, etc.). Researchers on the
public sphere will have to conduct investigations to determine
whether there is any long term modern trend in which public spheres
infiltrate areas of life that until now have been protected from dis-
courses on power. Similarly to Habermas and Foucault, Keane senses
the process in which public discourses are entering areas of life that
until now have not been public, have not been visible, and therefore
are less regulated. The consequence of this infiltration is that there
will no longer be areas of social and political life left out of discourses
on the division of power. No subject will remain “natural.” The con-
cept of a public sphere based on a silent oikos and involving citizen
participation centred around public topics will come to an end. As
the mediated public sphere expands, private phenomena will also
come under the effect of the negotiated controversy characteristic of
the public spheres. The world of privacy will end. Keane postulates
that the process of politicisation will do away with one-time bounda-
ries between public (where power discourses are legitimate affairs of
people in general) and private (where these debates are illegitimate in
face of intimacy, individual choice, or the nature). The process clearly
indicates the arbitrary nature of the traditional definition of private,
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which makes it increasingly difficult to justify treating certain matters
as private ones. In a paradox way, the expansion of the public sphere
and the growing dominance of politics lead to the generation of a new
type of political discourse on whether certain zones of political life
should be re-defined as private.29
Keane (1991) already presented the argument that a pluralist in-
terpretation of the various communication forms constituting public
life support a non-fundamentalist interpretation of democracy, mak-
ing it possible for anyone or any group in a plural public sphere to
express agreement or disagreement with the ideals or lifestyles of oth-
ers. According to Keane, there are no supra-historical truths or ideals,
so there is no pillar of support to use when deciding what type of
public debate is desirable. The only normative rule that can be stated
is that there are several public spheres competing within a healthy
democracy, and none has a monopoly on debating the distribution of
power. But it also can be assumed that a commercial public sphere
will certainly reduce the integrity of the citizens.
The theory assuming that there are various levels of public
spheres changes the concept of democracy, too. In the republican tra-
ditions of political thinking, it was believed that power was best con-
trolled through debate within the framework of the territorially de-
fined nation-state. According to the republican tradition, public-spir-
ited citizens were best able to co-operate in an integrated, politically
constructed space, which in the final analysis, was rooted in the
physical place occupied by the state power. This concept can no
longer be maintained because there is a steadily increasing number of
public spheres that are no longer directly connected to any physical
territory. The functioning of public life has been subordinated to a
process of de-territorialisation. There is less and less connection be-
29. Public debates are frequent on the issue of protecting certain spheres of private life
from the public, on limiting public visibility and the public’s opportunity to discuss these
matters. These areas include e.g. protection of private data, homosexual identities, or the
identities of victims of violence or disasters. Protection of these areas is constructed as a
public topic, and the debate on the issues is a typically public debate. In the meantime,
public actors are also fighting to keep their bedrooms and their private affairs invisible, and
to keep them out of public debates. E.g.: the debate that followed Diana’s and Dodi Al-
Fayed’s accident on the responsibility of the paparazzi, and on the publication of photo-
graphs of the accident. In other words, the changes underway in the public sphere are
closely connected to defining the boundary between public and private.
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tween the common proximity concept of the citizens and the spaces in
which they live their private lives (birth, marriage, home, etc.)
Keane makes reference to Dewey (1927), in which the latter al-
ready complains of the fragmentation of public life. By today the proc-
ess is irreversible. There is no single public sphere; there are public
spheres. Republicanism doesn’t even notice how undemocratic the
assumption of a single public sphere is, since it is based on the con-
cepts dating from a time when the nation-state was being built. The
fact that there are more than one public spheres existing simultane-
ously, increases the freedom of the citizen and makes it possible to
exert control from several points of view simultaneously. The in-
creased number of communication forums resulting from new ICTs
can spur a growth in the public sphere, where well-informed and ac-
tive participants in public spheres on various levels can freely and
unrestrictedly exchange opinions, procure information, and contact
one another through the numerous public and non-public communi-
cation forums. This complex structure makes it harder for anyone to
usurp power because it facilitates better access, control and debate by
those it affects. This new situation can result in a growing number of
social debates on various levels between active, informed and respon-
sible citizens (local, national, regional, and global citizens). Indi-
vidual activeness can also increase, not only in the consumption of
various communication and cultural genre, but also in their crea-
tion.30 The new ICTs create new modes of generating knowledge. At
the same time, with an increasingly complicated hierarchy of public
forums, circumspection of the public sphere can become more diffi-
cult and the knowledge and experience required for technological
mediation can reduce chances of everyone having identical or similar
opportunities to participate in the increasingly large numbers of pub-
lic spheres. At the same time, competition is growing not only in the
30. It is worth noting the individual and civil-social initiatives already visible and pointing
in this direction. It is astonishing to see the world-wide communication activities of young-
sters on the web – consider only the tremendous number of Harry Potter web-pages.
There has been an increase in lay journalism, and the internal and outward-directed com-
munication activity of small communities organised around common topics has become
stronger in places where there is technological access. A research project aimed at inves-
tigating private and locally significant Web pages on the Net is promising some very inter-
esting results. Mobile Internet access is further intensifying the process. The user is always
online and remains in a state of participation everywhere, being continuously in touch.
This means that there is never a state of isolation for any limited or broad, private or public
community, not even temporarily.
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field of ICTs, but in the vastly increased channels of content service
providers. This trend will reinforce competition between free and
unrestricted communication, communication established and con-
trolled by the state with its tools of power, and content providers cre-
ated and controlled by economic, commercial, and profit-oriented in-
terests. The issue of (un)equal opportunity has to be raised in this area
too, particularly in an period where there is still no valid regulation.
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New Communication Technologies
 and the Public Sphere
RÓBERT ANGELUSZ
THE CHALLENGES OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATION
From cable television to portable television sets, from video recorders
to the Internet, from fax to E-mail, new communication technologies
have gradually become parts of our everyday life. With most of these
we first came into contact at work, but some have spread and turned
into personal user goods at an amazing speed, in spite of the lasting
economic recession and reduction of real income. The diffusion of
video recorders and portable telephones has exceeded probably even
the most optimistic expectations, while the use of computers and the
communication possibilities they can provide is already expanding
among the upper levels of the social hierarchy.
In the developed Western societies, a few steps ahead in the
spread of these technologies, dozens of books and essays deal with
the new developments. Profound literature analyzes the emergence of
Information Societies, influential reference books deal with the “com-
munication revolution”, and some studies even talk of the chances of
a renewal of democracy or the last hopes for democracy, depending
on the world-view and disposition of the author.1  The system of sci-
entific institutions also tries to meet the challenges. In many countries
1. Among the most recent general works see for example the latest books by Frank
Webster (1995) or Manuel Castells (1996). Among the reference books on mass commu-
nication Denis McQuail (1994) also pays increasing attention to the most important is-
sues in relation to the information society and new electronic media.
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around the world research institutes and university departments are
established which aim to study the spread of computers and telecom-
munication technologies as well as the cultural and social conse-
quences evoked by these new forms of communication.
What are the possibilities, prospects and barriers for the spread of
the new communication technologies? Will the exponential growth of
computer technologies continue or will the process of spreading slow
down as it reaches classes whose financial and cultural resources are
more limited? How do the ownership relations of communication
systems change with the development of computer technologies? In
what way will the changes affect the future of traditional mass com-
munication? Has the era of mass communication really come to an
end? Do the new communication technologies influence the struc-
ture, the power relations and the stratification of society? Will sharp
dividing lines separate the computer generation from generations
that have been socialized in the era of traditional mass communica-
tion? To what extent will computer-mediated communication become
the domain of entertainment and political and cultural communica-
tion? Altogether, how does the further ‘mechanization’ of our life, the
computerization of major parts of communication, affect our exist-
ence, our time schedules, our health and our social vitality?
There is hardly any limit to these types of questions, just as a
whole series of problems arises concerning the traditional concepts of
communication theory. Can one maintain the concept of mass com-
munication or even the concept of communication, or do they need
revision, since in certain features these concepts reflect views formed
under the dominance of mass communication. To what extent can we
talk about a new type of communication and does the shift in commu-
nication processes justify the formulation of new communication
models? Can we discern phenomena whose exact description and
interpretation would require the introduction of new communication
concepts? In Hungary communication research has hardly dealt
with these questions so far2,  even though the opportunity to analyze
these large-scale processes ‘in statu nascendi’ in itself already justi-
fies careful study, which would only be facilitated by the relative
openness of these technologies. The cogent views that stress the deter-
2. Since the book issued by the former Hungarian Mass Communication Research Centre
studies on the social consequences of the new communication technologies have ap-
peared only sporadically. See Fritz, T. (ed.), Kommunikációs jövôképek. Budapest: MRT TK,
1988.
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minism of new communication technologies and their social struc-
ture transforming characteristics pay less attention to the strong de-
termining role played by the system of social and cultural conditions
or to the alternative possibilities residing in the new technologies.
Among the different communication schools the ‘uses and gratifica-
tion’ approach could offer useful notions, which emphasize the ac-
tive role of social conditions by underlining the aspects of needs and
utilization3. This view not only makes the initial failure of inventions
which proved successful later but were ‘immature’ earlier under dif-
ferent social circumstances understandable, but can also contribute
to the explanation of a stratum-specific reception of various novelties.
Technical inventions are followed by the social discovery of new
means. The model-making role, persistence and, if necessary, co-op-
erative behaviour of the first users can be important factors with re-
gard to the cultural institutionalization of new communication tech-
nologies.
Considering the tardiness and negligence of the social-scientific
reception of these issues in Hungary, my present study can naturally
only have limited aims. I will therefore only deal with those conse-
quences of the new technologies that could influence the structure of
the public sphere. An attempt to discuss or clarify other questions
and concepts will be made only if this seems to be indispensable from
the point of view of my analysis. First of all I will outline those proc-
esses that started with the operation of the first generation of the new
technologies and can already point to certain tendencies.
FRAGMENTATION OF THE PUBLIC
Traditional television broadcasting has created the concentration of
the public, a focusing of attention to particular messages to an extent
never seen before. Even unusual natural spectacles which are visible
for everybody, celestial phenomena like a solar eclipse, were unlikely
to attract so much attention that the great majority, 80 or 90 percent, of
the population of a country would concentrate on one common expe-
rience. Traditional mass communication has proved capable of con-
centrating attention to such an extent, with a certain periodicity and
3. On this approach see E. Katz, I.G. Blumler and Gurevitch: “Utilization of Mass Commu-
nication by the Individual.” In: I.G. Blumler and E. Katz, The Uses of Mass Communication.
Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974.
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on a large scale. Irrespective of one’s favourable or negative attitudes
towards television, considering the complexity, the density and the
risk-level of modern societies, one can hardly question the impor-
tance of the fact that society is able to establish contact with almost the
entire public and deliver certain messages within a relatively short
period of time. By constructing and moulding common experiences in
a highly differentiated society which spans all kinds of statuses and
life-worlds, this intense focusing of attention has created conditions
which make it possible to compare - broadly speaking - the world to a
global village.4
The significance of the focused experience is only partly formed
by the fact that virtually everybody does indeed see the same thing;
the point is rather that we know or can assume with considerable cer-
tainty that masses of people share the observation. This shared expe-
rience, even when it is based upon secondary knowledge, can pro-
vide a ‘common topic’ for people from different social backgrounds
and cognitive circumstances. Luhmann regards the situations when
“one tries to find a topic for a person” in order to start a conversation
as one of the typical communication dilemmas of the modern world.5
Through its mass production of ‘second-hand experiences’ that can
offer common topics for people belonging to different social groups,
mass communication contributes greatly to the maintenance of the
highly fragile social integration of modern societies.
This concentrating, attention-focusing potential of mass commu-
nication is undoubtedly on the decrease. The new communication
technologies have almost without exception an effect in the direction
of decentralization. The limitedness of communication channels has
been replaced by an abundance never seen before. People can choose
from an ever broadening collection of channels. Video recorders make
it possible to record a program while watching something else simul-
taneously, to postpone reception and fit various programs broad-
casted at inconvenient times smoothly into the daily or weekly sched-
ule. Especially more consumption-minded viewers suffer from an
abundance-induced confusion: the huge supply of mass-communi-
cation channels and recorded programs certainly makes it rather dif-
ficult for them to make a choice.
4. Cp. M. McLuhan, Understanding Media. The Extensions of Man. New York: McGraw Hill,
1964.
5. N. Luhmann, “Öffentliche Meinung”. In: Politische Plannung. Opladen: Westdeutscher
Verlag, 1971, p.22.
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At some level the process of decentralization undoubtedly en-
hances the element of competition. The monopolisation of attention
has been limited: various communication companies, institutions,
genres and programs compete for the public, since advertisers pay ac-
cording to the size of the public. Commercial television increasingly
overshadows public broadcasting, and entertainment pushes poli-
tics into the background.6 Although in many countries the amount of
time spent on watching television increases, partly because of the
varied supply of entertainment, it cannot impede the process of frag-
mentation of the public. Data published recently by Eli M. Noam im-
pressively show the rate of decentralization.7   In his analysis of me-
dia concentration the author distinguishes three stages in the era of
mass communication: the periods of limited mass communication,
multi-channel media and cyber-media. Compared to the previous
period, the major television companies have lost significant parts of
their audience in the present stage of multi-channel media. While
ABC, NBC and CBC reached 92 per cent of the public in the previous
traditional period, in 1996 the three major companies could count on
just 52 per cent of the public.
In spite of the trends described above the question arises whether
the extent of decentralization is appropriately characterized by the
increase in the number of channels and the resulting fragmentation.
The transformations related to the fragmentation of the public can be
explained together with the developments on the production and
media market side. The expansion of huge media empires that often
involve a whole range of branches has continued in the multi-media
era. Ongoing processes of concentration in the field of media and
message production render the picture much more ambiguous. For
lack of proper dynamic content analysis covering the entire message
system, we cannot be sure what is more characteristic considering the
process as a whole: that one can watch largely the same thing on a lot
of channels now or the fact that with the increase in number of chan-
nels more audience-specific message systems have emerged, pointing
in the direction of “polyphony”.
6. E.S. Herman, “The Externalities Effects of Commercial and Public Broadcasting.” In: K.
Nordenstreng and H. Schiller (eds.), Beyond National Sovereignty: International Communica-
tion in the 1990s. New Jersey: Norvood, 1993
7. E.M. Noam, “Media Concentration in the United States. Trends and Regulatory Re-
sponses.” Communication and Strategies,1996/4.
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We come across similar difficulties in answering a question more
directly related to our issue, namely how the changes under discus-
sion affect the formation of public opinion and the pluralism of opin-
ions appearing in mass communication. Researchers studying the
phenomena of concentration have drawn attention to the freedom-
limiting and pluralism-reducing effect of excessive centralization.8
At first sight the assumption that the evolving decentralization proc-
esses lead to an increasing pluralization of opinions and to a more
autonomous formation of public opinion seems evident. But the ques-
tion deserves thorough consideration. The pluralization of opinions,
their integrated nature or isolation, homogeneity or heterogeneity,
also depends on the formation of the public in its entirety, on the de-
termining structural factors of its framework, e.g. dominant stratifica-
tion tendencies. Before trying to outline the possible processes in the
structural changes of the public, it seems useful to examine one of the
other consequences of the new computer-bound media technologies,
the issue of interactivity in communication processes.
8. On the effects of the centralization processes see for example B. Bagdikjan, The Media
Monopoly. Boston: Beacon Press, 1988.
9. See E. Katz and P.F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence. Glencoe: Free Press, 1955, or P.F.
Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson and H.  Gaudet,The People’s Choice. New York: Columbia U.P.,
1948.
THE NEW MEDIA AND INTERACTIVITY
The adherents of democratic communication have always regarded
the unilateral flow of information as the Achilles’ heel of mass com-
munication. A great deficiency of mass communication is that it does
not allow for “two-way communication”, a “reply” from the public,
even the conditions for feedback are rather limited. Radio listeners or
television viewers are permanently compelled to play the role of re-
cipient. The activity of listeners or viewers is virtually confined to
switching the set on and off, and to the fluctuating interest and selec-
tivity with which they receive the programs.
The two-stage theory of communication seemingly loosens up the
one-sided picture formed about the communication process.9 Accord-
ing to this theory, communication effects should not be interpreted
linearly on the basis of the communicator-message-recipient scheme,
as they depend on characteristics of the group context, personal com-
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munication and opinion leaders as well. However, notwithstanding
the conversations and personal interactions induced by and related
to a mass communication message, one can hardly speak of
interactivity in relation to communicator and recipient. The decisive
element, direct communicative participation is equally missing from
discussion programs where public views are “represented” by me-
diators or others while viewers only follow the debate on television as
recipients. Even though the multimedia era has brought about some
shift in the relation between communicator and recipient, we cannot
speak of a significant breakthrough. The advantages of this period –
broadening choice for the viewers, individualization of mass commu-
nication, attempts from the side of television broadcasters to get view-
ers more actively involved - have not really changed the fixed role of
the recipient as such. Growing viewer activity is in itself not identical
with interactivity. Strictly speaking even those types of productions
where viewers phone in or influence the outcome of the program with
their votes, as for example in the program “Ön dönt” (“You decide”)
on Hungarian State Television, do not meet interactivity. Although by
way of their votes viewers do exert influence on the story performed,
the proceedings of the show and the possible alternatives always stay
within the boundaries of a previously elaborated scenario, and the
viewers are left out during the process of creation.
Computer-mediated communication has undoubtedly led to
some changes in the field of interactivity. The novelty of network com-
munication lies in the very fact that, by presenting a wide range of
communication forms, it highly increases the degree of interactivity
and the role it plays in the entire communication system. In principle
the most diverse topics may appear on the network and the communi-
cation processes can meet a search for information as well as an urge
to express opinions, a wish to find entertainment or a need for educa-
tion. Besides the institutions yet to be invented, the supply repertoire
offers a rather incredible range of services, from the use of libraries to
thematic bibliographies, from data banks to various games, from pur-
chase orders to banking transactions and interactive travels to ficti-
tious towns.
Another feature of computer-mediated communication is that, ex-
cept for personal verbal intercourse, it integrates nearly all the typical
forms of communication. The Internet can establish contact between
audiences of highly differing size: from a connection between two
225New Communication Technologies and the Public Sphere
persons, through several types of communication forms to various
degrees of broad publicity. Interactivity can thus make its appearance
in a wide range of topics and communication forms. The actual chan-
nels of real communication may expand significantly.
Besides the technical accessibility of particular groups or per-
sons, the communicational “openness” of the participants on the net
can improve the chances of establishing contact too. The mere pres-
ence on the web already assumes some kind of willingness to reply.
The protocol is more open, the expected reception more favourable
than when one tries to make contact with an unknown person on the
telephone or in a letter. Hence communication via E-mail is much
more extended – it can span a net which contains a larger ratio of
weak ties – than the connection network of telephone conversations,
which is more confined to stronger ties, more personal in character.
The fact that it is rather easy to meet people with a certain special
interest or the same profession or hobbies on the web, may similarly
increase the density of communicational relations in society. In mod-
ern societies, characterized by a highly developed division of labour
and far-reaching specialisation, the possible combinations of ranges
of interest may often come to resemble a jungle. Consequently, several
obstacles can appear when one tries to establish contacts. Luhmann
has referred to situations when people “try to find partners for a
topic” as the other typical dilemma of communication.10  The commu-
nication culture created by the new communication technologies may
significantly increase the emergence of this kind of contacts. Thus
geographically dispersed people who live far from each another yet
stand close as far as their interests are concerned may become mem-
bers of interacting communities.
With the expansion of network communication the linear models
of communication, although they do not lose their heuristic value and
comparative validity, become somewhat relativized in view of the
convergence models. The latter are intrinsically more related to a net-
work-centered approach and emphasize the features of interactivity.
In their convergence model Rogers and Kincaid use the notion of
“participants” instead of the terms “communicators” and “recipi-
ents” and assume that the chances to arrive at common interpreta-
10. See  Luhmann, op.cit.
11. E.E. Rogers and D.E. Kincaid, Communication Networks; towards a New Paradigm for Re-
search. New York: Free Press, 1981.
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tions improve in the course of an iteration process.11  In the case of suc-
cessful communication, i.e. when the communication is tending to-
wards convergence, the ratio of messages understood in the same
way increases, while dissenting interpretations decrease accord-
ingly. In spite of increasing convergence the communication obvi-
ously still contains elements of uncertainty even in this case.12  The
conditions for achieving consensus are more favourable when com-
munication processes are based on interactivity. Exactly because all
recipients are positioned as equals, linear communication can often
establish an illusory consensus. But while these pseudo-consensuses
may occasionally prove efficient in the short or middle-long run, over
a longer period they may lead to a rather tense atmosphere and give
rise to conflicts.
Reference books on communication theory published before the
arrival of the cyber-media era tried to place the types of personal and
mass communication in sharp opposition to one another. With the
gradual expansion of computer-mediated communication the divid-
ing lines between these two types are gradually washed away, since
communication on the network resembles personal communication
in some features, while it is similar to mass communication on others.
The criterion of interactivity relates it to personal communication, as
both types are characterized by bi- or multi-lateral communication;
the lack of complex social presence, on the other hand, emphasizes
the similarities between computer-mediated communication and
mass communication. A study by Jäckel has convincingly empha-
sized the importance of full physical presence by pointing out that
deficiencies in direct perceptibility, for example limited visibility or
audibility, reduces the full-fledgedness of communication to a great
extent.13 The absence or restriction of meta-communicative signs defi-
nitely renders communication semantically more uncertain. Accord-
ing to Jäckel the social consequences of the deficiencies occurring in
the case of electronic communication have not yet been researched
appropriately and, as he adds, “so far there is no social psychology of
electronic communication.”14
12. The model contains the possibility of divergency as well. However, the exploration and
systematization of sociological and social-psychological factors tending towards diver-
gency  has not been accomplished so far.
13. M. Jäckel, “Interaktion. Soziologische Anmerkungen zu einem Begriff.” Rundfunk und
Fernsehen, 1995.
14. See Jäckel, op. cit.
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The lack of complex social presence that can be perceived so
clearly in mass communication is not eliminated by computer-medi-
ated communication, although it produces an illusion of presence by
means of interactivity. The degree of personal presence appears to be
such an important factor in regard to the possibilities for democratic
communication that it seems useful to treat it as one of the determi-
nant dimensions in the categorization of types of communication.
Indicating the presence or absence of interactivity with the categories
of uni-directionality and multi-directionality, a two-dimensional
analysis results in the following scheme:
The in many respects passive behaviour that characterizes the
mass communication audience due to the lack of interactivity and
complex social presence can easily be connected to the view on the
narcotic functions of mass communication expressed by Lazarsfeld
and Merton.15  In the absence of actual political participation, the rep-
resentative style of the home-delivered politics, the dispersion and
loneliness of the audience and most of all the technical limits to inter-
activity together contribute to the “illusion of presence”. To what ex-
tent the ‘medial’ situation, created by the new technologies which
could extend the attribute of interactivity in principle unlimitedly, can
bring about growing activity in the field of political participation
forms an important question. Does the lack of personal presence and
the mechanical transmission of this type of communication not in it-
self mean the maintenance of the narcotic dysfunction? Would the
great potential which is opening up secure due opportunity and im-
15. See P. Lazarsfeld and R.K. Merton, “Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organ-
ized Social Action.” In: Schramm, W. (ed.), Mass Communications. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1960.
Type of Interactivity Complex social
communication presence
Personal communication    + +
Computer communication    + -
Mass communication    - -
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pulses for a consolidation of the civil sphere and the development of
more favourable conditions for the public in society?
BASIS COMMUNICATION AND
DEFORMATIONS OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE
From the aspect of the development of political communication as a
whole, perhaps the most important elementary phenomenon is
formed by conversations of private persons among themselves, and
among these the basis communication dealing with public issues
while touching upon the boundaries of private life.16   Spontaneous
communication of this kind is the basis of democracy, the breeding
ground for the formation of public opinion. The processes of basis
communication are characterized by vicinity, informality and
interactivity, even though they may be based on very different factors,
like proximity in social status, acquaintanceship or even the peculi-
arities of the situation. Personal or group talks dealing with an issue
of public life can be included in the concept of basis communication
in so far as the participants in the communication more or less know
each other and address their statements to each other, not to some
broad anonymous audience. The private nature of basis communica-
tion is primarily based on the non-public form of the communication
and the personal selection of addressees.17
From among personal communications, in addition to communi-
cation along strong ties, conversations between people connected
through weak ties can also be included here, since the partners know
each other in the latter case as well, and they address their messages
not to the public at large but to each other. Though direct verbal inter-
action is the most natural medium of basis communication, private
correspondence or telephone conversations also belong to the do-
main of basis communication in so far as they discuss issues of public
life. In the case of those forms of group talks which take place in cafés,
pubs, in various table companies or salons, the private nature of the
16. On the concept of basiscommunication see R. Geissler:  Mass Medien, Basiscommuni-
cation und Demokratie. Tübingen: Mohr, 1973. In this study I use a narrower interpretation
of the concept of basis communication than Geissler does in his book.
17. Following this approach, in the space divided by the common/personal and the public/
non-public dimensions, basis communication is to be found in the square typified as non-
public and common. On the communication space as mentioned here see M. Heller and Á.
Rényi, “A nyilvános kommunikáció szociológiai modellje.” Jel-Kép, 1996/4.
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talks is ensured by the selection of partners and the surveyability and
relatively closed character of the circle of participants. The same also
holds in the case of ‘new entrants’ when their aptness is guaranteed
by a regular member of the group or the invitation of the hostess. Al-
though in some sense these may be regarded as borderline cases, we
can also rank here the communicational situations in occasional
gatherings analyzed by Gerhards and Neihardt and called ‘encoun-
ters’ after Goffman’s wording, which occur under temporary condi-
tions, at accidental meetings, for example in a train compartment, at
the marketplace or in a queue.18  In situations like these political is-
sues or actual questions may sometimes arise. Although here the par-
ticipants do not or only superficially know each other, the private
nature of their communication may be justified by the small size and
surveyability of the group, the participation in the conversation and
the estimation of the situation on the basis of personal impressions.
In spite of the diversity and graduality of transitional situations,
speeches delivered at forum-like events should not be included in the
concept of basis communication because, due to the large size of the
public, its anonymity, the limited interactivity and the institutional
nature of the communication, they transgress the boundaries of infor-
mal private talks and therefore rather belong to the processes of pub-
lic communication.
The technical transmission may reduce the security and the per-
sonal nature of communication, but we have no reason to exclude
computer-mediated communication automatically from the concept
of basis communication. Several authors attach fairly great impor-
tance to the potentials of electronic communication and – joining
Habermas’ conception of public sphere – point to the resemblance
between the newly developing electronic communities or agora and
the early institutions of publicity, the salons and cafés.19  The limited
expansion of the Internet, the low institutionalization of its use and
the small number of empirical research on network communication
provide only very limited opportunities for answering questions like,
for example, what types of relations can develop in virtual space and
in what aspects the developing ‘electronic communities’ will differ
18. See J. Gerhards und F. Neidhardt, Strukturen und Funktionen modernen Öffentlichkeit.
Berlin: Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 1990.
19. See for example J.R. Höfflich, “Der Computer als ‘Interaktives Massenmedium’. Zum
Beitrag des Uses and Gratifications Approach bei der Untersuchung Computerver-
mittelter Communication.” Publizistik,  1994/4.
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from real ones. At present it still seems uncertain to what extent and
under what types of application the differences between electronic
and personal communication will be washed away when these tech-
nologies become more widespread and common, and where the dif-
ferences will remain significant. The experiences so far already ques-
tion the notions that emphasize sharp dividing lines. In one of his
studies specifically dedicated to electronic communities, Höfflich
points out, for example, that a certain group of communication part-
ners carries on personal and computer-mediated communication
parallelly. Apart from solely electronic contacts frequently cases oc-
cur in which an existing relationship is supplemented by a computer
connection. And the reverse also happens, when communication de-
veloping on the network constitutes the starting point for personal
interactions.20
Following the foregoing train of thoughts, we regard all forms of
computer-mediated communication where private communication
deals with issues of public life as basis communication. From E-mail
to those forms of group communication where the number of entrants
is limited and the exclusion of uninitiated participants and the gen-
eral public secures the privacy of the communicating group, network
communication can be considered as a part of basis communication.
The most obvious indicators of the current level of  public sphere
are the characteristics of the horizontal paths of basis communica-
tion, the expansiveness of communication processes, the density and
the vitality of the network. The decreasing role of public issues in the
contents of communication, the depoliticization of private conversa-
tions and the desolation of the field of horizontal communication can
be largely explained by the detachment of the societal institutions of
public sphere from basis communication.
Due to excessive state intervention or the dominance of informa-
tion market forms, the societal institutions of public sphere can only
convey the demands of private persons publicly or meet their needs
for information to a limited extent. A deteriorating interaction be-
tween the level of basis communication and the institutions of public-
ity leads to the deformation of both spheres. The systems of public
communication and basis communication become asymmetric with
regard to their contents. The ‘Up there they talk about something else
20. Cp. I.R. Höfflich, “Vom dispersen Publikum zu ‘elektronischen Gemeinschaften’.”
Rundfunk und Fernsehen, 1995/5.
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than down here’ syndrome becomes typical. The visibility conditions
deteriorate for both the official political top levels and the lower
strata. Within the official institutions an increasing amount of com-
munication takes place behind closed doors and the nascent arcane
turn the essential questions of politics into puzzles. Viewed from
above, the problem world of the lower strata becomes invisible due to
the weakness of the basis communication. With the deterioration of
the visibility conditions not only the suspected, reflexive secrets
spread, but also the unknown, unreflected secrets that remain ob-
scure.21 As a consequence of the coexistence of arcane and press free-
dom, scandals become almost natural concomitant phenomena of
public sphere.
The technical features of mass communication intensify the
asymmetries of the communication processes in society. On the verti-
cal paths of communication pictures, sounds and printed words flow
towards the population in quantities that can be expressed only in
astronomical figures. The very amount of information, its heterogene-
ity and mosaic-like form, paradoxically enhances the difficulties of
orientation. Messages proceeding upwards from below already ap-
pear in much weaker flows, and the lower we descend through the
degrees of social stratification, the smaller the chance that the infor-
mation will find its way upwards. On the horizontal paths of society
the diffusion of political information is very low as well. The
asymmetries in communication flows undoubtedly lead to the revival
of certain symptoms of representative publicity. 22 Politics turn into a
spectacle that happens above the heads of the citizens, and the insti-
tutions of publicity do not ensure a connection back to basis commu-
nication.
21. On simple and reflexive secrets see A. Bellebaum, Schweigen und Verschweigen.
Bedeutungen und Erscheinungsvielfalt einer Kommunikationsform. Opladen: Westdeutscher
Verlag, 1992.
22. On the interpretation of representative publicity see J. Habermas, A társadalmi
nyilvánosság szerkezetváltozása. Budapest: Gondolat, 1971.
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THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE CHANCES
FOR DEMOCRATIC COMMUNICATION
What kind of democratic potential do the new means offer to reduce
the disorders of political communication, to mediate between basis
communication and publicity, to establish a connection between the
two? To what extent will different groups of private persons be able to
make their needs public and present the information needed for it?
Will one manage to support the basic democratic function of public
communication, the improvement of social visibility and an increas-
ing transparency of political life? As far as the current state of the de-
veloping processes enables us to consider the appearing chances at
all, the trends that can be discerned at the moment seem to be rather
ambivalent, but in certain fields they show the contours of democratic
communication.
Computer-mediated communication can first of all further a more
well-founded orientation. The main obstacles to better orientation – a
shortage of available time, the lack of possibilities to directly ap-
proach major events, the greater number and complicate nature of is-
sues concerning the citizens – seem to confront the general public
with sheer insoluble difficulties today as well.23 Among these short-
age of time seems to be the obstacle hardest to overcome. The hopes
attached to the increase of leisure time have come true only to a very
small extent, and people spend only a fraction of their free time on
getting informed. In some sense the computer even enhances the diffi-
culties of dividing one’s time, as it offers a broader supply of
gratifications. It is indisputable, however, that the new technologies
can greatly increase the opportunities to check or correct information
and to obtain the most important background information. The re-
quired databases, libraries, search systems and different information
sources become accessible from one’s desk by pressing a few keys.
With the help of a computer one can have recourse to the advice of a
variety of partners, and the exchange of opinions on the network af-
fords possibilities of co-operative control. In some cases uncertainties
caused by the inaccessibility of events can be reduced by contacting
people in the vicinity of the scene, perhaps even witnesses. This ex-
traordinary potential for control will probably have great impact on
23. W. Lippmann’s famous book published in the early twenties already drew attention to
these factors. See W. Lippmann, Public Opinion. New York: Free Press, 1922.
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the whole style of journalism and may force the official communica-
tors to increasing objectivity and balanced reporting.
The emergence of private and public fora developing on the net-
work may – especially when the number of participants on the web
reaches a critical mass – bring about important changes in checking
news and in the formation of well-founded, informed opinions. Even
fora which regard the establishment of well-balanced, accurate infor-
mation provision as their basic mission may appear. Such institu-
tions would be within a hair’s-breadth from possible fora of laymen
journalism or even the rise of non-professional “magistrature”. The
livening up of the “for many, with many” type of communication may
result in the consolidation of the horizontal paths and the civil
sphere. Various groups and electronic communities may get in touch
with one another both in a private and in a public way, may discuss
and synchronize their points of views and could present a united
front in relation to certain events. Thus mass communication media
do not simply come into contact with dispersed public groups iso-
lated from one another, but with the networks of the recipients, which
can also approach a different large fora of publicity more easily.
It is hard to anticipate today to what extent the new technologies
will transform the means of traditional mass communication. It is
also uncertain what kind of division of labour will develop between
the media or what kind of ousting effects will prevail among the par-
ticular organs with regard to entertainment, culture and political
communication. The possibility of interactivity and the emergence of
electronic communities of citizens involved in public issues but dis-
persed earlier, by all means provide opportunities for basis communi-
cation to become more vivid and get closer to the institutions of public
sphere.
From the point of view of the safety and effectiveness of communi-
cation it is necessary to establish a clear separation between private
and public fora, while in some instances their combined application
may also be required. The assurance of maximum guarantees for pri-
vate communication forms the basis for a proper functioning of pub-
lic communication. According to the logic of democratic principles, in
the relation of private affairs to public affairs the priority of private
affairs is the decisive element. Since public affairs always touch upon
the boundaries and contents of private life, in principle state affairs
concern private persons as well. This relation cannot be reversed
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without the violation of democratic principles. State institutions and
the fora of publicity cannot cross the borders of closed private affairs.
Without broadly based guarantees of privacy public life does not
function. Encroachments from the side of the authorities or journal-
ists can shake public communication to its very foundations.
Concerning the application of computer-mediated communica-
tion and the assertion of its interactive potential, the inviolability of
privacy is of extreme importance. With the help of exactly these tech-
nologies, a whole range of different offices and state institutions have
easily accessible data on private persons at their disposal. These data
covering several aspects of private life – income, bank accounts, tax
payments, travels abroad, health – can, when integrated, signifi-
cantly threaten the autonomy of people as private persons. Only the
further development of legal institutions serving the protection of the
private sphere and the operation of self-defence reflexes of private
persons can sufficiently safeguard security in view of this threat. Cer-
tain initiatives can already be observed. Computer experts, for exam-
ple, have developed ingenious “cryptographic technologies”, with
the help of which the communication partners themselves can make
sure that their notes, private messages, etcetera, do not fall into the
hands of outsiders.24
With the new means of interactivity the elements of political par-
ticipation may be strengthened as well. Especially the character of the
periods preceding elections may undergo a transformation. Presum-
ably the knowledge about the different parties will also become in-
creasingly well-founded. The possibilities to check and compare the
programs of the parties with each other and with previous programs
will also increase. In all their subjectivity most political parties in
Hungary have already made their appearance on the Internet, used
only to a very small extent there as yet. With the expansion of compu-
ter-mediated communication the parties can expect an increase of
buoyant communicational initiatives directed towards them from
their potential followers and enemies, especially during election cam-
paigns. Computer communication may also bring about new devel-
opments in the relations between supporters of the same or other par-
24. On public-key cryptography see Pretty Good Privacy by P. Zimmermann, published in
the Hungarian Electronic Library (Magyar Elektronikus Könyvtár). On the possibilities of
cryptography see also D. Chaum, “Achieving Electronic Privacy”. Scientific American (Au-
gust 1992).
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ties. Circles of potential sympathizers scattered along large areas in
different towns may get in touch with one another and with the re-
spective centres of their parties. The features of campaigns may be
transformed in many respects. The network itself may become the
arena of electoral competition and in this area a real possibility arises
for citizens and electronic communities to exercise interactivity. The
nature of the medium and its written form offer fewer opportunities to
exercise direct emotional influence and for the “homo publicus” to
manifest his verbal superiority, thus on the network communication
may be diverted to a genre which is more favourable for the people
participating and more objective.
Other components of the elections may undergo a transforma-
tion, too. The institution of campaign silence and its effects will prob-
ably change. As the temporary suspension of communication does
not necessarily work in private electronic communities, the campaign
silence may strengthen the role of the network and basis communica-
tion in the outcome of the elections. These trends may modify the per-
ception of the parties that is formed at the electoral bases and influ-
ence the operation of the “set-of-carriages effect”. Although, because
of the size and complexity of modern societies, I do not believe in the
future perspective of electronic democracies as outlined by Masuda,
certain elements of direct democracy may definitely gain ground.25
As far as the examination of the political effects of computer-me-
diated communication is concerned, one of the most important ques-
tions deals with the rate of expansion of the new technologies. It has
become clear already that the use of the Internet does not follow the
same pattern as the spread of television, which became a natural ap-
pliance in almost every household in the United States and most Eu-
ropean countries within ten or fifteen years after the beginning of
public broadcasts. The temptation of the computer is not so universal
as that of the television was, which through the attraction of live pic-
tures, the tradition of the movies and the captivating passivity of its
reception held out promises of an easy form of recreation and enter-
tainment. The diffusion of the Internet is an even slower process still
than that of the computer.
25. See Y. Masuda: “The Information Society as Post-Industrial Society.” World Futures
Society. Washington DC, 1983.
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The expansion of the new communication technologies is also
hindered by the costs of their acquisition and application. Modern
communication research does on the whole not pay enough attention
to the role these factors play.26 Due to the shortage of available re-
sources and the established rank-order in which demands are to be
met, the possibility to purchase a computer does in many cases not
even enter one’s mind. Apart from this, operating on the Internet pre-
supposes types of knowledge, skills and needs that people possess in
rather highly divergent degrees. The strata-specific differences in
technical skills, language codes and communication needs make the
value of computer communication significantly relative to the vari-
ous levels.
Regarding the development of diffusion that is to be expected,
Castell’s assessment seems to be the most moderate one. According to
Castell “...CMC is not a general medium of communication and will
not be so in the foreseeable future. While its use expands at the
fenomenal rates it will exclude for a long time the large majority of hu-
mankind, unlike television and other mass media.”27 The differences
in expansion are observable not only internationally, between coun-
tries, there are significant stratum-specific differences within each so-
ciety as well. According to researches carried out in the United States,
the use of the Internet has reached a high density first of all among
groups with a high level of education and relatively considerable in-
come. A break-down by occupation also yields important differences:
people working in the sphere of technology, education or commerce
make most use of the potential of electronic communication. Members
of the younger generations and males are over-represented among the
26. Earlier authors like for example W. Sombart still attached greater importance to this
issue. At least this is suggested by the fact that he made a distinction between the open
and closed forms of indirect (non-verbal) communication when systemizing the types of
public communication. Since the closed forms go with certain costs, he separated them
from the free means of communication. See W. Sombart, Der Moderne Kapitalismus.
München und Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker Humblot., 1921.
27. M. Castells, The  Rise of  Network Societies. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996,  p. 358.
28. Due to the comparatively limited expansion of the Internet in Hungary it is not pos-
sible yet to carry out a detailed examination of the domestic trends of its spread. Even at
the present level of expansion it is, however, clearly perceivable that the younger age
groups and the professionals classes play an outstanding role in the diffusion of the
Internet in Hungary. See R. Angelusz, R. Tardos, Médiahasználat vagy médiafogyasztás? A
televíziózás egy új empirikus tipológiája. (manuscript)
29. See Castells, op. cit.,  p. 359.
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European Perspectives on Lifelong Learning
Environments in the Information Society
EERO PANTZAR
For the past ten years lifelong learning  has been – again – the most
central theme in European discussions on education. Most fre-
quently, it has appeared in various  connections of educational
policy. This may be considered rather strange, due to the fact that life-
long learning (from the point of view of learning theory) has, basi-
cally, not much to do with educational politics. At most, the issue
could be as to how educational policies can serve various lifelong
learning efforts.
Regarding the content of the present debate, a significant feature
is that lifelong learning has been connected to formal education or, at
least, to organised and intentional studies. This viewpoint was also
typical of the discussions on lifelong education (or permanent educa-
tion), in the 1970s. I cannot but wonder at the oblivion or depreciation
of the role of informal learning environments, for example. It seems
inevitable that even fewer total solution models, organisations or
education programmes can be provided in the present, to meet all the
lifelong learning challenges, than in the past. As I see it the signifi-
cance is in the individuals’ independent knowledge acquisition
abilities and skills to reconstruct information obtained from informal
learning environments and that accumulated through random learn-
ing situations into new learning. Combined with formal education,
they can create adequate preconditions for meaningful lifelong learn-
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ing. (Cf., for example, Kaiser 1991; Lampinen 1997; NIACE 1992;
Watkins & Marsick 1992; Reichsmann 1995; Pantzar 1997).
THE IDEA OF LIFELONG LEARNING
For a long period, analysis of lifelong learning was mainly restricted
to education philosophical activities, which was reflected, for exam-
ple, by UNESCO’s interpretations of the idea of lifelong education, as
late as in the 1960s. However, an expanded viewpoint was repre-
sented by the Foundations of Lifelong Education, a comprehensive pub-
lication  by Dave (1976), in which lifelong learning was subjected to
highly versatile analysis. At that time, analysis was still detached
from social political connections, which came to play a contributory
role during the 1970s. (Council 1970; Lengrand 1970). This means
that the idea of lifelong learning was, clearly, part of the training soci-
ety thinking.
The present information society connection of the 1990s provides
two alternative viewpoints to lifelong learning. The connection can
be understood as a need for lifelong learning generated by the chal-
lenges arising from the surrounding information society, or as ex-
panding lifelong learning opportunities made available through the
information society’s new means and methods. My personal view is
that the information society offers increasing opportunities to meet
the challenges of lifelong learning, including any ‘traditional’ chal-
lenges. Similarly, the information society will create new settings to
meet the learning needs that are continuously created by life’s many
ever-present changes.
The viewpoints of lifelong education, continuing education and
recurrent education, which were expressed in the 1970s and 1980s,
seem to have remained specifications of past ideas in the 1990s. At
least, the favoured trend is just to speak of lifelong learning, in almost
all the connections where people previously tried to choose between
the said terms. (Cf. Pantzar 1991; Dohmen 1996). To speak of lifelong
learning in conjunction with each educational activity pursued dur-
ing an individual’s lifespan becomes problematic, especially due to
the fact that the necessary definition of learning, which is required in
terms of study, teaching, training and education, remains untackled
or insufficient. From a pedagogic and learning theoretical viewpoint,
these distinctions are indispensable. On the other hand, even educa-
tion political terminology, for example, cannot be so inaccurate as,
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when referring to the construction of educational solutions that pro-
mote lifelong study, one would speak of a lifelong learning system. In
the same vein, one can criticise the habit introduced in working life
education of referring to each and every flexible training and study
model as lifelong learning.
Being EU’s theme year of lifelong learning, 1996 was of special
interest in Europe. EU’s education policy proclamations and na-
tional education policy decisions gave the impression that a transfer
had been made, or was being made, into an era of lifelong learning.
Even if several policy decisions, like so may before, spoke widely of
the citizens’ need of versatile lifelong learning, one felt, however, that
labour force quality, and the maintenance and development of com-
petitiveness are still seen as the primary determinants for education
and training needs. (European Commission 1994; Cochinaux & de
Woot 1995; cf. Freyer 1997).  In this respect, the past 30-year develop-
ment from Unesco’s “lifelong education” ideas through the Council
of Europe’s “permanent education” and OECD’s “recurrent educa-
tion” to the interpretations above, rather reflects the changes of
societal settings and educational systems than a key detected at the
end of a long road to solve the mystery of lifelong learning.
The original 1970s idea of developing a versatile personality
seems to have been abandoned, to a large extent, as an essential life-
long learning objective. However, this is not always seen in education
policy documents, for example. These texts often mention that an in-
dividual’s life consists of a number of actions and various activities,
some of which are necessary, others challenges encountered in vari-
ous walks of life, and the rest personal choices made by the indi-
vidual in question.
The awakening to the reality of lifelong learning during the 1990s
has been largely supported by the challenges generated through swift
changes in working life and by massive unemployment. This seems
to shift the focus  on the educational content needed by the individual
as an employee. It is this narrow view that has probably contributed
to the fact that the concepts of continuous education and lifelong
learning have merged.
The impression of the current direction of lifelong learning that I
have described above has been mainly supported by educational
policy norm providing practises (even within the EU), by the practical
decisions made and by the activities of working life interest groups as
moulders of people’s perceptions.
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INFORMATION SOCIETY AND
LIFELONG LEARNING
During the near past learning environments have not changed very
much. This is true, even when assuming that life itself is the most
important learning environment and that informal and incidental
learning provide the majority of those information items and stimuli
that contribute to learning. These are valid arguments, especially
when analysing the history of learning. The framework has not
changed much. Instead, marked changes have manifested them-
selves within the framework, in the form of quantitative and qualita-
tive developments. Life as such is and will remain a learning environ-
ment but will keep on changing and providing new learning chal-
lenges. When trying to find comparison points for the current situa-
tion from a sufficient distance in the past, the change will be seen
more clearly. The change of industrial structures, the development
history of social communities, and the change of the socialisation
process will provide an appropriate perspective for analysis. From
the point of view of the history of mankind, the said developments are
also connected with fairly young phenomena, such as the birth of a
school system, formal education, current social communities, and in-
dustrialisation with its related structures.
Over the past few years, the discussion on changing learning en-
vironments has been contributed to by a many-faceted talk and analy-
sis of the information society which has been considered essential for
the breakthrough of lifelong learning. Most discussion participants
and others who have expressed their opinions have said that a
knowledge society  (information society) has emerged and developed,
mainly during  the 1990s. This interpretation is based on the idea of
the information and communication technologies’ decisive contribu-
tion to societal change in terms of the fundamentally changed infor-
mation and/or data communication, storage, retrieval and process-
ing, compared with any previous developments.
Initially, the information society was discussed in a spirit that
had a strong technological bias. That spirit never vanished but is now
accompanied by a number of additional viewpoints. The said techno-
logical bias was most evident through the fact that information and
communication technological infrastructures provided by society
were heavily concentrated. I do not want to deny the fact that the vari-
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ous services and opportunities provided by the information society
would require certain structures as a basis. Of course, this structural
basis is necessary but is not sufficient in itself as a condition for an
information society to become a learning society.
In the early 1990s, the information society was discussed in a
lively fashion. It has been believed that a world in the process of be-
coming networked, with all of its virtual elements and other commu-
nication possibilities, can generate new forms of social interaction
and, naturally, unforeseen settings for learning. However, the experi-
ence of the past few years has confirmed the vision of many analysts
since the very beginning of the information society debate. After all, it
is a fact that the majority of people prefer living with their fixed habits,
rather than seizing new, sometimes ostensible opportunities. The op-
posite can happen only after long consideration, if ever.
This can be called prudence, despite the fact that it has been
clearly proven as conservatism or outdated behaviour in this connec-
tion. When constructing learning environments for an information
society, either for the needs of formal basic education or for more indi-
vidual non-formal lifelong study, we can rest assured that people’s
attitudes to new things will often be very reserved.
In the following, I shall resume dealing with the perceptions per-
taining to the birth of an information society. Above, I have repeatedly
stated that a knowledge society, and the information society alike, is
regarded as a societal development stage that began in the immediate
past and is currently in the process of development. It is, in fact, sur-
prising how rarely one hears any of the arguments and criteria on
which the notions of society’s newly begun development are based.
On the other hand, a variety of matters are referred to in these discus-
sions. One of the most frequent arguments is the rapid increase of the
so-called knowledge work (Mannermaa 1997; Central Statistical Of-
fice 1997). The weakness of this argument lies in the hazy definition
of the knowledge work and professions. According to the most vague
interpretation, almost any occupation contains various  elements
connected with information and data processing. In this respect, they
can be regarded as information professions.
But does knowledge work really produce something new? Kit
Sims Taylor, an American researcher, has analysed the matter and
stated the following, among other things:
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There is clearly a rosy scenario afoot: the knowledge sector – with
much higher productivity than other sectors of the economy – will
expand rapidly in terms of employment as well as output; as most
workers become high-productivity knowledge workers our in-
comes will rise proportionately; best of all, this will be accom-
plished within the institutional structure of capitalism as we know
it today. Unfortunately, this rosy scenario is based on five
premises and four of these are incorrect.
The two most interesting incorrect premises are, firstly, that
knowledge workers primarily create new knowledge, and secondly,
that demand for knowledge work will grow in pace with the in-
creased supply and rising productivity of knowledge work-
ers.(Taylor 1998).
An excellent counterweight to the prevailing notion of an infor-
mation society, and food for thought for the most industrious of ana-
lysts is provided by the model developed by Hungarian Szathmary
and Britain’s John Maynard Smith. This model examines biological
evolution from the information viewpoint. The model developers’
view is that evolution has progressed in jumps, in conjunction with
which recognisable changes have take place in the forms in which
information has been presented, stored and transferred. In accord-
ance with Maynard and Szathmary’s theory, an information society
was born when man learned how to make cave paintings and use
hieroglyphs and cuneiform symbols for writing. Man’s ability to store
and transfer knowledge in forms other than by word of mouth and
oral traditions has been stated in a number of other connections as the
starting point for development towards a information society. (Sokala
1996).
Long before the present information society debate was
launched, education professionals, especially in the field of adult
education, had realised that society and life will change at an increas-
ing rate, with requirements to complement the basic education ac-
quired during childhood and adolescence. At that time, the theme
was the training (schooling) society whose main principle mani-
fested itself as the idea of continuing education during the 1970s.
(Pantzar 1991). Many industrialised countries underwent an era of a
vigorous rise in education policies which revealed the needs for life-
long study, primarily through analysing educational needs from a
societal perspective. The  UNESCO introduced lifelong education
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With regard to the assessments of a learning society, the most cru-
cial element is constituted by the definition of the idea of learning,
which also specifies the frame of reference for any interpretation of
lifelong learning. I am not going to express an exact definition in this
connection. To provide a background and premise for thought, I just
refer to the research by the Swede, Roger Säljö, who has analysed the
notion of learning. According to Säljö, the narrowest interpretation
sees learning as quantitative increase of information. According to
the widest interpretation, learning is a process that helps interpret
reality better. (Säljö 1976; cf. Csikszentmihalyi 1982 and Forrester &
Payne & Ward 1995).
A critical point in the definition of learning has been the decision
whether to see learning as a process or as a product. This decision is
significant, for example, when assessing the nature of the informa-
tion society as a learning society. Personally, I interpret learning both
as a process and a product thereof. An essential element in this inter-
pretation is seeing information/knowledge as a raw material for the
said process. This means that I understand
learning to be a process in which the individual processes the in-
formation/knowledge acquired in various ways, producing new
capabilities which emerge as enhanced skills, increased under-
standing, and an ability to interpret matters or approach things
and phenomena in a new way..
Correspondingly, I see
lifelong learning as a lifelong continuum of the said process.
At present, the term learning is frequently used to refer to the proc-
ess only. The prevailing constructivistic idea of learning bases its
theoretical elements  on learning as a process. Therefore, the issue is
how to act in order to learn. (Resnick 1989; Pantzar 1995). Informa-
tion-technology-based learning environments are typical of the infor-
mation society. The very constructivism has, to a certain extent, pro-
vided justification for the suitability of these environments. The inter-
pretations of lifelong learning have also emphasised the learning
ideas of the 1960s had been left far behind. So, what is a 1990s modern
information society like, as a learning society, particularly from the
point of view of lifelong learning? (van der Zee 1991; Raggat &
Edwards & Small 1996).
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process. I claim that these interpretations have rather dealt with life-
long or continuous study than learning. This means that, in conjunc-
tion with the information society, people have spoken of the opportu-
nities for study made available by the information society. As such,
study does not guarantee learning, but can produce it, undoubtedly.
Furthermore, as study is almost invariably intentional and often con-
nected with formal or non-formal education, it is obvious that the in-
terpretation of lifelong learning will remain restricted.
When examining the change or current appearance of lifelong
learning, one must emphasise survival, the basic function of learning.
Survival has been and continues to be the essence in the indispensa-
bility and expediency of learning. From the lifelong learning view-
point, changes are mainly an expansion and diversification of the
means to survive. At the dawn of humanity, survival was connected
to the acquisition of nourishment and shelter, and to reproduction.
During that period, learning was, in terms of lifelong learning rather
limited, but absolutely necessary. Learning ensured survival more ef-
fectively, but not necessarily, while man’s only environmental rela-
tionship was his relation to nature. At present, survival takes place
within the constraints of a multi-faceted and multi-layered man-envi-
ronment relationship. To survive in this setting also requires a great
deal of learning, and learning of various types (Pantzar 1993a;
Dohmen 1996). The development that has brought the idea of lifelong
learning close to lifelong study is based on the fact that the need for
intentional learning has increased rapidly. Regardless of this, the in-
herent lifelong nature of informal learning and various random
learning forms have not lost their significance. Intentional learning
needs are primarily supported by formal educational institutions,
and increasingly by  individuals’ self-initiated intentional studies.
As these are forming into processes with far reaching effects on peop-
le’s life cycles, it has been  natural to think that lifelong learning is a
requirement expressed by the present period only.
Today, lifelong learning based survival is encountered in the
realms of four man-environment relationships. These relationships
are: man-nature, man-built (technological) environment, man-social
communities, and man’s relationship to himself. These relationships
can also be analysed as inter-community relationships. (Pantzar
1993a). Considering the learning requirements created by these rela-
tionships, it is easy to understand the versatility of the required and
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existing learning environments. Under these circumstances, lifelong
learning can be learning, study, education, or training, depending on
the point of view.
EUROPEAN INTERPRETATIONS ON LIFELONG
LEARNING AND LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS OF
INFORMATION SOCIETY
The empirical research data collected for the research on European
interpretations of lifelong learning was mainly acquired using non-
structured questionnaires which were sent to over 30 foreign experts
of lifelong learning in 12 countries (all of them EU countries, with the
exception of one). The respondents work in universities, chiefly in
research and teaching duties..
To constitute the basic issue and premise, I requested the experts to
define a number of concepts connected with the theme and to identify
the essential differences between these concepts.
With regard to the idea of lifelong learning, I shall present the fol-
lowing summary:
1) The definitions of lifelong learning place a strong emphasis on the
fact that learning takes place at all times and in all places.
“Lifelong experience based learning taking place in all life spheres,
incl. formal education”.
2) Lifelong learning is not a system but an activity that is typical of
man whose function is to survive as an individual and as a member of
a community.
“Man is a biological system, unable not to learn”.
3) In conceptual interpretations, lifelong learning seems to be exclu-
sively connected with the learning needs arising from the relation-
ship between the individual and his or her environment
“To continue the learning process during the whole life, to im-
prove and   actualise knowledge, behaviour, skills, attitudes and
concepts of life and society”.
Learning is understood so as a human activity, or as a process
that changes preconditions for the process and/or its outcome. (Cf.
Cropley 1980; Himmelstrup 1981; Gross 1982; Raivola 1996)
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Lifelong education is seen, almost without exception, as an activity
that supports lifelong learning.
“Lifelong education is planned education for individuals through-
out life. The authorities and (private and official) organisations
arrange and administrate lifelong education for people”.
“A system, which offers and facilitates lifelong learning”
It is interesting to observe that in cases where lifelong learning is
seen as a process that also takes place or occurs, to a considerable
degree, outside formal education, lifelong education is described as a
system or as an activity organised by some other means. Even func-
tional interpretations, which justify the need for lifelong education in
particular, are found among the definitions produced. (Cf. Cropley
1980; Himmelstrup 1981; Knopper & Cropley 1991; Atchoarena
1995)
The function of education (including lifelong education) can be
seen to be different from that of learning. As a lifelong intention edu-
cation means continuous socialisation. With regard to learning, an
individual always has much greater freedom to define the purpose. In
many cases, lifelong education seems to be clad in a tidier robe of life-
long learning. Thus, the individual’s societal adaptation to change,
which is necessary, – in working life, communities, etc. – refers, in a
way, to the individual’s own intention or activity, and can be said to
be for his or her own good.
“Lifelong learning” constitutes a wider concept than “lifelong
education”. Thus, education is understood as an activity geared to-
wards learning. Another shared feature applies to the intentional as-
pect of learning. Whereas  “lifelong learning” is understood to stand
for intentional learning, random learning and non-intentional learn-
ing, “lifelong education” has always been understood as an inten-
tional activity.
When assessing the development of the lifelong learning concept,
with conventional usage as the basis, it appears that the concept’s
interpretation has somehow changed over the period of the past 30
years, This has also been observed by the European experts who par-
ticipated in the research. According to their interpretations, the
changes have been of numerous types. One respondent group is of the
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opinion   that, primarily, a change has taken place in what is seen as
the most important content in lifelong learning (studying). This is
also reflected in the definition of the necessary lifelong learning crite-
ria, and in redirecting the activities which support learning within
the constraints of intentional education.
LIFE CYCLE AND LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS
One of the objectives of my research was to specify the role of learning
environments and how this role has changed in lifelong learning. I
asked the experts for detailed notions of learning environments out-
side work and working life, the reason being that the significance of
learning in work environments has been recognised in wider Euro-
pean discussions. (Crawford 1994; Atchoarena 1995; Otala 1995). On
the other hand, the assessment of the conventional and modern me-
dia is pervasive. This is connected with the aforesaid viewpoints and
emphasise place on the role of informal learning environments which
support the individual’s versatile development in lifelong learning.
When the family, conventional classroom teaching, newspapers and
periodicals, electronic mass media, the Internet/WWW and compu-
ter-aided teaching materials (e.g. CD-ROMs) were finally examined
as learning environment cases, it is, naturally, justifiable to point out
that the palette of learning environments in question is not perfect. To
strengthen the lifelong learning aspect, I requested the respondents to
evaluate the significance of the said learning environments at various
stages of the life cycle. The stages were defined to cover early child-
hood (pre-school years), childhood, adolescence and adulthood.
Adulthood was not subdivided, even if the post-career period, for ex-
ample, could, justifiably, have formed a separate period for examina-
tion. A particular reason being that the population’s age distribution
is changing in the EU area. Talk of a greying Europe is very true in
terms of the near future.
The experts evaluated the family to be the most significant early
childhood learning environment. In early childhood, the position
and role of any learning environment is best discernible. Only the
electronic mass media is seen to have some importance as a learning
environment, in addition to the family. The influence of various pre-
school education systems is clearly seen in the background of evalu-
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ations of conventional early childhood learning environments. In
early childhood, the role of intentional education is emphasised as a
promoter of learning. It is also a fact that  children are subjected to a
considerable degree of random learning as they grow older and ob-
serve their habitat.
Having reached the stage where school forms an essential ele-
ment, the diminishing role of the family can be seen as a natural de-
velopment. From the lifelong learning perspective, however, the fami-
ly’s role does not diminish much when considering the concrete as-
pects of school. Indeed, the family and school have been regarded as
the central childhood environments for learning and growth. The
importance of electronic mass media seems to be increasing slightly.
The experts assume that, when entering school, children also enter
the world of the modern learning environments. In comparison to
early childhood, their learning environment expands significantly.
The adolescence stage is characterised by various learning envi-
ronments having a balanced importance. According to the experts,
school, the family, and the electronic media are now the crucial fac-
tors. The so-called modern learning environments that are based on
information and communication technologies are playing an impor-
tant role in the learning of young people approaching adulthood.
Approaching adulthood means a diminishing role for the school-
form of learning environment. Still, the significance of the family, for
example, is assessed as being preserved, albeit not to the same extent
as during other life cycle stages. The position of the family in the
learning environment changes also. In adulthood, the various refer-
ence groups and peer groups, and  working life become more impor-
tant as learning environments. Taking the experts’ views as the basis,
one may say that, during adulthood, the learning environments are
increasingly discovered and constructed by the learners themselves.
To summarise, one may state that when leaving the ‘one-sided’
learning environment typical of the early stage of his or her life cycle,
a learner enters an entity, when reaching adolescence, where the sig-
nificance of various learning environments appears to be the most
versatile and most evenly distributed. During adulthood, more scope
is provided by the increasing freedom of choice and learning at work.
European lifelong learning experts are fairly unanimous with re-
gard to the fact that the family is the most important learning environ-
ment of the individual’s entire life cycle. Despite the fact that the
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greatest significance of the family seems to concentrate on a short pe-
riod of time, it is, however, the period during which all learning is
new and invariably provides a marked contribution to the earlier
learning achievements. Indisputably, these initial stages of the life
cycle also form the most important basic stage for lifelong learning.
As a learning environment, a school which provides conven-
tional classroom teaching plays an important role, especially during
the early stages of compulsory education. On the other hand, ‘school-
like’ study is also increasing during adulthood.
When examining the entire life cycle, a very important learning
environment seems to be that constituted by electronic mass commu-
nication. As a learning environment, it is most significant during
adolescence and adulthood.
The significance of modern learning environments which are
based on information and communication technologies is still seen
as rather small. They may be regarded as relevant to the learning of
young people and adults. This view is interesting and noteworthy, for
example for the fact that the common assumption has been that these
environments are, in a way, the domain of the new generation and
typical of the information society.
The experts were also requested to evaluate the change in the sig-
nificance of learning environments.
It is not surprising that the significance of information and com-
munication technology based learning environments is evaluated as
high. On the other hand, the role of the electronic mass media can be
considered interesting. Although the role of television, for example,
has been observed in other surveys, the role of the electronic mass
media is evaluated as exceptionally strong in this research. This can
be explained by several factors. Firstly, the concept of lifelong learn-
ing has been interpreted comprehensively. Secondly, people have a
fixed and steady relationship with these types of media. Furthermore,
it is difficult to deny the fact that the versatile supply of the electronic
mass media provides an excellent opportunity to learn new things.
The research data also indicated the evaluators’ view that learn-
ing at work has increased. During the period of school-like theoretical
vocational learning it has been found that many things are learned
faster and more specifically in close proximity to work. This is the
case, especially in the area of vocational further training which, as
such, is an example of vocational education’s orientation towards
lifelong learning. The connection between work and learning has
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been markedly strengthened by the simulation and virtual solutions
based on the latest information and communication technologies.
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE TO LIFELONG
LEARNING DISCUSSIONS
National traditions and cultural heritage are significant to the posi-
tion of school and the family as educational institutions and, conse-
quently, as  learning environments that support lifelong learning. In
the Finnish debate, for example, the frequently repeated notion of the
rapidly declining role of school as a learning environment is not sig-
nificantly supported by wider European views. Clearly, it has been
difficult to define the family’s position as a learning environment. As
formal education has expanded, it has not always been seen neces-
sary to ponder the role of the family as a learning environment, quan-
titatively or in terms of the content. With the development directed
towards better private learning environments, the role of the family
will acquire an entirely new dimension.
When assessing the contribution of the European perspective to
the national discussion on lifelong learning one must also remember
that, from a global perspective, there are no essential differences in the
preconditions of the various EU countries, for example. This is also
proven by the ease with which people accept the EU’s education po-
litical messages as basic principles for a national education policy,
even within the constraints of lifelong learning. This development is
natural and partly necessary in a Europe that is becoming integrated
in other respects. This issue is the comprehensive functionality of the
integration.
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part four
challenges and policies

Global Challenges and
 National Answers
FRANK WEBSTER
It is now commonplace for commentators to state – as a matter of plain
fact – that today we inhabit an “Information Society”. Grander still,
Manuel Castells (1996–1998) has titled his massive and influential
trilogy the Information Age. While it is easy to appreciate that, at least
in very general terms, these concepts capture something of the reality
of the contemporary situation it also must be admitted that it is ex-
tremely difficult to say, with any precision of definition, just what is
meant by an “Information Society”. For instance, is it an economic
phenomenon (where the monetary worth of information is telling)?
Or is it a matter of changed occupations (where increased numbers of
people are employed in informational jobs such as teaching and re-
search)? Or is it, more straight-forwardly, distinguished by the preva-
lence of information and communications technologies (and thus a
matter of technology)? Is it more to do with spatial relations (such that
the “flows” of information between “networks” of people and places
are the critical variable)? Or is it a cultural issue (where what matters
is the explosion of symbols and signs in television, fashion, design
and so on)?  Or is the “information society”  something which is char-
acterised by a shift away from “practical” towards “theory” (hence a
society in which abstract models shape social destiny)?
Each of these conceptions has been forwarded by serious and
thoughtful scholars – and each has, in turn, been contested by equally
serious thinkers.
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Of course, the pragmatist will insist that the “information soci-
ety” is a composite of all of these elements. Perhaps it is hoped thereby
to advance analysis rather than getting stuck in debates about defini-
tions. Unfortunately, however, pragmatism does not help very much,
since the question must then be put: if it is a composite, just how is the
“information society” composed? Is it primarily economic, cultural or
occupational? Or does technology stand as the most significant factor
in its constitution? With such questions, we come face-to-face with
the paradox: however confidently people may assert that we inhabit
an “information society”, we are in considerable confusion when it
comes to defining the concept with any exactitude.
I have written extensively about this imprecision of definition
elsewhere (Webster 1995). I have done this not to score points in an
academic game, but to challenge the ready presumption that this “in-
formation society” is something distinctively and self-evidently new
in human history. If something cannot be accurately distinguished,
then it is accordingly rather difficult to assert that it is novel. Asking
sceptical questions about how commentators characterise the “infor-
mation society”, is also to stop in their tracks those who are overly-
enthusiastic in announcing the arrival of a new and radically differ-
ent type of society.
Actually, it is my belief that the continuities in society today are at
least as significant as are the novelties. There is a great deal more in-
formation in circulation nowadays, and this plays an unprecedented
part in everyday affairs, but  very familiar forces continue to tell even
in the vastly expanded informational domain. The presence of these
established phenomenon must raise doubts about the credibility of
the argument that the “information age” is something markedly new.
If there is more information around, but this information remains
under the control of long-established forces, then there are surely
good reasons to doubt claims that we are entering a new era. Accord-
ingly, such sceptical reasoning may well lead people to resist endors-
ing the argument that we live now in an “information age”, and –
more serious still – to doubt its corollary, that adaption to this novel
situation is a necessity.
In this chapter I want to put issues of definition to the side, so that
I may focus on more compelling matters. I say, “to the side”, only be-
cause discerning readers will be able to see that, even in the substan-
tive discussion which follows, definitional issues are, in fact, con-
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stantly in play. My major concern in the next few pages is to ask: what
is happening in the world today,  particularly with regard to the more
advanced and affluent  societies of Europe, North America and the
Far East?  What are the major contours of development and what op-
tions and constraints do these trends present? As I address these
question, it will be seen that information is indeed central to what is
taking place, though I doubt that talk of an “information society”
does very much to illuminate what is actually going on.
GLOBALISATION
High on any list of pertinent developments must be the phenomenon
of globalisation and its associated traits. Globalisation refers to the
increased - and accelerating - processes of interpenetration and inter-
dependency of relations on to a world scale, relationships in which
time and space are “compressed”. Relationships - industrial, finan-
cial, intellectual - are conducted across and draw on a global stage,
and every one of us is influenced by these trends, whether it is in
terms of the foods we eat in our homes, the ways in which we work, or
the media we see and hear. Of course, this is a tendential and complex
process, and there is plenty of life which remains intensely local, but
there can be little argument about the realities of globalisation. Its
roots lie in the distant past, traceable at least to the 16th century and
the beginnings of colonial exploration, when the spatial divisions of
the world began to be overcome. The temporal barriers were later in
being lowered, but today we do indeed have “real-time” activities
operating around the world, making it possible to conduct affairs
across distance more or less immediately.
Globalisation ought not to be seen a straight-forwardly homog-
enising force. One argument has it that American corporations espe-
cially have foisted upon the world their ways of conduct and their
ways of seeing, leading to an “Americanisation” of life across the
globe.  This is the familiar theme of Coca-Colonisation. Against this,
other commentators observe that globalisation is much more compli-
cated than a one-way flow. They suggest that it brings hybridisation
of cultures, a result of mixtures of cultures and massive movements of
peoples, something  evident in the wide range of cuisines available in
any sizable city around the world, in ethnic fashions combined with
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indigenous styles found just about everywhere, in the remarkable
popularity, say , of reggae music across the globe.
It would be short-sighted to ignore this pluralism that has accom-
panied globalisation. But it is equally naive to suggest that globali-
sation does not reflect power differentials which do, in large part,
impel considerable homogenisation. Think, for example, of the finan-
cial networks which now traverse the globe, and one must concede
that these fit in with, and express, the domination of Western organi-
sations. Again, the globalisation of manufacture has not led to signifi-
cant hybridity – the lion’s share goes to large-scale corporations that
have their bases in Europe, North America and Japan. And, while it is
true that music draws on many influences from many places, no-one
can deny that it is British and American practices which account for
the most part of popular music at least.
What I am insisting on here is that globalisation, while it is an
extraordinarily complex phenomenon does, for the most part, shape
the world in ways which bring it into conformity with Western ways.
In saying this, let me stress that I do not wish to suggest that bringing
the world into line with Western ways has brought stability. On the
contrary, another major feature of globalisation is an intensification
of competition, as once separate realms are brought into relation with
others, and this impels deep uncertainty, and an acceleration of
change itself as well as allowing many expressions of hybrid cultural
forms (Lash and Urry 1987). What I do want to emphasise here is that
globalisation expresses, above all else, the triumph of what one might
call “business civilisation”. By this (and by its synonym, “market
civilisation”) I want to underline that the world, however much vari-
ety we may witness in it, has been brought together under a common
set of principles which have been historically most closely associated
with the West. These principles include:
•  Ability to pay will be the major criteria determining provision of
goods and services.
•  Provision will be made on the basis of private rather than public
supply.
•  Market criteria – i.e. whether something makes a profit or loss - is
the primary factor in deciding what, if anything, is made avail-
able.
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•  Competition – as opposed to regulation – is regarded as the most
appropriate mechanism for organising economic affairs.
•  Commodification of activities – i.e. relationships are regarded as
being amenable to price valuations – is the norm.
•  Private ownership of property is favoured over state holdings.
•  Wage labour is the chief mechanism for organising work activi-
ties.
To be sure, these are idealisations of what happens in practice,
but what seems to be unarguable is that these principles have spread
round the globe at a accelerated pace in recent decades.
There are complex reasons why this should be so, and there re-
main to this day important pockets of resistance to their spread, but it
appears to me that we have witnessed the massive intrusion of “busi-
ness civilisation” in recent years. This has been, it may be empha-
sized, both an intensive as well as an extensive affair. Intensive in so
far as market practices have enormously intruded into areas of inti-
mate life hitherto relatively immune even in the West. One thinks here,
for instance, of child rearing (the plethora of diverting toys and televi-
sion for the young), of the provision of everyday foodstuff (just about
everyone nowadays is reliant on the supermarket for food, while not
so long ago many families self-provided, at least in large part,
through gardens and allotments which allowed vegetables to be
grown and useful animals to be reared), and of the decline of self-pro-
viding activities such as dress making and knitting (cf. Seabrook
1982).
Extensively, of course, we may instance the spread of global-
isation, a process which has colonised many areas that previously
were self-supporting. The obvious, if under-estimated, instance of
this is the elimination of the peasantry from most quarters of the earth.
This, by far the majority of the world’s population throughout re-
corded time, is now on the eve of destruction. And the reason is clear:
the peasantry is antipathetic to market civilisation. Peasants are
largely self-supporting, they are sceptical of technological innova-
tion, resistant to wage labour, and distanced from market organisa-
tion. As such, their ways of life have been diminished by what Kevin
Robins and myself (1999) refer to as the “enclosure” of the earth by
business practices, by which we mean the incorporation of activities
once outside into the routines of the business realm.
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Should there be some readers who perceive, on reading this, a
nostalgia for times before the triumph of capitalism, let me stress a
number of things. First of all, the penetration of market mechanisms
does not, by any means, mean that there is hardship amongst con-
sumers. On the contrary, for those with the wherewithal, reliance on
the store for one’s foods is preferable to the dreary round of home bak-
ing, and having to endure ill-fitting and unfashionable clothing. Sec-
ond, the peasantry has been destroyed by various methods. Repres-
sion and dispossession certainly, but probably of more consequence
has been the pull of the market society, offering change and opportu-
nities that the peasant way of life could never match. Finally, no-one
should refer to the success of capitalism without acknowledging the
failure of its major rival, communism. Politically discredited, commu-
nism also failed in economic matters, being incapable of matching the
dynamism of the West. Together these are important qualifications to
any account which might imply regret about the triumph of  business
civilisation. Nonetheless, what must be accepted is that capitalism
has won out, and its success has meant that the world has been en-
closed within its orbit, within its ways of organisation.
I would also emphasise that this success – of what has been
called, appropriately, the “neo-liberal consensus”, to underscore the
ways in which this is the foundational principle of all governments
around the world nowadays – represents no return to a former capi-
talist age. Not least, globalisation has ensured that there is no going
back to the days of laissez-faire. Much of business civilisation is fa-
miliar, and would be recognised by 19th century free traders, but it is
undeniably now in new circumstances. Prominent amongst these is
the presence of corporations with global reach which, if they are en-
gaged in intense and rivalrous competition amongst themselves, ex-
clude from but the fringes of activity the small-scale entrepreneurs.
Today’s capitalism is one dominated by huge corporations – the likes
of General Motors, Shell, Matsushita, and Siemens – with breath-tak-
ing research and development budgets (often in excess of a billion
dollars per annum), international leverage, and world-wide market-
ing campaigns (Dicken 1992). In addition, global capitalism today is
linked in real time by world financial markets – markets which trade
in excess of a trillion dollars every day – the size and speed of which
is unprecedented, and the consequences of which have been evident
in massive upheavals of national economies such as Russia, Malay-
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sia, Mexico and Spain in the1990s. Again, today’s capitalism is one
which exercises global reach in many aspects of its operation, as wit-
ness the tendencies towards, and practices of, the world marketing of
products, international divisions of labour, and creation of global
brands.
Nevertheless, while I am at pains here to emphasise the novel fea-
tures of the current era, it seems to me essential that we appreciate that
these are consolidations and extensions of long-established princi-
ples. That is, today’s global economy represents the spread and
growth of capitalist ways of behaviour – witness the increased use of
market mechanisms, of private rather than public provision, of profit-
ability as the raison détre of organisations, of wage labour, and of the
ability to pay principle as the determinant of goods and services sup-
ply. In short, the “global network society” in which we find ourselves
today expresses the continuation - transmutation if one prefers - of
long-held capitalist principles.
DECLINE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
Of the many consequences of these trends, one I think stands out
above all others. This is the fact of the relative decline of the economic
sovereignty of nations. Bluntly, governments have relatively less ca-
pacity to control the national economy than they formerly did. This is
not to say that governments are helpless when it comes to exercising
influence over economic behaviour within their own territories (cf.
Held et al. 1999). Governments still maintain considerable power
over those economic activities which are restricted to their territories.
However, in this age of twenty-four hour per day electronic financial
flows, when world stock markets are constantly trading in foreign
currencies to the tune of billions upon billions of dollars, then the
nation state must feel increased pressure to maintain the “confi-
dence” of these markets. The evidence is plain for all to see: where a
country loses the confidence of the world financial markets, then its
economic strength rapidly collapses, as witness the disinvestments
from the Far East in 1998 and several nations before that. Further, the
global capitalist economy, one in which global corporations are the
major players, is astonishingly difficult to trace to any clearly-identi-
fiable national economy. What, for instance, constitutes the British
economy? Do companies such as Nissan or Rover – significant em-
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ployers within the country – represent the British economy because
they have plant here, though they are owned by non-British parents
and their stockholders come from around the world (and trading in
these stocks is a ceaseless activity)? Much the same might be asked of
Nokia: it seems quintessentially Finnish, and is certainly important
in the employment of Finns, yet its ownership comes nowadays pre-
dominantly from outside the nation. Furthermore, many corporations
which straddle the globe not only have a diverse ownership struc-
ture, they are also hard to identify straight-forwardly as belonging to
a particular nation because so much of their activity is undertaken
outside the “home” nation.
Put simply, there are nowadays serious questions to be asked
about the capacity of national governments to control their nation’s
economy because of the pressures to conform to global market prac-
tices, and these are compounded by problems of identifying who
owns a company and to what extent it might be identified as belong-
ing to a particular country. One result of this has been a general acqui-
escence from governments to the fact that they cannot do much to
plan their economy. Of course, conservative governments have long
had faith that their nation would thrive so long as they left the
economy alone, so this has not presented them with particular chal-
lenges. It has been social democratic regimes that have most had to
change their ways. Their former inclination towards collectivist poli-
cies  - for example nationalisation of key sectors of industry - has been
stifled in the 1990s, and they have had to accept the “neo-liberal con-
sensus” if they intend to avoid rapid fiscal crisis.
EDUCATION, EDUCATION, EDUCATION
But if the economy cannot be touched by government, then just what
are politicians to do? One key policy has led to a prioritisation of edu-
cation, and the reasoning behind this is easy to understand. The ar-
gument goes that most people attend the education systems of the
nation in which they are born. Therefore, government has leverage in
this realm, if not in the economy. Now, in this free-wheeling global
market economy in which we find ourselves, it is estimated that about
20% of all the available jobs will go to those who occupy the upper
levels of this system. These are what the most significant proponent of
this account, Robert Reich (1992), calls “symbolic analysts” – i.e.
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those whose work involves deal-making, communication, manage-
ment and such like – in the world economy. Manuel Castells (1998),
adopting the same reasoning, identifies this as “informational la-
bour”, which he estimates at 30 % of jobs in OECD countries, those
which oil the wheels of this “network economy” by organising, de-
signing, trading and innovating.
Let me emphasise that “informational labour” is a widely differ-
entiated group, ranging from highly creative film makers to profes-
sional accountants, but it does share two characteristics. The first is a
capacity to change itself, and to adapt to change, as a matter of rou-
tine. Informational labour is always on the alert for novelty and new
learning, constantly up-dating its skills – traits essential for prosper-
ity in today’s highly competitive global economy. A constant refrain
here is the need for “flexibility”, and symbolic analysts have this
quality in abundance. The second characteristic informational la-
bour shares is a crucial contributor to this adaptability – high level
education, not in a specific skill, but in a capacity to “self-pro-
gramme” (or, in language popular in British policy circles, in having
“learned how to learn” and thereby become equipped for “lifelong
learning”). Attendance at higher education institutions cultivates the
“transferable skills” so essential to symbolic analysts because these
are what is required by the global market economy that is intensively
dynamic. Indeed, no learning, at however high a level, is nowadays
likely to last more than a decade or so - except for the capacity to re-
educate oneself in readiness for meeting the challenges of constant
change.
So what does this mean for national governments? The answer is
that a government which can command a disproportionate share of
this 20-30% of top jobs worldwide, may deem itself successful be-
cause large numbers of its citizens will be in well-paid and rewarding
occupations. And what government can do towards meeting the
challenge of the “information age” is encourage first rate educational
services so that large numbers of its young people emerge with quali-
ties required by the global economy. Such is precisely the reasoning
articulated by Robert Reich before and during his service as Secretary
of State for Labor in the Clinton administration (1992-1996). And be-
cause the same refrain is echoed by Prime Minister Tony Blair in his
ambition to make “London the knowledge capital of Europe” by
prioritising “education, education, education”, the British New La-
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bour government has been described as “Reichian” in its outlook.
The policy means that one can resign oneself to the play of market
forces at the global and national level by placing the onus of policy on
producing the “human capital” that most appeals to this world sys-
tem.
Incidentally, those nations that lack the necessary educational
infrastructure will be doomed to supplying the workers who are to be
acted upon by the symbolic analysts. In addition, there is likely to be
serious internal stratification within even prosperous nations, since
those people who fail to take advantage of the fine education avail-
able in nations such as the USA and Britain, are likely to suffer badly
in this era of informational capitalism. For a start, the old options –
semi and unskilled labour in factories and coal mines – are increas-
ingly not available, not least because information labour has ar-
ranged for much of these to be automated and/or to be undertaken
abroad. After all, while the under-educated in metropolitan states
may be poor as compared to their countrymen, in comparison to the
labour forces in China and the Philippines, they are expensive to hire,
and these days informational labour is quite adept at organising
things so that necessary non-skilled work is conducted at far dis-
tances.
Thus a distinct prospect is for further polarisation of classes
within relatively advantaged nations: while government does its best
to encourage informational labour that appeals to the global eco-
nomic system, should it try to implement measures that militate
against polarisation by redistributing resources to the under-achiev-
ing, then it risks losing the confidence of the world’s markets which
frown on policies which introduce “distortions”, just as it is likely to
estrange the successful symbolic analysts who resent high taxation
(and who are often capable of migrating with their high-level skills).
Indeed, politicians will need to negotiate a fine balance between sati-
ating global capital and meeting the reluctance of the better off to pay
taxes, while also ensuring that the social fabric of the nation remains
sturdy enough to appeal to investors and the symbolic analysts who
need to be persuaded to stay inside the nation. After all, if an
“underclass” develops to an extent that the quality of life of the afflu-
ent is threatened (unsafe areas of the city, high levels of street crime
and the like), then however sophisticated are electronic defence sys-
tems (commentators make much of the spread of CCTV systems in the
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inner city, of the “gated communities” which insulate the well-off
[Blakely and Snyder 1997]), significant numbers of advantaged peo-
ple will leave (European readers who are sceptical might reflect here
on their reaction to the fact that, in the United States, around ten thou-
sand people die annually from handguns; in European nations the
equivalent figures rarely rise above two dozen). For the most able
symbolic analysts Geneva might appeal more than Los Angeles if vio-
lent crime especially continues to grow. It is precisely this fear which
drove Robert Reich to advocate what might be called post-Reagan
policies for the USA in the 1990s. The poor cannot be “thrown to the
vagaries of the market if the social fabric is to be maintained, so so-
cially-ameliorative policies are recommended, but these must be mild
enough not to incur the displeasure of the better off or global capital.
CULTURE
It is very easy to give all of one’s attention to the economic forces in
play, and to the policies adopted by governments which try to gain
relative advantage in this new situation. However, the cultural di-
mensions of the current epoch ought not to be ignored because they
too are of enormous consequence. When I refer to culture I wish to
point especially to the symbolic realm of life, that arena which feeds
into one’s identity and consciousness. I should like here to identify
four issues that pose enormous challenges to nations - and indeed the
entire world – today.
Globalized Media
Globalisation profoundly challenges the well established practice of
national broadcast media. In evidence one might point to the techno-
logical innovations which bring us satellite television services as
well as the Internet while by-passing national frontiers. But one
needs to add that, since national broadcast systems, at least those
outside the United States, have been brought to us largely by state-
funded organisations, these have felt the destructive impact of a
changed climate of opinion. State-sponsored systems are out of step
with today’s stress on private rather than public provision of serv-
ices, and accordingly where they survive they have to face continued
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diminution of their revenue as well as competitive pressures from
commercial suppliers. Digitalisation of television, as well as addi-
tional terrestrial channels and cable services, for instance, will mean
that it will become increasingly difficult for state-funded television to
justify its funding.
In addition, the ethos which came to justify such services, at least
in social democratic societies, was the doctrine of public service
broadcasting, one which was conceived as a national service to be de-
livered by public servants who were imbued with a vocation to pro-
mote in broadcasting “information, education and entertainment”
(as went the famous formulation of the founding Director General of
the BBC, Lord Reith).  Today, this is regarded on many fronts as unac-
ceptably elitist as well as antipathetic to commercial services where
entertainment prevails. The old-fashioned services produced pro-
grammes about which audiences had little or no choice, audiences
getting what they were given in return for an obligatory tax on tv
ownership – nowadays such form of supply is seen as unaccountable
to those who pay for the service. Again, the programme makers
tended to be highly educated and from privileged backgrounds, ones
which predisposed them towards programming which stressed
“worthy” and “educational” output – this today is regarded with
suspicion, as being out of touch with the consumer’s right to have the
programming which he or she desires. Moreover, public service
broadcasting rather presumed that it could engage the entire nation
in a “conversation with itself”. The BBC (British Broadcasting Corpo-
ration), in this regard, might be seen to have contributed to a “public
sphere”, broadcasting to the whole country, where, through diverse
programming, the nation could come to see itself in its variety as well
as its distinctiveness. This “public sphere” devoted a large amount of
air time to coverage of news and current affairs (at least double that
provided by commercial channels in the U.K.), since, ran the argu-
ment, a genuine public service ought to privilege information about
political (public) affairs. Moreover, the BBC also endeavoured to ex-
pand on this commitment to promote high quality coverage of  drama,
documentary and even music.
Today, one may readily understand that these days of public serv-
ice broadcasting as well as a single public sphere are numbered
(Tracey 1998). For a start, there are many legitimate critiques which
highlight the failures of the former system: this public sphere as often
excluded as it included, as often projected a narrow view of the nation
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as it did a plural one. Anyway, “narrowcasting” is ensuring that the
notion of a national audience is collapsing – instead there are many
segmented audiences,  occupied with specialist interests, often re-
ceiving their programming from abroad.
The question then is, does one relinquish television to the world
market?  This may turn out to be the future reality whatever govern-
ments may desire, and, while the short-term will surely see the as-
cendancy of transnational organisations such as Rupert Murdoch’s
satellite channels, Star TV and MTV, the spread of internet-type serv-
ices may offer a good deal of diverse programming even where it is
organised on commercial terms.
A second question raises the matter of the public sphere, and with
it that matters of identity. In the old days of public service broadcast-
ing, it was presumed that the nation could be addressed more or less
collectively, and, at least to a degree, citizens of a given country could
see a reflection of themselves in those sorts of programming. Today,
one might more accurately talk of the development of multiple public
spheres, of many means by which people may be informed and enter-
tained, either through television or computerised networks. Some
thinkers contend that this can be a positive force for extending plural-
ism, with more opportunities for the participation of citizens and for
their reception of a more diverse sort of programming.
But there must also be anxieties expressed about the potential for
fragmentation of identities and outlooks this may bring. For if the
prospect is of multiple sites of information, and of people receiving
highly diverse programming in the privacy of their own homes, then
how might a national consciousness be addressed? How might citi-
zens speak to fellow citizens? To be sure, one might reply that in the
past such a practice has been deeply divisive, homogenising very dif-
ferent peoples and proving incapable of catering for the diversity of a
nation’s population. Yet the ambition to talk as a nation disappears
with “narrowcasting” and, while there may be gains in terms of the
individual or at the small scale level (the football fan in London can
readily access his team in Barcelona, the Turk in Berlin keep in touch
with his ethnic community in Istanbul), there may too be put at risk
the ability to conceive of a nation as a phenomenon with a collective
consciousness.
But perhaps things will not turn out so negatively. John Keane
(1998) suggests that what might develop is a multiple level of “public
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spheres”: an extension at the supra-national level (e.g. trans-
European television services, even global programming), the continu-
ation of national broadcasting systems (even in commercial form, but
also in terms of services which remain reliant on public funding), as
well as a proliferation of localised (if global in reach) and specialised
services which might link specialist communities. In such ways, the
optimist suggests, the complexities of identity in today’s world might
be attended to, with citizens capable of reaching out beyond their
own country for some matters (perhaps to think of themselves as Eu-
ropean in particular ways), turning to their own nation for others,
while always able to fulfil particular informational requirements by
the proliferating specialist services – for instance, “I am a European,
but am also Hungarian, while simultaneously an ethnic Jew who has
a particular interest in the fortunes of Inter-Milan football club”. Per-
haps it is such “multivocalism” that is most consonant with the
postmodern culture characteristic of the globalised capitalism amidst
which we live. For sure, national governments will be called upon to
negotiate the difficult terrain of this new media map.
Place image
Historically places have always been important, but the reason for
their importance seems to be changing. In the past, places were im-
portant largely because of their physical location – for instance, Gi-
braltar commanding the entry to the Mediterranean, Cairo the mouth
of the Nile. In recent times, this physical reason for the importance of
place is in decline, to be replaced by the primacy of “image”. This
stems, of course, from the fact that space has been, in large part, di-
minishing in significance. When, for example, one may organise af-
fairs through telecommunications connections, then the former rea-
sons for location are of less precedence.
However, this is not to say that places are no longer important.
Not at all. For a start, this global network economy requires that there
are central switching points, what open might conceive of “nodes”
amidst the world’s information circuits.  Several scholars have, in
this regard, pointed to the emergence of “global cities” – pre-emi-
nently London, New York, Los Angeles and Tokyo – as locations
where are congregated key world players such as corporate head-
quarters, key government departments, financial services, media and
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marketing centres. With these come the essential occupational
groups, composed heavily of symbolic analysts, whose work calls for
their location close to “where the action is”. However, what is inter-
esting is that these places attain, and aspire towards, particular im-
agery – as action-packed, as galvanising, as powerful, as centres of
cultural innovation and availability. A crucial point is that these
places do not automatically attain a particular image, but this im-
agery requires active involvement to be developed - and the wrong
image may have negative effects on the prosperity of a place. For these
reasons, what we are witnessing is great investment being made in
the imagery of places – because it can have very real consequences for
jobs and positioning in the global economy.
The point can be made negatively easily enough. Consider, for
instance, Johannesburg in South Africa, a city located in a potentially
strategic nation for African development, blessed with rich natural
resources, and in a region with good quality educational institutions.
It also happens, however, to be projecting an image of being crime-
infested and dangerous, scarcely the place to draw the symbolic ana-
lysts and investors of global capital. One might also instance the case
of Birmingham in this regard, Britain’s second biggest city, and one
developed through industrialism (more precisely engineering) and
its location at the centre of canals, railways and roads in the 18th
and19th centuries. De-industrialisation has led to a massive collapse
in traditional employment in manual occupation, while much of the
place-image was dull and boring, a city ill-suited to change and
weighed down with out-dated industry. But over the past two dec-
ades or so huge investments have been made in reinventing Birming-
ham – to which end the centre of the city centre has been radically
overhauled (to stress its civic grandeur as well as fine cultural facili-
ties - its theatres, its orchestras, its conference and performance ven-
ues), its multiculturalism has been heavily publicised to stress Bir-
mingham’s capacity to adapt to and precipitate change as well as to
offer huge varieties of experience, its canals have been rescued from
industrial decay and abandonment to become walkways into the
heart of a city of around 1.5 million citizens, its airport developed to
become an international service, media organisations encouraged,
universities expanded, and so forth. The upshot has been a massive
expansion of service employment, the increased attraction of Bir-
mingham to entrepreneurial informational labour, and a heightened
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role as a hub in the British, European and world networks along
which affairs are conducted. In this regard, consider also the situa-
tion of Budapest, a large central European city of unsurpassed archi-
tectural beauty and with a rich history of music and the arts. How-
ever, it is a city that is, relatively, little known on a world stage, since it
has been distanced from the world’s media and incapable, in the
Communist era, of projecting itself in desirable ways. This is likely to
change, though it will take enormous amounts of energy to
“reinvent” Budapest – to establish the communications infrastruc-
ture necessary for success, from roads and air transport to media sys-
tems, to an open, innovative and stable commercial sector.
The general point that place image is of heightened importance
may be better appreciated beyond consideration of metropolitan cen-
tres. Tourism, one of the world’s biggest industries, puts an enormous
premium on imagery. The likes of Greece and Spain are heavily de-
pendent on carefully crafted and assiduously maintained images for
around 30 % of total employment. Few believe the myths of “authen-
ticity” that are projected (“unspoilt” places, “genuine” people and
the like), but still these places draw tourists in significant part be-
cause they project a particular sort of imagery – of their folk cultures,
their cuisines, their hospitality, their safety, etc. This imagery does not
appear by happen chance; it must be worked upon if it is to continue
and be capable of adopting to ever-changing requirements. Govern-
ments – national, regional, supranational and local – will undoubt-
edly be called upon to play a central role in this recreation.
Heightened cosmopolitanism
The accelerated globalisation that has taken place over recent years
brings with it a generalised heightening of cosmopolitanism. This is
evident, for example, in the increased awareness of different cultures
and histories that comes from world-wide media (which is not to say
that this coverage is in any way representative). But cosmopolitanism
stems from many other factors too – from awareness of the increas-
ingly international origins of products, from knowledge that one’s
work activities draw in many other countries, from the massive
growth in foreign travel (of both work and tourism), from interaction
with migrants from many different cultures, from the rapid develop-
ment of English as the de facto lingua franca around the world
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(which eases communication between members of minority linguistic
groups), from daily consumption of foods bought in the local super-
market which come from all corners of the earth...
This heightened cosmopolitanism must be one of the most impor-
tant characteristics of living at the dawn of the second millennium.
However, the experiences of cosmopolitanism are not equally distrib-
uted. The relatively privileged symbolic analysts are amongst the
most cosmopolitan of all groups. After all, they are routinely in touch
with people from around the world (via the internet, business travel,
because they work in metropolitan – and thereby variegated – centres,
by their capacity to enjoy the fruits of multicultural life [the restau-
rants, the cinema and theatre etc.]), and thereby comfortable with va-
riety and differences between peoples.
This might be contrasted with the experiences of those, dispro-
portionately concentrated in the least advantaged sectors of society,
who feel most threatened by globalisation. These are the groups
whose employment prospects are uncertain and whose options are
limited, whose ways of life are challenged by the extension of the glo-
bal market, who find globalisation not an opportunity but an anath-
ema which promises to uproot everything once thought secure. Not
surprisingly perhaps, these  who are threatened are readily drawn to
fundamentalisms of one sort or another (militant Islam, born again
Christianity, neo-Fascism, deep ecology) because fundamentalism
gives certainty in an uncertain world. Fundamentalism provides a
faith in established creeds, offering a “return” to a secure and certain
order which has appeal especially to those who are unsettled by the
global market’s dynamic.
At least two things are striking about this situation.  The first is
that those attracted to fundamentalism are found in every nation of
the world, but especially amongst the most marginal. The second is
that fundamentalisms articulate a creed that is the very opposite of
the cosmopolitanism of the wider society (though fundamentalists
are not averse to using the latest technologies to advance their views).
By, for instance, evoking a mythical past (of national history, race or
religion), fundamentalism sets itself against the internationalism of
the more fortunate members of society. Moreover, a good deal of fun-
damentalism is extremely dangerous, expressing itself in racist at-
tacks, or in terrorism and civil conflict, aimed as a rule at minority eth-
nic groups or an imagined enemy (the “great Satan” of the West). The
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most disturbing expression of it in Europe in recent years has been the
waves of “ethnic cleansing” in the former Yugoslavia, directed at mi-
nority populations in the name of a mythically pure nation and na-
tional identity.
What one might project from this potential polarisation between
those who are more cosmopolitan and those who are unsettled by
globalisation is  that conflicts between nations will decline. This is a
remarkable phenomenon, since wars for most of the past several cen-
turies, have been between nations over territory. This form of warfare
seems to be receding, to be replaced by conflicts between groups
within nations (when one, for instance, proclaims that it epitomises
the “true” national creed, something which requires the expulsion of
foreign, contaminated and contaminating, “outsiders” – who may
well have lived inside the nation for centuries) and across national
boundaries (where a bond is forged between fundamentalisms
against a common enemy). As we are witnessing in Kosovo, and be-
fore this in Bosnia and Croatia, these challenges are formidable to
nations as well as to the wider international community.
Migration
Globalisation presupposes the movement of peoples as well as infor-
mation. And how pleasant travel is for those of us blessed with credit
cards, prepaid flights, and the promise of well-paid employment, Still
more enjoyable is it to be a tourist, to visit other parts of the world at
one’s leisure, where one will be chaperoned, attended to, pampered...
We are familiar with this sort of migration: the visiting scholar, the
international businessman, the annual vacation in Antibe or
Marbella...
But of course this is but one part of migration. The other, a part
which has grown to unprecedented levels since 1945 and especially
since the 1980s, involves the poor who travel to find a better way of
life. Such migration is by no means new – think of the Irish who sailed
to the United States, forced out of their nation by famine in the mid-
19th century, or consider the Italian exodus from the South of that
country where the land could not offer a sufficiency... Nonetheless, in
recent decades migration has grown enormously, and most of it is for
reasons of economics. The world’s poor, wherever they are and when-
ever they can, migrate to where they might find better opportunities.
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For the most part, this means that peoples move from the South to-
wards the North (the majority, of course, do not move since migration
is a last-ditch option, and the majority who do move only make it to
the urban centres of their own nations, but still the impulse is evident
everywhere, and chiefly it is to try to make a better livelihood).
There are a great many consequences of this migration, but
Zygmunt Bauman (1998) puts his finger on perhaps the most telling.
In a world of high-level migration, the privileged are “tourists” who
are, as such, encouraged to travel freely and with pleasure, while
those at the bottom of the social heap are the “vagabonds”, are those
who are regarded as tramps and discontents who ought really to “re-
main where they come from”. In Bauman’s terms, the migrants from
the South are those who most disturb those in the (relatively) privi-
leged North - their skin colour is different, they dress differently, their
cultures do not conform to our own, their languages are incompre-
hensible... As such, Bauman continues, they are the nightmarish alter
egos of those free-travellers who are the beneficiaries of globalised
capitalism. Accordingly, they are a source of conflict and tension that
must be addressed.
I do not believe that we can wish away this conflict by saying that
people should simply be tolerant of one another. Of course, I earnestly
advocate this, but it is not enough. Migration is but one, important,
dimension, of a global market society which is subject to constant
change. Indeed, migration at the levels we experience today is a con-
comitant of this fluidity of advanced capitalism. However, this up-
heaval necessarily weakens the bonds that develop amongst stable
peoples, not least (if not only), by bringing into play others ways of
life, other backgrounds, other – strange – ways of behaving. Encoun-
tering others is surely an important stimulant for  innovation, and
one might welcome many aspects of other cultures experiences, yet
still a key issue then remains: how might people retain a sense of
commonality, of togetherness, while living with differences? What
are the bounds of tolerance? Where might the line be drawn between
sufficient difference to stimulate change while at the same time main-
taining constancy? This is indeed an extraordinary problematical is-
sue, and it is one which surely must be tackled by  many agencies, at
many levels from the local to the global, now and increasingly in the
future. If ever there was a global challenge which requires national
(and other) answers it is this: how might we live together amidst dif-
ferences?
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So What?
Reflections on the Study of
Information Society
KAARLE NORDENSTRENG
This chapter was first supposed to be an epilogue, highlighting the
central points of the bulky text. But then I realised that if the reader
has ploughed through the 10 chapters, he or she no longer needs tu-
toring about what to make of it all – a reader surviving this far is no
doubt mature enough to conclude for himself/herself, what the
meaning of “information society” or “informational societies”, in
short IS, really is.
 Nevertheless, I invite the reader to ask So What? And to answer
by focusing on what all this suggests about how to study the phenom-
ena of IS. In other words, we should now shift the perspective from the
phenomena themselves to the ways in which they are articulated in
academic disciplines – from the “real world” to the paradigms and
research traditions about the world. Such a meta-perspective in fact
suggests that we revert to the first chapter, where Antti Kasvio guided
us through the main traditions of academic thinking about IS, and in-
deed to the Preface, where Erkki Karvonen reminded us about the
great stories of historical revolutions, the latest of which is crucially
made by information.
However, this epilogue is no place to continue discussing the
merits of various research traditions. I shall simply offer some ideas
for conducting and organising academic studies so that the challenge
raised by the preceding chapters will be adequately met in universi-
ties – both in our Finnish reality (and in similar western European
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conditions), and in the Hungarian reality (and in similar Central/
East European conditions). My reflections are presented from two
angles to the contemporary academic institutions: Why is IS worth
studying? How should studies of IS be organised?
The reasons for studying IS can be listed under four headings:
 1) history, 2) economy, 3) information, 4) society. In short, my thesis is
that, especially in contemporary journalism and media studies, IS
can save society from falling between the fashionable chairs of cul-
ture and technology.
The ways to study IS, on the other hand, can be summarised by
1) placing emphasis on sociology and political economy, i.e. on macro
paradigms instead of countless micro perspectives, and by 2) ensur-
ing that the studies are conducted from a broad interdisciplinary
platform, while on the other hand not creating an intellectual gou-
lash.
WHY TO STUDY IS?
“One cannot eat information” is a standard argument against those
who have made IS into hype. Indeed, even the most advanced post-
industrial societies remain dependent on a lot of physical labour, and
dreams such as telework reducing traffic and electronic management
eliminating paper are far from materialising. The car and paper in-
dustries have not collapsed; on the contrary, traffic and pollution
problems are getting worse. Although the European Union is advo-
cating eEurope as a regional policy towards IS, and local initiatives
such as eTampere follow suit, it is important to be realistic about the
socio-economic developments, as highlighted by the chapter of
Raimo Blom, Harri Melin and Peter Robert.
Accordingly, one should be careful not to mystify IS and turn it
into an ideology, as is the tendency in national IS programmes exem-
plified by the Finnish case in Jari Aro’s chapter. On the other hand, we
should not become hyper-critical, either, and deny the significant
new aspects associated with IS. This topic simply cannot be over-
looked in contemporary social science. In this sense an answer to the
above question is self-evident: IS should be studied because it repre-
sents something that is vital in social development.
But my point goes beyond the merits of the IS developments them-
selves. I find IS quite useful, particularly in studies of journalism and
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mass communication, since it provides such intellectual material that
invites, indeed compells, a proper context for understanding the media.
The same could obviously be said from the point of view of other so-
cial sciences, but my arguments here are based on media studies.
History
First of all, IS suggests a broad outline of history – with waves and
revolutions, as noted in the editor’s Preface. My own introductory
course on communication has started since the early 1970s with a
perspective of communication “revolutions” (speech, writing, print-
ing, electronic) related to the fundamental socio-economic modes of
development (hunting-gathering, agriculture, trade, industry) and to
the respective socio-political systems (tribal, feudal, capitalist, social-
ist, democratic). In such a perspective IS has a natural and strategic
place, showing how all societies at all times have been to a degree
informational societies and how this aspect has lately grown in im-
portance.1
Consequently, this perspective helps to create and maintain a his-
torical frame of reference. History is all too easily overlooked in media
studies, which are typically dominated by the juicy elements of the
day – including media spectacles and new technologies understood
as part and parcel of IS itself. So I admit that IS has also nurtured an
unhealthy tendency towards a superficial notion of communication
as something a-historical. Armand Mattelart even suggests in his re-
cent book2  that IS and communication has replaced development as
the paradigm of endless progress, which in fact prevents us from see-
ing history beyond the past decade or two, thus leading us to a mental
“short circuit”. Yet, I am convinced that IS also feeds a healthy ten-
dency to highlight rather than cover up history.
Economy
Secondly, IS suggests an economic perspective. This includes the cus-
tomary breakdown of labour force into different types, with informa-
1. This paradigm was elaborated in my introductory textbook on journalism and mass
communication, with a section on “Information explosion”, published in Finnish in 1975
(Tiedotusoppi) and transtlated into Swedish, Danish and Hungarian in 1977.
2. Histoire de la société de l’information. Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 2001.
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tion processing as a growing sector in the occupational structure. But
information economy is much more, as Pál Tamás points out in his
chapter; it takes us back to the fundamentals of social relations – liter-
ally to the radical tradition in social sciences, including the classics of
Karl Marx et al. It was no coincidence that the OECD was among the
first to respond to the challenge of IS, known in the 1970s as “compu-
ter-telecommunication policy”. It is also symptomatic that IS issues in
the EU belong to a commissioner (Martin Bangemann, followed by
Erkki Liikanen) whose prime mandate is in trade and industry.
An economic perspective – both macro and micro – on IS enjoys
such wide support that there is no risk of economy being forgotten.
Rather there is a risk that the IS discourse invites “soft” culture to be
offset by “hard” economy. But considering again media studies in
general, it is obvious that economic aspects are overlooked and there-
fore IS serves as a welcome corrective measure. In fact, a cultural stud-
ies orientation in approaching the media has created such a heavy
emphasis on the symbolic level of media discourse that the material
level of media structure has been neglected. It is in this sense that I
welcome IS as a balancing factor in the paradigmatic struggle – to
ensure that political economy is not replaced by cultural studies.
Information
The nature of information and communication is not one of the
strongest parts of media research tradition. Actually it is a paradox
and anomaly that a discipline has pretty much bypassed the core of
the life phenomenon which it is supposed to examine. Likewise, the
scientific and administrative approaches to IS lack crystal clear defi-
nitions about what information is. There persists widespread confu-
sion between more or less technical information and human knowl-
edge, especially in languages such as Finnish, where the word for in-
telligent knowledge (“tieto”) has been adopted to refer to all kinds of
information, including computers (“tietokone”, literally “knowledge
machine”).
The confusion is so common, and the homework of media studies
so poorly done, that it is naturally exposed by IS. Therefore IS does
good for media studies – not directly by offering conceptual clarity
but indirectly by compelling the discipline to theorise about its core
concepts. Karvonen’s chapter reminds us all about his challenge.
283So what?
Society
Like information, society tends to be lost in media studies. This is es-
pecially true under the influence of cultural studies, which tend to
reduce society into a thin web of power relations. Similarly, technol-
ogy tends to distract attention from social relations and structures.
Here IS by its very nature serves as a corrective measure – as in the
case of economy. Society with its macro perspective is such an essen-
tial part of the IS idea that it cannot be missed even by cultural and
technological enthusiasts.
It goes without saying that there are different concepts and
schools of thought about the nature of society, and I do not suggest
that IS helps to solve this paradigmatic problem. However, it is al-
ready important that society is compelled to occupy a prominent
place in the agenda of research and study. Ironically this has to be
stated not only regarding media studies being pursued within the
humanities but also within the social sciences.
The whole field of social science today is in a problematic – some
would call it crazy – state of affairs, not least because of the increas-
ingly blurred boundaries with other fields of science. In this respect,
too, IS serves as a healthy catalyst for deconstructing the system of sci-
ences. Likewise, IS helps to avoid a separation of theory and practice
– to bring analytical reasoning and policy considerations to a com-
mon intellectual platform.
HOW TO STUDY IS?
The first answer to this question is to set priorities regarding the dis-
ciplines being studied: to ensure that society is not lost between vari-
ous exciting and fashionable elements such as new technologies, top
priority should be given to sociology. IS cannot be understood with-
out at least the fundamentals of general social science, in particular
what is known as macro-sociology and political economy.
This does not mean in practice that everyone must become stu-
dents of sociology. A rudimentary understanding can be achieved
even by one course, if it is built so as to cover both the philosophical
traditions of the past and the theoretical streams of the present, sup-
ported by an appropriate textbook.3
3. A comprehensive reader on social theories of the present is Understanding Contemporary
Society, edited by Gary Browning, Abigail Halcli and Frank Webster (London: SAGE, 2000).
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4. The Tempus project and the present textbook inspired its authors, particularly Harri
Melin, Erkki Karvonen and Kaarle Nordenstreng, to put together a set of classic texts,
which were translated into Hungarian and published as another volume of the project.
Later discussions with Frank Webster led to prepare a more comprehensive reader, which
will accompany the 2nd edition of his Theories of the Information Society.
Second to such a basic knowledge of sociology comes a course on
the “classics” in IS. In practice, this would be made up of readings of
those scholars and works listed in Kasvio’s introductory chapter –
from Karl Marx and Max Weber to Anthony Giddens and Manuel
Castells.4
Such a dose of basics helps the student to acquire a broad frame of
reference – to appreciate IS primarily in a macro perspective, without
being led astray by various micro approaches. The curriculum aims
at inspiring the student to construct a holistic picture of IS – to reach
beyond a postmodernist solution of fragmented landscape towards a
great narrative.
However, a preference for a  macro perspective and a big story
does not mean to feed the student with a uniform ideology. On the
contrary, a vital part of the pedagogy should be to engender critical
thinking about IS – a kind of sensitivity training on how to avoid be-
ing indoctrinated by political and technological forces.
Finally, the study of IS should be organised in a truly interdisci-
plinary way instead of being made into the bastion of a single school
of thought. On the other hand, like any interdisciplinary project, this
open platform should avoid going to the other extreme and becoming
so eclectic that depth is sacrified to breadth.
